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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with people's accounts of their direct 
encounters with paranormal phenomena. The discussion in the first 
three chapters sets out the reasons for an examination of these 
materials and the objectives of such an analysis, both in terms of 
sociological interests, and also in relation to parapsychology. 
In Chapters Four to Six I pursue specific analytic themes. 
In Chapters One and Two I outline an ethnomethodological approach 
to the study of accounts of anomalous experiences. Hitherto, 
parapsychological studies have used accounts as investigative 
resources to try to discover the 'facts' of reported experiences. 
On the other hand, sociologists have largely ignored personal 
accounts, and have 'explained' claimed experiences in terms of 
underlying social causes. Rejecting these two approaches, I examine 
the ways that speakers tacitly use language to describe their 
experiences, focusing in particular on the moral, inferential and 
constructive features of language use. 
In the empirical chapters I use a conversation analytic methodology 
to explicate some of the interactional tasks that are mediated 
through the design of specific utterances. In particular I examine 
some ways that speakers attend to the possibility that their account 
may receive a skeptical or unsympathetic hearing, and design their 
utterances to defuse arguments which could be adduced to undermine 
the verisimilitude of their reports. 
In Chapter Five I examine the ways that speakers address this broad 
range of interactional tasks through the design of utterances in 
which they recall their first impression of the onset of the 
phenomenon. In this analysis I argue that these formulations, which 
have traditionally been taken as indicating the operation of 




This thesis takes as its subject matter the way that people use 
language to describe direct, personal encounters with a range of 
anomalous or supernatural phenomena. It is therefore related to 
three areas of academic work: 
[a] parapsychology, the scientific study of paranormal events; 
[b] sociology, especially sociological investigations of 
involvement and belief in the paranormal; 
[c] contemporary approaches to the analysis of language use, 
especially those which are informed by broadly ethnomethodological 
arguments concerning the nature of the relationship between 
descriptive utterances and their referents, and the role of language 
in social life. 
" As this thesis deals with such a range of issues, I have employed 
a rather unconventional structure for the first two chapters. Instead 
of devoting a chapter firstly to parapsychology, then to sociolgy, in 
each of the first two chapters I try to draw together related themes 
and issues from both disciplines. 
In Chapter One, I trace a brief history of parapsychology. This 
begins by discussing the concerns and events which motivated initial 
efforts to establish the reality of psychical phenomena, and goes on 
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to sketch the development of parapsychology as a laboratory-based 
scientific discipline. Although parapsychology has achieved some 
recognition as a respectable scientific subject, its present status 
is precarious, and some researchers are beginning to challenge its 
fundamental assumptions. To illustrate this I introduce Blackmore's 
(1988a; 1988b) arguments that parapsychology should be concerned with 
actual experiences rather than conducting experimental studies to 
find evidence of psychic phenomena. She emphasises that such a 
research objective necessarily entails a greater emphasis upon the 
use of people's accounts as investigative resources. 
The primary purpose of this chapter, however, is to review the 
sociological research on belief in the existence of, and forms of 
involvement in, occult or supernatural phenomena. This research 
falls into two broad types, identified as the socio-correlative and 
the socio-cultural. The objective of the former is to identify the 
sociological and social-psychological correlates which are associated 
with various types of involvement in the occult. The results from 
these studies suggest that social 'marginality' and psychological 
vulnerability correlate strongly with claims to believe in or to have 
experienced supernatural events. The second line of research 
proposes that cultural changes have facilitated involvement in the 
occult. For example, that increasing trends towards secularization 
have released individuals from religious orthodoxies, thus liberating 
them to engage in activities hitherto proscribed by the Church. 
Both of these approaches, to varying degrees, are informed by the 
common assumption that personal experience of and involvement in the 
paranormal are mere epi-phenomena of underlying and determinant 
social forces. I argue that this assumption is incorrect by drawing 
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on evidence from sociological and parapsychological studies which 
show that paranormal experiences are not restricted to certain 
'marginal' sections of society. Also, I discuss contemporary 
evidence that knowledge of and belief in supernatural events are 
integral features of contemporary cultural life. 
There is a further problem with this body of research. In their 
commitment to furnish the 'true' - that is, sociological and 
rational - explanations for the experiences which people claim, 
researchers have exhibited a traditional sociological orientation to 
the 'primacy' or 'superiority' of the analysts' accounts. 
Ethnomethodological considerations on the relationship between 
'scientific' - that is, sociological - reasoning and theorising, and 
'lay' forms of explanation, have shown this to be a highly dubious 
methodological assumption. Furthermore, and more relevant to my 
interests, it obscures an interest in the way that people themselves 
describe and account for their experiences. Some advantages of an 
ethnomethodological interest in people's accounts of personal 
experiences are illustrated through a brief discussion of Smith's 
(1978) analysis of the way langauge is used in a description of a 
young girl's decline into mental illness. 
The kinds of analytic issues which are generated from an 
ethnomethodological perspective on language use are detailed in 
section 2 of Chapter Two. In particular I look at the flexibility of 
descriptive resources which are available to natural language users, 
and consider some of the practical, pragmatic tasks which are 
mediated through talk in social interaction. In short, I focus on 
moral and inferential aspects of descriptive practices. Having 
established some properties of the medium through which people 
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describe their paranormal experiences, I turn to look at the ways 
that accounts have been used as investigative resources by 
parapsychologists. 
Parapsychology is primarily a scientific discipline with a heavy 
bias towards experimental, laboratory-based research. Throughout its 
hundred year history, however, there have been periods in which 
researchers necessarily turned to reports of spontaneous experiences. 
The work of the early investigators was almost entirely directed 
towards establishing the 'facts' of reported cases. In order to 
obtain these facts, and to overcome difficulties perceived to be 
associated with human testimony, researchers conducted in-depth 
interviews with the experients and collected numerous corroborative 
accounts. Their studies, then, were, to a significant extent, 
dependent upon the various descriptions they solicited. 
The establishment of parapsychology as a scientific study ensured 
that, for many years, there was little active interest in personal 
accounts. One of the major developments that promoted the 
scientific status of parapsychology, however, was the development and 
application of statistics to assess the significance of experimental 
results. Statistical tests eventually came to be employed in the 
analysis of accounts of experiences. Through the use of various 
coding procedures, the character and incidence of specific aspects of 
experiences were obtained from reports. These were then assessed 
statistically to investigate patterns within and relationships 
between discrete categories of the experiences. 
Within parapsychology, Louisa Rhine holds a special place by virtue 
of her studies of a mass of unsolicited reports deposited at the 
Parapsychology Laboratory at Duke University, North Carolina. In a 
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review of her work I emphasise the procedures she devised to overcome 
the 'reporting difficulties' traditionally associated with human 
testimony. Her research is also useful in that it illustrates the 
kind of assumptions about the relationship between language and the 
world which inform much parapsychological research concerned with 
accounts of personal experiences. 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the 
phenomenology of paranormal experiences. I discuss this trend and 
show how it relates to contemporary developments within the 
discipline; in particular, Blackmore's recent arguments for a 'new' 
parapsychology, which takes as its point of departure a keener 
interest in accounts of spontaneous experiences. 
In discussing these four areas of research my point is that 
parapsychologists have worked with what is now considered to be an 
unsatisfactory view of language. They have assumed either that 
written or spoken reports are, potentially, so unreliable as to be 
analytically worthless; or that descriptions of events are 
essentially 'transparent', to the extent that the researcher may take 
descriptions at face value. In each of the four types of 
parapsychological research these assumptions are explicated and 
criticised. To do this I draw on two sources: points raised in the 
earlier discussion of the moral and inferential character of 
language use; and methodological issues exposed in discourse analytic 
critiques of sociological studies of science and experimental social 
psychology. This critical appreciation of parapsychological research 
is useful insofar as it allows me to illustrate further the character 
of an ethnomethodological interest in accounts of paranormal 
experiences. 
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In section 4 of this chapter I consider Westrum's studies of 
'social intelligence' about anomalies. In these he emphasises the 
sociological significance of the processes through which accounts of 
phenomena are transmitted from the experients to various official 
bodies. This allows me to indicate that the activity of producing an 
account in face-to-face interaction also warrants analytic 
investigation. 
There are two contemporary approaches to the analysis of language 
use which, in part, owe their origins to ethnomethodological 
thinking on the nature of natural language and its significance in 
social life: discourse analysis and conversation analysis. These are 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
The term 'discourse analysis' is associated with a variety of 
intellectual positions in sociology and linguistics. In this thesis 
I use it to refer only to that form of analysis which emphasises 
that language is a variable, constructive and functional medium. I 
trace two stages of its recent development: its emergence as a 
methodological alternative to traditional sociological procedures in 
the study of scientists' actions and beliefs, and its subsequent 
application to issues within traditional social psychology. 
Drawing on research findings from conversation analytic studies, I 
sketch a critical appreciation of the claims and objectives of 
discourse analysis. In particular, I focus on four aspects of 
language use which I feel are not given sufficient attention within 
discourse analysis. First, that even single word selection may be an 
organised outcome of locally-occasioned reasoning practices, and thus 
the processes by which such selections are achieved are analytically 
interesting. Second, discourse analysts focus on the 
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'interpretative' resources embedded in accounts through which 
participants furnish a specific character, or 'sense', for the events 
they describe. I argue that the way these resources are treated 
tends to gloss important issues, namely, the ways in which 
participants may employ specific structural features which inhere in 
the trajectory of prior utterances as interpretative resources. 
Third, and related to this point, I am interested in the ways 
speakers use occasioned 'social identities' as interactional 
resources. Such identities are accomplished in the fine-grained 
detail of talk. With its objectives pitched at broader levels, 
however, discourse analysis does not provide the most satisfactory 
perspective for a systematic appreciation of the practices which 
inform 'identity management' in the details of members' talk. 
Finally, I argue that problematic issues regarding the relationship 
between sequences of utterances and their 'context' invites 
resolutions primarily derived from conversation analytic studies and 
considerations. A conversation analytic approach is, therefore, more 
applicable to the objectives of the present research. 
Hitherto, conversation analysts have, almost exclusively, studied 
materials generated in telephone conversations and face-to-face 
interaction involving two or more parties. The accounts used as 
data for this research, however, are multi-unit, one-speaker turns, 
as opposed to stories developed in the course of interaction. 
Therefore it is necessary to discuss the appropriateness of a 
conversation analytic mentality for the examination of monologue 
materials, and this is done in section 5 of Chapter Three. Here, I 
argue that, although the nature of monologue talk may present 
analytic problems - for example, the analyst has no recourse to the 
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'proof procedure' which results from the way that participants' 
utterances are designed to exhibit analyses of prior turns - these 
are not intractable problems. 
Chapter Four is the first analytic chapter. In this I take a small 
data extract in which a speaker describes the first occasions on 
which she noticed the occurrence of a strange noise, which she later 
discovered to be caused by a discarnate spirit. The utterances which 
compose this extract are subject to a rigorous analysis. This 
exercise is not only in keeping with the analytic tradition 
established by Harvey Sacks in his early lectures, but also allows me 
to accomplish two objectves. First, to reveal how analytic 
considerations generated in the investigation of other forms of 
conversational materials can illuminate the way that this sequence 
has been methodically produced. This in turn confirms the 
applicability of a conversation analytic approach to the study of 
one-speaker materials. Second, to identify the range of 
interactional concerns to which the speaker is orienting in the 
construction and composition of these utterances. This establishes 
themes and issues to be investigated in subsequent analytic chapters. 
Thus, I use a single case analysis, albeit loosely, as a conversation 
analytic equivalent of a 'pilot' study. 
To summarise briefly, the analysis in Chapter Four explicates some 
of the resources used by the speaker to accomplish two tasks: to 
provide for, and warrant, inferences about her competence as an 
'ordinary', 'normal' person; and to design utterances which 
incrementally reveal the mysterious character of the phenomenon she 
is reporting. The analysis also explicates a normatively-prescribed 
convention regarding the design of descriptive utterances to which 
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the speaker orients throughout the course of these utterances. 
One important point to emerge from the analysis is that this 
account, and indeed all accounts, consist of speakers' reports of 
their memories of the phenomena they have encountered. One aspect of 
this feature of accounts of paranormal experiences is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Five. 
This chapter begins with the observation that there is a format 
which is recurrent, not only in reports of paranormal events, but in 
descriptions of dramatic events generally. This is identified as 'I 
was just doing X.... when Y'; the 'Y' component is used to introduce 
into the account the speaker's first awareness of the phenomenon, and 
in the 'X' component a reference is made to the mundane and trivial 
activities or circumstances at the time of this experience. The 
apparent ability to recall trivial events which were happening at the 
time of dramatic experiences has been the focus of considerable 
attention within cognitive psychology. Here, I review one 
explanantion which claims that traumatic events trigger the operation 
of neurophysiological mechanisms which record all information being 
processed by the brain at that time, thus storing, and making 
available for subsequent recall, otherwise unmemorable states of 
affairs. Taking an alternative approach, I argue that these memory 
formulations are socially-organised devices through which speakers 
engage in specifically interactional business. The analysis takes 
two directions. First, I try to explicate the procedures which 
inform the speakers' selection of items to describe their 
circumstances at the time of their experiences. This suggests that 
'X' components are constructed so as to provide for the mundaneity of 
these states of affairs. Second, the analysis shows that speakers 
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orient to the possibility that their accounts may receive an 
unsympathetic hearing. I examine some of the ways that speakers use 
this device to attend to specific interactional tasks which derive 
from the inauspiciousness of claiming to have had paranormal 
experiences. For example, to defuse the possibility of attempts to 
undermine the veridicality of the claimed experience. 
The importance of this analysis is that it points to socially- 
organised practices which inform the composition of memory 
formulations which are produced naturally in the course of these 
accounts. In this it draws attention to, and tries to explore, the 
relationship between this specific type of memory - which has 
hitherto been taken to be essentially a cognitive phenomenon - and 
the interactional and pragmatic character of the medium through which 
instances of these memories are produced. 
The final analysis, reported in Chapter Six, deals with some 
instances of the use of reported speech in accounts of paranormal. 
events. I identify some of the tasks accomplished through the 
incorporation of active voices into reports. For example, by 
reporting someone else's comments on a phenomenon, speakers may 
display that the event they claim to have experienced was also 
observable to independent witnesses, thereby demonstrating the 
'objectivity' of the phenomenon. Also, speakers use active voices to 
exhibit the 'normal' character of their assumptions about the events 
they were experiencing: that is, what 'anybody' would have thought 
and done in these circumstances. By doing this speakers furnish 
information from which recipients can make inferences which are 
favourable to their broad objectives - to construct believable 
accounts of unbelievable events. 
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In the final section of this chapter I look at instances of 
reported dialogue and focus on the way these sequences are organised. 
In particular, a three-stage sequence is analysed. In the first 
stage the speaker reports another's voice talking about some aspect 
of the paranormal phenomenon in question. In the second stage the 
speaker employs an active voice to report their reaction to this 
information. In the final sequence the other voice goes on to confim 
the 'paranormality' or 'objectivity' of the experience. Some of the 
interactional benefits which accrue from this organisation are 
discussed, and I attempt to explicate the basis for its effectiveness 
by drawing on Schutz's remarks on intersubjectivity. 
In the Conclusion I draw out some of the implications of the 
present research. First, some comments are made about the 
sociological study of belief in and claimed experiences of the 
paranormal. I argue that there should be more sociological effort 
directed to increasing our understanding of what appear to be stable 
and recurrent cultural events. In this respect, it is suggested that 
ethnomethodologically-informed studies could he particularly 
illuminating, and I illustrate the kind of empirical issues that may 
be addressed in such projects. 
Second, I make some remarks about the relationship between 
conversation analysis and discourse analysis. I focus primarily on 
the similarities between these two approaches, both in terms of their 
analytic goals and their common intellectual heritage. Furthermore, 
I suggest that certain discourse analytic emphases can be useful as 
resources in the pursuit of conversation analytic goals, especially 
in the study of materials which do not afford the benefits of the 
'proof procedure' available as a consequence of a co-interactants' 
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publically-displayed interpretations of prior turns. 
Finally, I turn to parapsychology. I consider Pinch's (1987) 
recommendation that parapsychology should attempt to secure its place 
in the scientific community by developing essentially pragmatic links 
with the orthodox sciences. Taking a lead from this, I suggest that 
a rapprochement with the social sciences is equally important, and go 
on to sketch some of the implications of ethnomethodological 
considerations on the constructive character of language use for some 
areas of parapsychological research. In particular, I argue that 




ON THE ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTS OF ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA 
1 Introduction 
The following extracts come from accounts of personal encounters 
with anomalous forces and entities. The first is taken from a taped 
interview, the second is from a study of 'Old Hag'l experiences and 
the third is taken from an article in a parapsychology journal. 
'As I said, you know, I was playing in a darts match 
over Leighton Buzzard; I left there about twenty past 
nine and I was driving through Stanbri. dge... and there's 
a road down there called Peddar's Lane... about 100 
yards past there the street lights finish. There was a 
figure I [saw] on the left-hand side, thumbing a lift 
down there. I pulled up in front of hire, so I could 
see him walking back in the headlights. 
He had a dark-coloured jumper on, dark-coloured 
trousers, with a white open-collared shirt. He came up 
to the motor; he got in there and sat down - he even 
opened the door himself, I had nothing to do with 
opening the door. I asked him where he was going and he 
just pointed up the road - never said a word. So I 
assumed he was either going to Dunstable orTotternhoe. 
So I was driving up the road, I suppose I was driving 
for - what, four, five or six minutes, I suppose, 
doing a speed of about 40 minimum. 
I turned round to offer him a cigarette and the bloke 
had disappeared. 
I braked, had a quick look in the back to see if he 
was there. He wasn't and I just gripped the wheel and 
drove like hell. ' (Goss 1984: 90) [original emphasis] 
I For a further discussion of these experiences, see footnote 
no. 1, Chapter Six: 'Voices'. 
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'It happened last Thursday between 6.30 and 7, and it 
happened on the second floor of the library, which is 
unusual. And I've been studying. I've been preparing 
for a microbiology exam. And I've been putting in a 
lot of late hours, and I was tired and getting about 
four hours of sleep a night. Three hours sometimes and 
I was really very fatigued. And----I'd been studying 
in the library for about three hours. And then I 
decided, "Well, I think you should go and lay down 
before you fall out. Because you're really tired, " you 
know. I went to a sofa that's on the floor and I 
thought "Well, I'll lie down on the sofa. " And sofas 
being sofas I could really only lie down on it on my 
back, which was a bad choice. (Laughs. ) So I was lying 
on my back and had my hands across my chest, and I had 
a series of about three or four very quick dreams which 
to me made no sense, because they didn't really pertain 
to anything that----that was familiar to me. They were 
very obscure episodes. I----I can't even describe 
them. But I know each one of them shocked me into 
waking suddenly. And I had the impression that they 
only lasted for about fifteen seconds apiece. And I 
know when I finally woke from the last one I said 
"Well, come on. Stop, " you know. You know, "Why are 
you----your mind is just racing. Just relax and lie 
down. You'll be OK. " So, I laid back down. And I 
closed my eyes, and hands folded across my chest---- 
And I had the impression that I could hear someone 
coming behind me. But I said, "Well I don't----" You 
know, "They'll pass by. " And I could hear the 
footsteps, and I said, "Well, they're going to pass on 
by nie, and I hope they don't mess with me, whoever they 
are. I hope it's not somebody who comes by and messes 
with me. " And the next thing I knew I heard a female 
voice and----The voice wasn't really familiar to me. 
But the voice addressed me like she knew me. Or it 
knew me. And it said, "You knew that I would come. " 
Something like that. And----then there was a lot of 
talk about her----her face. Or her appearance. And 
she didn't want me to look at her or something, because 
of her face. And all this time I remember I had my 
eyes closed, and I kept thinking, "Well, who is this? 
Who's playing this----Who's who's talking? " And the 
next thing I knew, my----The pressure----on my arms. 
And I. couldn't move. I couldn't move anything. And it 
was at this point I said, "Hold it. Wait a minute. 
Who's messing around with me? " And I could still hear 
her talking, but I couldn't make out the words too 
clearly. But I'm saying, "Who's messing around. Let 
me see who's messing around. Let me see who's messing 
around with me. " 
And while I could still feel the pressure, I looked 
up and there was nobody there. But the pressure was 
still there. And that scared me! ' (Hufford 1982: 81- 
2) [original emphasis] 
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'Two years ago my parents went away on a short 
vacation. Shortly after they left on their trip my son 
became very ill and had an extremely high temperature. 
Early the next morning I was surprised to see my mother 
and father driving in the driveway. Mother rushed in 
and said, "I had a terrible dream. I dreamed I kissed 
Bobby and he was burning with fever and when I turned 
around Bud (my brother) was standing there with a big 
hole in his head, pouring blood. " I told her that 
Bobby was terribly sick but that my brother ? ud had 
gone to work as usual that morning and was just fine. 
In less than an hour my brother, a lineman for Southern 
Bell Telephone Company, had been brought home by his 
foreman with a big hole cut above his left eye and 
bleeding profusely. ' (Dale, White and Murphy 1962: 
13) 
The topic of this thesis are accounts of direct personal 
experiences with anomalous forces and events of the kind illustrated 
in these extracts. Other types of reported phenomena will include 
contact with the dead, encounters with ghosts, mystical revelation, 
apparitional manifestations, attacks by demonic forces, poltergeist 
disturbances, clairvoyance, precognition, telepathic experiences, and 
UFO sightings. 
Events such as these may be far from uncommon: Blackmore's (1982a) 
investigation of the out-of-body experience leads her to conclude 
that as many as one person in every ten may have had an experience of 
this kind. Thus, in the United Kingdom alone, there may be as many 
as five million case histories of this experience. Given the wide 
array of paranormal phenomena which are reported, we can only 
speculate at the total number of individuals who have had a direct 
encounter with some sort of anomaly. 
Neither are these experiences peculiar to contemporary culture. A 
recent study of the relationship between society and the paranormal 
begins with well-documented, illustrative examples of the range of 
phenomena in question: a manifestation of an apparition, a 
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levitation, mediumistic powers, knowledge of the death of a distant 
relative and a U. F. 0 sighting. These events occurred in 1610,1645, 
1868,1920 and 1967 respectively (Evans 1982). Cursory examination 
of some of the more serious literature devoted to the paranormal 
reveals that people have been making reports of incidents of this 
kind throughout recorded history. (For example: Blackmore 1982a; 
Evans 1982; 1984; 1987; Gauld 1982; Levi 1982; McClure 1983; Vallee 
1966; Zohar 1982. ) As William James wrote: 
'The phenomena are there, lying broadcast over the 
surface of history. No matter where you open its 
pages, you find things recorded under the name of 
divinations, inspirations, demoniacal possessions, 
apparitions, trances, ecstasies, miraculous healings 
and productions of disease, and occult powers possessed 
by peculiar individuals over persons and things in 
their neighbourhood.... Look behind the pages of 
official history, in personal memoirs, legal documents, 
and popular narratives and books of anecdotes, and you 
will find that there never was a time when these things 
were not reported as abundantly as now. ' (James 1979 
[18971: 223) 
The primary objective of this- chapter is to consider previous 
sociological research which has, in broad terms, dealt with issues 
concerning the paranormal. I want to show that throughout this 
research there has been little attention given to accounts of 
direct, personal contact with anomalous phenomena, and to sketch an 
outline of the range and character of sociological questions which 
may be explored through the analysis of accounts. 
Hitherto, the study of reports of this kind has been the preserve 
of parapsychology (the most sustained and organised study of 
paranormal phenomena), psychic researchers, UFO research groups and 
committed individuals. Thus, it is necessary, first, to look 
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briefly at the history of parapsychology. This allows us to locate 
the importance of accounts of paranormal events within the 
development of this discipline, and also to outline some of the 
attitudes to the use of accounts displayed by parapsychologists. 
2A brief history of parapsychology 
The study of the paranormal was stimulated by two events: the 
growing popular interest in spiritualism and the possibility of some 
form of continued existence after death; also, the increasing 
awareness of the occurrence of a wide variety of anomalous mental 
experiences, such as precognition and telepathy. (For a more 
complete history of the study of psychical phenomena, see Gauld 1968; 
Haynes 1982; Mauskopf and McVaugh 1980; Nicol 1982. ) 
Spiritualism began in the 1840's in the United States when two 
young sisters in New York became the apparent focus for a series of 
strange rappings and knockings. These sounds seemed to have no 
physical cause (Jung 1977: 92ff). Eventually, a method was devised 
by which the noise could be asked questions; the answers to these 
claimed that the source of the noises was the spirit of a man who had 
been murdered in the house where the girls were living. 
The girls quickly became celebrities. When they visited other 
cities the noises appeared to follow them,, and they were able to 
engage in conversations with the dead through the knocks and raps 
produced by their spirits. In the wake of their popularity and their 
travels, many other individuals claimed to communicate with the 
spirits of the dead, and this ability came to be known as mediumship. 
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The popularity and fame of spiritualism grew, spreading across the 
United States and eventually to Europe (McVaugh and Mauskopf 1976). 
Although spiritualism developed into a religious movement which even 
today still boasts a considerable number of churches, its primary 
significance is that it popularised, and gave credence to, the 
possibility that people could, in some form, survive death. 2 
At approximately the same time, within certain intellectual 
circles, there was a growing awareness of what came to be known as 
spontaneous psychic experiences. It was felt that, given 
sufficiently rigorous investigation, events of this kind could 
furnish insights about the nature of the universe, and the human 
beings who populated it. Many of the founder members of the Society 
for Psychical Research were motivated' by such 'quasi-metaphysical' 
interests (Blackmore 1988a; 1988b). 
The first society specifically concerned with the study of psychic 
events was the Cambridge University Society for Psychical Research. 
The Oxford equivalent, the Oxford Phantasmological Society, was 
established in 1875 (Nicol 1972). Both organisations were eclipsed, 
however, by the founding of the Society for Psychical Research in 
1882. The Society was heavily influenced by Cambridge academics, 
especially those of Trinity College. The first President, Henry 
Sidgwick, was a Fellow of Trinity, as were other notable members, 
such as Edmund Gurney and F. W. H. Myers. Despite the link with such 
a prestigious university, however, initial research in Britain was 
conducted largely by private individuals who possessed sufficient 
personal resources to fund their activities. 
2 For recent discussions of the survival issue, see Kastenbaum 
(1984), and Thouless (1984). 
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The early investigators tried to adopt the methodological protocol 
of the physical sciences: collating evidence, testing hypotheses and 
verifying first-hand reports of experiences. In their attempts to 
infuse the study of psychic phenomena with scientific rigour, these 
researchers charted the path for future studies, in particular, those 
conducted within the auspices of universities. For example, much of 
the early research in Britain established techniques and approaches 
which were later to be refined by J. B. Rhine in the United States. 
Tyrrell (1938) pioneered a card-guessing methodology during the 
1920's; Olliver (1932) experimentally distinguished between 
telepathy and clairvoyance. These developments either pre-dated, or 
were contemporary with, Rhine's paradigmatic influence on psychical 
research. 
The initial stages of what later came to be known as 
parapsychology thus reflected two concerns: to establish the 
phenomena as a proper subject for academic inquiry; and the 
development of the scientific study of these phenomena. Both these 
are evident in the way that much of the early research was conducted 
according to the procedures of other experimental sciences. 
The American Society for Psychical Research (A. S. P. R. ) was 
founded in Boston in 1885. Like its British counterpart, the members 
were originally interested in spiritualism, but soon came to direct 
more of their energies towards establishing a scientific approach to 
the phenomena (Palfreman 1979). Unlike their British colleagues, 
however, the American researchers enjoyed the assistance, albeit 
limited, of university departments. Furthermore, there was a greater- 
interest in the use of statistics to assess the validity of 
experimental studies. In 1912 at Stanford University, J. F. Coover 
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tried to find out if human behaviour could be influenced through the 
exercise of will-power. Although he produced no positive results, 
his work was important in that it was conducted with strictly 
controlled procedures. Some years later at Harvard, L. T. Troland 
devised an experiment to test for the ability of subjects to 
influence mentally the operation of an electrical circuit. This too 
was a landmark, for it was the first research to employ a machine 
specifically designed to test for psychic phenomena (McVaugh and 
Mauskopf 1976). 
In both the United States and Europe, then, there was a movement 
towards adopting standard procedures and methodological techniques in 
the study of psychical phenomena. Thus, in 1927, when J. B. Rhine 
was appointed to the psychology department at Duke University, North 
Carolina, there were sufficient preconditions for the establishment 
of a thoroughly scientific approach to the understanding of anomalous 
mental events. 
Rhine's work is of central importance in the history of the study 
of the paranormal insofar as it had a paradigmatic influence on 
future research. He devised replicable experiments and produced a 
standard terminology, employing for the first time the title 
'parapsychology'. The subjects for his experiments were ordinary 
individuals, not self-confessed mediums or 'psychic stars'; and his 
experimental results were analysed with sophisticated statistical 
techniques, and furnished numerous significant results. He tested to 
see if psychic abilites were effected by variables such as distance, 
or drug-induced altered states of consciousness, thereby raising a 
variety of issues which subsequently became the focus for further 
research. lie supervised research students who later continued 
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working in other university departments, and he founded the Journal 
of Parapsychology, which quickly became the pre-eminent forum for the 
publication of empirical and theoretical papers. 
The consequence of Rhine's efforts was that the investigation of 
paranormal phenomena became synonymous with laboratory-based 
experimental studies. The spontaneous experiences which had prompted 
the founding fathers of psychical research were considered to 
provide, at best, only anecdotal evidence, and this was considered to 
be insufficient for a scientific discipline. 
Accounts of personal experiences were not ignored altogther. 
Rhine's wife, Louisa Rhine, spent many years studying reports of 
experiences which occurred in everyday life, and we shall consider 
her contribution in more detail later. For present purposes, 
however, we may note that this area of research was thought to be 
useful only because it offered the possibility of furnishing 
information about the occurrence of psychic events in a natural 
environment, which might then be utilised in the design of ever more 
sophisticated laboratory studies. 
During the 1940's and 1950's parapsychology seemed to thrive. In 
1957 the Parapsychological Association was formed, and in 1969 it was 
allowed to affiliate with the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. 3 
Despite a sudden renewal of interest in the paranormal during the 
late 1960's and early 1970's (Truzzi 1971; 1974a; 1974b), 
professional parapsychology has had a difficult last twenty years. 
Universities are now reluctant to have parapsychology laboratories 
3 However, three previous applications had been rejected 
(Collins and Pinch 1979: 254). 
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officially affiliated to them. The laboratory established by Rhine, 
for example, is now an independent research unit - the Foundation for 
Research into the Nature of Man - and has no formal links with the 
university. (The exception to this trend is the recent appointment 
of a Professor of Parapsychology at the University of Edinburgh. 
This Chair, however, is funded by private money bequeathed in the 
will of the writer, Arthur Koestler. ) Despite the evidence accrued 
from a massive number of experimental studies, orthodox scientists 
are hesitant to accept the claim that psychic events exist, and that 
parapsychology is a 'proper' science. Indeed, its critics have 
become particularly strident, vocal and well-organised in their 
denunciation of knowledge claims produced by parapsychologists 
(Collins and Pinch 1979; Pinch and Collins 1984; see the journal The 
Skeptical Inquirer, published by the Committee for the Scientific 
Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal). Moreover, some of the 
most impressive evidence for psychic abilities has been found to be 
fraudulent (Markwick 1978; 1985; Nicol 1975; Rogo 1985; see also the 
exchange between Blackmore 1987, and Sargent 1987). 
In a recent historical study, biauskopf and McVaugh (1980) conclude 
that the prospect for parapsychology is bleak. Support for this 
comes from a recent exchange between two professional 
parapsychologists and a committed skeptical psychologist, in the 
journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Alcock 1987; Rao and Palmer 
1987). This exchange suggests that the critical debate between the 
two camps has become stagnant: the parapsychologists make cautious 
and measured claims for the existence of minute extra-sensory 
influences detected by increasingly sophisticated experimental 
studies; the skeptic elevates parapsychology's (implicit) claim to be 
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a revolutionary science and finds no evidence to support it. 
Sociologists of science who have analysed this debate have noted that 
the terms in which it has been conducted rarely seem to develop 
(Pinch 1987). It appears that science alone is incapable of 
arbitrating upon the existence or non-existence of paranormal 
phenomena. 
It is not only sociologists and skeptics who have noted that 
parapsychology has -made little progress in its attempt to become an 
accepted member of the scientific community. In a series of papers, 
Blackmore argues that parapsychology has failed to establish its 
subject, and has made no significant contribution towards an 
understanding of human nature. To rectify this, she suggests that it 
must discard many of its fundamental assumptions. In particular, she 
focuses on the concept of 'psi' - the mental ability which is claimed 
to be present in all forms of psychic phenomena (Blackmore 1985a; 
1988a; 1988b). 
Blackmore argues that the search for evidence of psi has led the 
discipline down a blind alley, especially as this has obscured 
interest in those events which initially stimulated psychical 
research: spontaneous experiences of anomalous phenomena. Blackmore 
urges that these experiences are the proper subject for 
parapsychological investigation, not the nebulous concept of psi. 
She has no doubt that these experiences occur; the issue is to 
explain why they occur and take the form they do. 
We will assess Blackmore's appeal for a new psychical research in a 
later chapter. For our purposes here, however, we need only make the 
following observation: that the character of the study she 
recommends in place of traditional parapsychology relies heavily on 
23 
the use of people's accounts of their experiences. For example, in 
analysing the phenomenological features of the out-of-body 
experience, in the study of precognitive dreams and in the 
examination of spontaneous poltergeist activity, the parapsychologist 
does not have direct access to the phenomenon under investigation. 
Thus, as long as paranormal phenomena remain 'elusive', the 
researcher must inevitably use first-hand reports as a primary 
resource. As Blackmore herself has stated: 
'The phenomena [of parapsychology] are essentially 
accounts of people's experiences. ' (Blackmore 1988b: 
56) 
Insofar as the subject matter of this thesis are precisely such 
accounts, there is a clear connection with the type of research 
envisaged by Blackmore. Before further elaborating this connection, 
however, it is necessary to outline previous sociological work on 
aspects of the paranormal. 
3 The sociological investigation of the paranormal 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's there occurred in Western 
nations a massive resurgence of popular interest in those forms of 
experiences and beliefs commonly referred to as occult. For example, 
take the extent of popular interest in astrology: in the United 
States during the mid-1970's there were as many as 10,000 full-time 
and 175,000 part-time astrologers, who, either through personal 
contact or newspaper and magazine astrology columns, catered for an 
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estimated 40,000,000 people. The popularity of astrological 
forecasts was not limited only to the United States, but was common 
also in France, West Germany and Japan (Truzzi 1975). Moreover, a 
variety of people sought involvement in one form or another: research 
showed that 21% of the books in the campus bookshop at the University 
of Pittsburgh dealt with the subject of astrology (McConnell and 
McConnell 1971); also, a study of the readership of one occult 
magazine revealed that a high percentage of the subscribers had 
professional occupations (Hartman 1976). 
There were other factors which further stimulated popular interest 
in aspects of the occult For example, the publications of J. B. 
Rhine on parapsychology promoted belief in the existence of events 
such as ESP and and precognition. Eastern religions and forms of 
mysticism were popularised by rock music celebrities. The study of 
magic became fashionable, and the number of covens grew throughout 
the United States and Western Europe, culminating in establishment of 
the Church of Satan in San Francisco. The writings of Erich von 
Daniken (1971; 1974), which claimed that primitive civilisations had 
been visited by extraterrestrials, enjoyed massive commercial 
success, and the advent of Uri Geller in the early 1970's led to a 
dramatic public awareness of psychokinesis and other forms of 
paranormal mental faculties. 
Social scientific research which was prompted by these events 
roughly followed two paths: an attempt to discover the social and 
social-psychological characteristics of people who believed in the 
existence of, or claimed to have experienced, anomalous events; and 
the investigation of the cultural changes which had facilitated the 





looked directly at accounts of paranormal experiences, they are still 
important for our purposes because they raise for discussion a 
variety of issues relevant to the study of accounts. 
[a] The social correlates of paranormal experiences 
This approach attempted to locate the sociological characteristics 
of individuals who claimed either to have experienced paranormal 
phenomena, or who expressed the belief that such phenomena existed. 
In much. of this research there was an overriding concern to provide 
a sociological account for these experiences and beliefs. That is, 
researchers worked, explicitly or implicitly, on the assumption that 
there is a significant correlation between a variety of social 
characteristics and belief in or experience of the occult. Moreover, 
that this supported the conclusion that these beliefs or experiences 
were in some way a consequence of the individual's social position or 
social-psychological traits. 
Wuthnow's (1976) paper on belief in the power of astrological 
predictions provides a particularly striking example of this 
assumption. lie reports that the tendency to believe that planetary 
forces influence human behaviour is strongest amongst groups which 
are marginal in society. The greatest appeal is in the poorly- 
educated, the unemployed, ethnic minorities, females, the unmarried, 
those over-weight, those under-weight, the ill, recently bereaved or 
the lonely. From his research he concludes that, for these groups, 
astrology may act as a substitute for more conventional religious 
belief. Astrology, then, has a functional role for the deprived as 
it is, essentially, a coping mechanism. 
A similar theme informs Moody's (1974) participant observation 
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study of a coven in San Francisco. Between 1965 and 1967 Moody 
studied the dimensions and practices of the group. His analysis 
claims to reveal the social and social-psychological character of the 
members who participated in the coven's activities. Ile argues that 
'pathological' traits were exhibited by many members of the coven. 
The most common trait was: 
'a high level of general anxiety related to low self- 
esteem and a feeling of inadequacy. ' (Moody 1974: 
226) 
Moody suggests this syndrome was related to interpersonal conflict 
in the nuclear family of the members of the coven. For example, 85% 
of the group claimed that their childhood was disrupted either by 
divorce or alcoholism of the parents. Their adult lives were no more 
successful or happy: many members of the coven had failed in their 
social, business and sexual relationships. The implication is clear, 
if not articulated explicitly: that the resort to witchcraft was a 
response by the members of the coven to the cumulative pressures 
exerted by the miserable circumstances of their lives. 
In both these studies the analysts provide a sociological account 
for the behaviour and beliefs of the people they have studied. In 
doing so they display a -commitment to what might be termed a 
'sociology of error' approach (Bloor 1976). That is, they are 
furnishing accounts of events which are deemed to reveal the true 
causes of the beliefs of. the participants. These sociological 
accounts are, therefore, superior to those which the participants 
themselves may offer as accounts of their actions. 
Social-psychological analyses of aspects of belief in or experience 
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of anomalous phenomena provide explicit examples of the assumption 
of the superiority of the analyst's account. Warren (1970) examined 
the various status positions held by people who had claimed to have 
seen UFO's. He looked at status inconsistents - people who hold 
conflicting social positions. For example, a black, working class 
doctor practising in a predominantly white middle class area may feel 
tension arising from the conflict between his professional and ethnic 
statuses. Warren found that status inconsistents were more likely to 
have reported UFO sightings than status consistents. From this lie 
concluded that the tendency to believe that one had witnessed an 
anomaly of this kind was causally related to the problems resulting 
from status inconsistency. Littig (1971) argued that belief in the 
extraterrestrial origin of UFOs is significantly related to 
affiliation motivation -a 'human disposition to be accepted and 
loved by others' (Littig 1971: 308). Both reseachers assume that the 
real root of belief in or experience of UFOs is in underlying 
social-psychological processes, and that these are preponderant 
amongst individuals who are, in some way, frustrated or deprived. 
The work of Bourque (1968) and Bourque and Back (1969) examines the 
phenomenon of religious or mystical anomalies in relation to the 
social-structural position of the individuals claiming to have had 
such experiences. They begin with the observation that the 
experience of altered states of consciousness seems to have two 
primary forms: the religious and the aesthetic transcendental state. 
They attempt to discover whether there are two distinct experiences, 
or whether the same phenomenon is being comprehended and described in 
two different ways. They conclude that the character of the 
underlying experiences is the same, but that the significance 
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attributed to transcendental experiences depends upon class position, 
religious affiliation and marginality. They regard the individual's 
social characteristics as having a crucial importance in determining 
the phenomenological forms of the experience. For example, they 
argue that the people who report religious transcendental experiences 
share a number of common features (Bourque and Back 1968). These 
individuals display a great deal of 'ego-anxiety', and a degree of 
'social anxiety'; they are relatively disinterested in economic or 
aesthetic concerns, but they are highly oriented to religious values. 
They go on to conclude: 
'In fact, in the light of their anxiety levels and 
their concern with social values, it may be indicated 
that the experience itself is a structured group 
attempt to overcome feelings of frustration and 
alienation. ' (Bourque and Back 1968: 38) [emphasis 
added] 
In a later paper they take a more linguistic stance. Following 
Bernstein (e. g., 1972), they argue that certain strata in society 
have access to specific linguistic resources, and it is the use of 
these differentially available resources that determines the nature 
of the experience being reported. Those who are lower down the 
social scale will have access to a linguistic code redolent of 
religious imagery, while those of a higher social class position will 
be able to articulate their experiences in terms of its more 
aesthetic qualities (Bourque and Back 1971). 
This study is relevant to the sociological analysis of accounts of 
anomalous events in that it points to one direction in which 
research. may go: to examine how it is that language can be used to 
provide for the character of the experience being so reported. 
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Although this theme informs Bourque and Back's paper, however, their 
argument is of little value to the present study. Their position is 
not fully explored in any detail, and there are no analyses of 
instances of the ways in which language is used in the way the 
authors indicate. Moreover, the division of linguistic resources 
into two codes which correspond to two broad divisions of the social 
strata is particularly unsophisticated. 
Nelson's (1975) study of the psychic experiences and belief in the 
existence of paranormal events in the population of Dawley, in 
Shropshire, begins with a similar position. He argues that it is 
better to assume that psychic experiences do exist, and as such they 
ought to be treated as 'givens' in sociological analysis. His 
research assessed whether certain social conditions facilitated or 
inhibited belief in the existence of, or experience of, anomalous 
psychic phenomena. He found no significant class-based difference 
when those class allocations were made according to the Registrar 
General's classifications. Those who ascribed themselves to the 
middle classes, however, were less likely to believe in the existence 
of ghosts. The inter-generational downwardly-mobile were more likely 
to claim to have had a greater number of actual experiences than the 
upwardly-mobile. The intra-generational downwardly-mobile were more 
likely to believe in and claim experience of psychical phenomena. 
Nelson concluded that social mobility may release individuals from 
set or rigid ways of perceiving and interpreting events in the world, 
thus facilitating a heightened sensitivity to the occurrence of 
anomalous phenomena. 
Although Nelson's approach is, in many respects, different to that 
found in the research by Wuthnow, Moody, Warren, Littig and Bourque 
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and Back, it is important to emphasise the over-arching similarities 
in these studies. First, the accounts of personal experiences are 
not treated as a topic for sociological study; their value is 
obscured by the analysts' overriding commitment to deal 
comprehensively with a wider spectrum of beliefs and experiences. 
Second, in all cases it is assumed that sociological correlates can 
be unproblematically located and then used either as a causal 
explanation of the anomalies reported, or for the belief that the 
anomalies exist, or can account for the phenomenological features of 
various experiences. In the strongest sense, there is the 
implication of a direct causal link between the features of people's 
lives and their propensity to report belief in, and encounters with, 
anomalous forces. In the weak sense, there is the suggestion that 
the nature of the phenomena may be determined by the sociological 
variables of individual's lives, or that their position in the social 
structure may influence which type of events they experience, and to 
what. degree. Third, consistent throughout all these studies is the 
argument that the downwardly mobile, the marginal - in short, those 
who are psychologically vulnerable - are more likely to report 
experiences of and belief in the existence of anomalous phenomena. 
There is a considerable body of research, however, which 
contradicts the findings from Wuthnow, Moody and so on. hay and 
Morissy's (MS) national survey of mystical, religious and paranormal 
experiences, for example, produced evidence opposite to that from 
Bourque and Back's analyses. In particular, they found that 
religious transcendental experiences were usually reported by 
advantaged groups, rather than the disadvantaged. Furthermore, 
people reporting this type of anomalous phenomena tended to score 
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highly on tests designed to assess psychological well-being. In a 
further study, Hay (MS) noted that individuals who had remained in 
education longer than the average were more inclined to claim to 
have had paranormal experiences. Wuthnow (1978) reports that he 
found no relationship between the level to which an individual had 
been educated and the propensity to experience or believe in the 
existence of extrasensory perception. Saunders' (1972) study of the 
social correlates of 80,000 people who claimed to have seen UFOs 
indicates that the better educated are more likely to report their 
sightings. Summarising the results of surveys by Green (1966), 
Palmer (1975), and Blackmore (1980), Blackmore (1982a: 82ff. ) 
reports that the incidence of out-of-body-experiences, or OBEs, is 
unrelated to sex, age, ethnicity, birth order, political affiliation, 
religion, religiosity, education, occupation and income. She 
concludes that we cannot say with any conviction who are the people 
most likely to have this particular type of experience. Finally, we 
may again refer to Hartman's (1976) study of the American occult 
magazine, 'Gnostica', which revealed that those who are better 
educated and those with professional occupations were highly 
represented in the readership. 
Contradictory evidence is also provided by Greeley (1975): for 
example, he found that people who claim to experience psychic 
phenomena show greater extremes of both positive and negative affect, 
and that they are likely to have enjoyed a longer period in education 
than non-psychics. Although some of his conclusions can be taken as 
supporting the marginality thesis, overall his results are ambiguous. 
Given the wealth of contradictory evidence, then, it would be 
unwarranted to presume that experience of or belief in anomalous 
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events can be explained by reference to the characteristics of people 
who make such reports. 
It is also worth noting that surveys indicate that a large number 
of people claim to have anomalous experiences. This can be 
illustrated by looking at studies of the OBE. Green (1966) found 
that 19% of her sample claimed to have experienced this phenomenon. 
Palmer (1975) sent a questionnaire survey to the inhabitants of the 
town of Charlottesville, West Virginia, and to the students of the 
nearby university. The results revealed incidence rates of 14% and 
25% respectively. Haraldsson et al's (1977) survey of the population 
of Iceland produced a figure of 8%. Blackmore's (1980) survey of 
students from the universities of Surrey and Bristol revealed 
incidence rates of 13% and 14% respectively. 
Ilaraldsson's (1985) survey of national polls from a number of 
European countries and the United States provides a similar guide to 
the incidence of a variety of paranormal phenomena. The author's 
own summary states: 
'Here we have for the first time relatively comparable 
data from most nations of Western Europe and the 
U. S. A..... Weighted figures have been given for the type 
of experiences among the total populations surveyed in 
Europe.... For the whole of Western Europe telepathy was 
reported most frequently, by almost every third 
respondent (32%); contact with the dead by every fourth 
to fifth person (23%), and finally every fifth respon- 
dent claimed a personal experience of clairvoyance 
(20%). ' (Haraldsson 1985: 155) 
Given the reservations as to the accuracy or usefulness of survey 
methodologies (for example, Cicourel 1964) it would be unwise to 
treat these figures as if they indicate a 'real' rate of the 
incidence of the OBE, or of the other phenomena reported. They are 
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significant, however, in that they strongly suggest that reports of 
the experience of paranormal phenomena are common to a large 'section 
of the population of Western Europe and the United States. If these 
phenomena are differentially distributed in favour of those who are 
in socially marginal positions, then we must reconsider the meaning 
of the word 'marginal'. 
There are a range of criticisms which centre on methodological 
issues. The studies cited so far have employed 'a range of 
methodological techniques: interviews, questionnaire surveys, 
participant observation and so on. They have looked at a variety of 
questions, including both experience of and belief in the existence 
of a number of anomalous phenomena: astrology, witchcraft, belief in 
and experience of psychic events and UFO sightings. Furthermore, the 
subjects for these studies have come from a variety of backgrounds, 
ranging from the inhabitants of a small Shropshire town, to 
residents of the Bay area in San Francisco. Such a wide variety of 
methods, objectives and subjects makes it difficult to produce 
general points which summarise the overall conclusions that we might 
draw from this body of research. It is equally difficult to provide 
a comprehensive critical appreciation. Consequently, we will make 
some points which are relevant to specific studies. 
Warren's (1970) attempt to explain UFO sightings by reference to 
variant status positions held by single individuals can be questioned 
on two grounds. First, attempts to replicate his original findings 
have failed (Fox 1979). Second, status inconsistency theory has 
been shown to be inherently weak. For example, it gives little 
attention to the interpersonal circumstances in which statuses are 
actually experienced; furthermore, there has been an over-emphasis 
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upon individual statuses, and no systematic exploration of statuses 
which derive from group membership (Knocke 1972; Nelson 1973). 
Many of the studies discussed have relied on categories and indices 
which are observer-created. That is, they are produced from the 
theoretical or empirical perspective adopted by the analyst. Wuthnow 
(1976) attempts to test whether astrology is a substitute for 
conventional religious affiliation amongst the socially marginal. 
His findings suggest that those on the margins of society are more 
disposed to believe that astrological predictions work, and that 
human beings are governed by planetary influence. His evidence seems 
to support this hypothesis. It is important, however, to note how 
the category of 'marginal' was produced. We have already observed 
that it seems to include a wide variety of sociological correlates: 
the old, bereaved, poor, less well educated, over-weight, under- 
weight, ethnic groups, women, unmarried people, and so on. We may 
seriously question the utility of an analytic category that is 
clearly applicable to a large number of individuals. 
A central point in Wuthnow's argument is that these people suffer 
some form of deprivation, and their acceptance of astrology is a 
consequence of this. But we can ask, what is 'deprivation' ? Is it 
a state of mental discomfort and tension, a form of psychic strain ? 
Is it constant ? Can individuals be less deprived one day, and more 
deprived the next ? We may ask the same about 'general anxiety' 
(Moody 1974), 'social anxiety' and 'ego anxiety' (Bourque and Back 
1968). That is, the researchers use these terms unquestioningly, as 
if the meaning of them is unproblematically available and commonly 
known. This point is not only relevant to the writing of the final 
report, but also impinges upon the actual study. For example, to 
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determine if his interviewees had weight problems, Wuthnow asked that 
his interviewers make an assessment of their weight. The results of 
this assessment contributed toward the overall classification of the 
individual as either marginal, or not. This procedure, however, is 
clearly marked by serious difficulties. It assumes that 
interviewers' have sufficient knowledge of what the proper weight for 
a person should be, and that they are at least proficient in making 
such assessments. These would clearly be clouded by culturally- 
available standards of body weight, and the interviewers' knowledge 
and interpretation of these standards in relation to specific 
individuals. Thus there are problems, both in the way that 
categories such as 'marginal' are composed, and in the manner that 
they are ascribed to specific individuals. 
A further issue concerns the ways that the social conditions of an 
individual's life actually come to be manifested as the experience 
of, say, a paranormal phenomenon. Implicit in much of the research 
reviewed here is the assumption that there is some causal link 
between what we might term the 'epi-phenomenon', for example, seeing 
a ghost, and the 'true' phenomenon: being subject to the 
psychological pressures imposed by virtue of social marginality. In 
the analyses presented here there are no clear attempts to articulate 
exactly how these two aspects of experience are related, let alone a 
satisfactory account of how one may be the cause of the other. 
The most important feature of this research is that it obscures 
people's own accounts as an area for sociological investigation. The 
(assumed) rationality of the sociologist's accounts renders 
uninteresting the type of descriptions which may be collected; for 
example, reports of direct experiences. This methodological 
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presumption informs Wuthnow's following remarks: 
'Even if we had asked people why they were interested 
in astrology, it isn't clear that the deprived would 
have recognised it as a coping mechanism. ' (Wuthnow 
1976: 163) 
This quote from Wuthnow would suggest that, because it is likely 
that they would not correspond to the analyses furnished by the 
sociologists, such reports are considered to be analytically 
worthless. This point has been made by Eglin (1986) in his 
ethnomethodological study of alchemy: 
'The admittedly least sophisticated and yet perhaps 
most telling indictment against analytic forays into 
the realm of the occult is simply researchers' 
persistent unwillingness and - with reference to the 
sanctioned and sanctionable legitimacy of their 
researches - inability to take the practitioners of 
the occult sciences seriously; to attend to these 
practitioners' claims and representations as anything 
other than epiphenomena, if not instances of fraud and 
chicanery; to resist the ever-present temptation toward 
reduction. All studies of the occult or arcane 
sciences which fail to take into account the claims of 
its practitioners can in no way assess those 
practitioners' methods or victories, and are 
consequently capable of bringing into view little more 
of ultimate interest than the invidiousness of their 
own investigations. ' (Eglin 1986: 124) 
This passage illustrates that ethnomethodological criticisms of 
sociological practice question the assumption that the analytic 
accounts sociologists provide stand as more objective or superior 
versions of the events than ones which may be provided by the 
participants in those events. Following this, the real problem for 
sociology is not to furnish purportedly 'definitive' statements about 
the world which reveal the 'true', as opposed to perceived and 
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thereby irrational, influences on social life; instead it is to 
furnish analyses of the ways that participants provide for, and 
display, the accountable and rational sense of events, behaviour and 
phenomena (Sacks 1963; Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). 
These points will be explored in greater detail later. For the 
present we may note not only that these issues may be actively 
explored by studying the ways that people talk about their paranormal 
experiences, but that there is a sustained body of theoretical 
writing and empirical research which promotes such an approach as a 
sociological imperative. 
A further observation is that within parapsychology, the discipline 
with an official responsibility for the study of anomalous 
phenomena, there is a growing interest in, and recognition of the 
importance of, accounts of paranormal experiences. Indeed, we have 
seen that one leading parapsychologist has gone as far as to argue 
that such reports are the fundamental phenomena of parapsychological 
inquiry. The sociological approach exemplified in the socio- 
correlative studies, however, systematically directs attention away 
from personal reports. In this, it is singularly ill-equipped to 
attend to issues of contemporary importance. 
In summary, then, the evidence provided by the investigation of the 
social correlates of paranormal experiences, or belief in the occult, 
can be criticised on several grounds. Firstly, there is a 
considerable body of evidence to suggest that the experience of and 
belief in the existence of anomalous events is not confined to the 
marginal, deviant, or psychologically maladjusted. Indeed, some 
parapsychologists (such as Blackmore 1982a, and Palmer 1979) have 
come to the conclusion that experiences of these kinds are not 
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peculiar to any specific section of the population. Secondly, it is 
clear that these experiences are not rare events, but may be quite 
widespread. Thirdly, the methodological procedures adopted in these 
studies can be questioned, not only in that they rest on an 
unwarranted assumption as to the superiority of professional over 
'lay' explanations and accounts, but also in that they obscure how 
these lay accounts may be sociologically interesting. 
[b] The occult as a deviant culture 
We have already stated that in the late 1960's and the early part 
of the 1970's there was a sudden increase in the extent of popular 
interest in all aspects of the paranormal. Although this increase 
was evident in many Western countries, it was in the United States 
where it made its biggest impact. The second strand of sociological 
research, prompted by the proliferation of mystic and occult 
philosophies and practices, and claimed experience of various forms 
of paranormal phenomena, looked to the cultural context in which 
these developments were occurring. A predominant theme in this 
literature was that specific social and cultural events facilitated 
or encouraged belief or involvement in some form of the occult. In 
its strongest sense, this reiterates the harsh reductionism common to 
aspects of the socio-correlative research: that social forces can be 
identified which are deemed to provide an account for people's 
claimed beliefs and behaviour which is superior to any that they 
themselves may provide. Another overlap with the socio-correlative 
perspective is the conflation of experience and belief: both are 
accounted for' by the same sociological explanations. 
Perhaps the most sustained analysis of this kind comes from the 
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work of the American sociologist, Marcello Truzzi. In his analysis 
of modern forms of witchcraft, for example, (Truzzi 1971), he argues 
that contemporary involvement in black magic, Wicca, Satanic crafts 
and so on, is not to be understood as the result of direct experience 
of the efficacy of magic by an increasing number of people. Rather, 
he claims that such involvement represents a form of reaction to the 
pronouncements of the Church. That is, by dabbling in matters which 
are traditionally proscribed by the established Church, such as 
witchcraft and associated activities, people are demonstrating their 
liberation from, and rejection of, the prevailing religious 
orthodoxy. 
lie develops a more sophisticated analysis in his consideration of 
the Church of Satan in the United States. He suggests that the 
values, attitudes and beliefs espoused in the philosophy of the 
Church, as exemplified by the writings and philosophy of its founder, 
Anton le Vey, are not traditionally magical or Satanic in the sense 
of, for example, the writings of Aleister Crowley. The members of 
the Church, Truzzi claims, are more like cynical realists, attempting 
to manipulate what they consider to be supernormal forces for very 
pedestrian, pragmatic ends. Witchcraft, then, is not a new search 
for a perverse form of spiritual meaning, but the manifestation of a 
disenchantment with standard religious teachings. 
For Truzzi, esoteric culture is parasitic on exoteric culture. The 
knowledge it claims to provide has appeal by virtue of the fact that 
it contradicts the accepted store of knowledge in a society: 
'In many ways the occult is a residual category, a 
wastebasket for knowledge claims that are deviant in 
some way. ' (Truzzi 1974a: 245) 
40 
Truzzi's analyses of the relationship between the occult and 
exoteric culture rest on the assumption that these two forms of 
cultural life are distinct, and that the analyst's task is to explain 
why individuals reject normal culture, and its associated patterns of 
behaviour and belief, and adopt the deviant culture of the occult. 
This assumption, however, overlooks the extent to which the occult is 
a central feature of exoteric culture. Indeed, it is possible to 
question whether the distinction between these two cultural forms can 
be sustained. Instead of viewing interest in the occult as, in some 
broad sense, a rejection of orthodox beliefs and actvities, it is 
possible to ask in what ways the occult derives support from 
dimensions of exoteric culture. 
For example, in various ways occult beliefs and practices derive 
positive support from aspects of orthodox religion. In his analysis 
of the relationship between folk and official religions, Bock (1966) 
draws attention to the way that elements of the former are absorbed 
into the latter and become acceptable characteristics of that 
religious form. This work is useful insofar as his definition of 
folk religion bears a similarity to common conceptions of occult 
groups. He argues that, whereas official religion appeals to a 
universal sacred authority, folk religions are attached to, and 
common to, specific groups. In this, we can see a parallel between 
for example UFO contactee cults, witchcraft groups, occult societies 
and so on, and folk religions. His work implies that the 
contemporary form of orthodox religion may be due in part to the 
assimilation of ideas, images, themes and practices derived from, and 
more conventionally associated with, folk religions. The point is 
that even orthodox religion may have an elements of ideology and 
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practices which reflect the concerns of folk, occult or pagan 
activities. Bock argues that this is clearly the case with the 
symbol of Father Christmas, the annual appearance of whom is a 
central theme of the modern-day form of the Christian celebration of 
the birth of Christ. lie shows how the original St. Nicholas motif 
was incorporated into more traditional religious ideology despite its 
original appearance as a feature of European folk religious beliefs, 
and the behaviour associated with them. 
There are many features of contemporary religious orthodoxy to 
which the occultist can reasonably point so as to illustrate that 
supernatural elements pervade even the most stable and accepted 
religious orthodoxies. For example, the Virgin Birth, the 
Resurrection and in the prophecies of the Book of Revelation there is 
a distinct flavour of the supernatural, or paranormal. By proposing 
the truth, literal or symbolic, of such events the established Church 
can hardly not emphasise that its own traditions are heavily imbued 
with magical or supernatural events (Campbell and McIver 1987). 
Not only can occultists draw support from certain features of 
contemporary religious doctrine, they can also obtain support for 
their own ideas and practices by indicating the failure of the Church 
to provide 'proof' of the teachings it provides. Occultists can 
claim that their own doctrines are, in a sense, more scientific than 
those offered by the established Church. Consequently, they are able 
to provide 'evidence' for their own beliefs, whereas the Church 
cannot. In so doing they capitalise on a 'failure' of the 
established Church to be able to substantiate its claims. Ashworth's 
(1980) study of new mythologies highlights this process. He 
considers, amongst other things, the popular appeal of the writings 
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of Erich von Daniken and the myth of Atlantis. He argues that 
proponents of what he terms 'popular' sciences claim to be able to 
prove their arguments and theses, which, in part, accounts for their 
appeal. That is, whereas religion can offer no proof of its 
assertions, the writers of popular science always attempt to ground 
their arguments in facts, theories and evidence. They gain 
credibility for their theories by adopting the rubric of science. 
The established Church is in an uncomfortable position with regard 
to its official pronouncements about the dangers of dabbling in areas 
of occult practice. The clergy may denounce these activites as 
dangerous, but in doing so they can be seen to be endorsing the 
occultists' claims that these practices have real effects. Indeed, 
by claiming that such activities are dangerous, the established 
Church may be making them more interesting and exciting, thus 
increasing the likelihood of public interest and involvement in them. 
The Church does not reject the occult out of hand. Many members of 
the clergy are clearly interested in the relationship between the 
paranormal and the concerns of orthodox theology. In 1954 the 
Churches' Fellowship for Psychical and Spiritual studies was founded 
in Britain, thus forging a formal theological link between religion 
and the occult. There is also the journal, The Christian 
Parapsychologist, which is devoted to issues of the connections 
between the paranormal and religion. It is also interesting to note 
that since the occult revival of the early 1970's the Church has been 
more inclined to discuss openly those aspects of its own teachings 
which display a supernatural or paranormal flavour (Marty 1970). 
For example, since the middle 1960's the church has expressed a 
greater willingness to discuss the status of angels, which culminated 
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in Billy Graham's (1975) arguably definitive text on the subject 
'Angels: God's Secret Agents'. 
Marty (1970) has argued that the success of modern occultism rests 
in its ability to incorporate and assimilate traditionally middle 
class values. He focuses not on the occult underground - the 
seamier side of occultism, involving black magic, sacrifice and 
orgiastic ceremonies - but on the occult 'aboveground', or the occult 
establishment. In this domain he finds that, although there are 
elements of strange sexual practices and supernatural powers, these 
function merely as titillating aspects. There is little that 
resembles the orgiastic excesses of popular versions of black magic. 
The success of the occult establishment rests in the ways that 
acceptable personal goals have been derived from exoteric culture. 
The participants tend to orient towards transcendental, mystical or 
spiritual values, and in this they share aims which are not so far 
removed from the goals of the established Church. This is supported 
by Lynch's (1979) study of one occult group, the popularity of which 
stemmed not from a rejection of religious values, but the way that it 
was able to offer novel means by which to attain essentially 
traditional forms of spiritual enlightenment. 
Analysis of the values of the Californian-based Church of Satan 
provides further evidence that the relationship between exoteric and 
esoteric culture is misrepresented by a model of dichotomously 
opposed alternatives. The members of the Church do not espouse 
anti-Christian values simply as a consequence of their opposition to 
the established religious values and activities. They reject 
Christianity, and other forms of traditional religious adherence, 
because they believe it fosters individual dependence upon external 
44 
powers and forces, thereby diminishing human freedom and curbing the 
potential for self-fulfilment. Their own beliefs and practices are 
oriented directly to the achievement of personal goals through the 
manipulation of supernormal forces. 
Occultists exploit prevailing rationalism, and the popular 
adherence to science as the ultimate arbiter on truth and reality, to 
establish further their credibility. The Church of Satan argues that 
its philosophy is informed by knowledge of events and forces which, 
although as yet 'undiscovered' by orthodox science, will eventually 
yield to the same scientific mode of investigation as any other 
accepted physical force. To support this claim occultists point to 
episodes in the early development of areas of established science to 
indicate that its roots are shrouded in what would today still be 
considered as mysticism and magic. For example, early interest in 
chemical reactions was stimulated by the alchemists' attempts to 
transmute base metals into gold. Information about the motions of 
planets and stars was made available for astronomers partly through 
the detailed observations compiled by astrologers. Interest in 
medical treatment developed from herbal remedies employed by witches. 
Moreover, as late as the 1800's Scottish scientists were debating the 
merits of phrenology, the interpretation of personality through 
assessment of the contours of the skull (Shapin 1979). In a similar 
vein, we can note that Charles Darwin was a physiognomist, and that 
his decision to embark on the voyage which was eventually to lead him 
to the Galapagos Islands was, to some degree, motivated by his 
favourable opinion of the face of the Beagle's captain. All these 
can be cited by occultists to show the extent to which the history of 
science has been heavily infused with aspects of the occult or the 
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paranormal. 
Related to this is the way that parapsychologists may refer to 
aspects of contemporary science to substantiate their claim that the 
forces they deal with are not necessarily opposed to modern science. 
Some have argued that developments in quantum mechanics - the study 
of sub-atomic particles - support parapsychological explanations; for 
example, that paradoxes produced in quantum theory can be resolved 
by reference to the influence of mind and observation upon matter. 
(For a discussion of the relationship between parapsycholgy and 
quantum mechanics, see Collins and Pinch 1983, chapter 4; Gardner 
1985; Josephson 1975; Koestler 1972; Oteri 1975. ) 
The 'cultic milieu' identified by Campbell (1972) ensures that 
there are various sources of support for individuals involved in some 
form of occult participation. That is, people interested-in one kind 
of anomaly are likely to be exposed to ideas from other areas of 
oocult involvement. For example, interest in the U. F. O. phenomenon 
may lead to an awareness of issues from parapsychological research, 
and also a familiarity with doctrines common to ceremonial magic. 
The cultic milieu ensures that individuals from disparate areas of 
anomaly involvement to come into contact with their colleagues, thus 
facilitating an exchange of ideas -and stimulating individual 
interest. In this way, the cultic milieu sustains the stability of 
occult involvement. 
Finally, Campbell and McIver (1987) have indicated the extent to 
which occult themes, images and ideas permeate the reading material 
produced specifically for young children. The libraries of 
children's schools are awash with witches, ghosts, goblins, fairies 
and creatures from outer space. This stock of material ensures that 
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young children are exposed to a vast array of information about the 
paranormal. Campbell and McIver make the point that, with so many 
children being exposed to such powerful images at such an 
impressionable age, it is surprising that in their later adult life 
more people do not reject orthodox culture for the esoteric. 
The relationship between the occult and ordinary culture is 
therefore far more complex than suggested in the work of sociologists 
such as Truzzi. Rather than dichotomously-opposed alternatives, the 
esoteric and exoteric are intimately connected. The paranormal 
derives support from orthodox culture; many features of the occult 
have permeated ordinary culture, and some occult beliefs and 
practices reflect prevailing currents from mainstream culture. By 
way of a summary to this section we may make some observations which 
relate to our interest in accounts of paranormal experiences. 
The study of the cultural conditions under which interest in the 
paranormal flourishes has, like the socio-correlative approach, 
tended to ignore people's own accounts of their experiences. 
Moreover, the experiences themselves have been overlooked as an area 
for sociological analysis. This is primarily linked to the 
assumption that the things which are being reported simply can't have 
happened in the ways that they are being described. For example, it 
is assumed that astrology is popular, not because it provides 
accurate information about the future, but because the marginal 
circumstances of people's lives lead them to look to 'fate' as a 
means to rationalise their plight (Nederman and Goulding 1981); or 
that people claim encounters with spirits of the dead on account of 
the combination of specific psychological, social class, educational, 
occupational and geographical characteristics. Similarly, we noted 
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earlier that some sociologists have been critical of the assumption 
that belief in and knowledge about the occult is inherently deviant. 
Yet even their work seems to imply that the sources of support for 
contemporary occultism, which they cite as evidence to confirm that 
the occult is a part of orthodox culture, can somehow explain the 
continued existence of patterns of involvement. 
The primary conclusion from this section is that knowledge about 
and belief in the existence of paranormal or supernatural phenomena 
are not deviant to mainstream culture. Indeed, such knowledge may be 
regarded as a fundamental feature of the fabric of contemporary 
society. However, this is not to claim that paranormal experiences 
are treated as 'just another' form of experience by members of 
society. Clearly, their very nature assures suspicion, and, at 
times, derision for those who claim them; reactions which seem to 
have permeated much of the work reviewed in this and the last 
section. It is necessary, therefore, to develop a position which 
eschews a priori skepticism and suspicion. To do this we will turn 
to themes raised earlier regarding ethnomethodological concerns. 
This discussion will demonstrate that the ethnomethodological 
position is not only a suitable perspective from which to undertake a 
study of accounts of paranormal experiences, but that such an 
approach is imperative. 
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4 Ethnomethodological considerations 
We may illustrate these points by discussing briefly Smith's (1978) 
study of an account of mental illness. Smith's datum was a report of 
a young girl's decline into mental illness and behavioural 
irregularity, which was provided by one of her friends. The analytic 
interest in this account was not motivated by the assumption that it 
allowed the sociologist to find out whether the girl was 'really' 
mentally ill, or whether the friend was being pernicious, and 
distorting the 'truth' of the matter. Smith rejects the idea that a 
single, 'true' version of events can be obtained from the details of 
the report; indeed, she goes on to reveal how the 'same' information 
could be used to support an entirely different reading of the 
reported behaviour. What she does is take the account apart to 
explicate two of its features. First, the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and conventions about 'normal' and 'abnormal' behaviour 
which inform the friend's descriptions. Second, she examines the 
rhetorical linguistic practices through which this stock of knowledge 
is deployed as a resource to build an account which points clearly to 
the conclusion that the behaviour of the girl was due to her 
increasing psychological instability. That is, Smith reveals how the 
'facticity' of the girl's problems are constructed in the course of 
the account. 
The primary analytic contribution is this: Smith reveals how an 
account of a state of affairs in the world is designed to be 
recognisable as that state of affairs. It does not presuppose an 
objective world, independent of members' reasoning and discourse 
practices, which can be used as a 'yardstick' either to confirm or 
disconfirm the truth of the friend's account. Instead she looks to 
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the embedded practices through which this sense of events is 
accomplished. 
The method exemplified by Smith's study echoes central concerns of 
the ethnomethodological study of social life: 
'in contrast to certain versions of Durkheim that teach 
that the objective reality of social facts is 
sociology's fundamental principle, the lesson is taken 
instead, and used as a study policy, that the objective 
reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of 
the concerted activities of daily life, with the 
ordinary artful ways of that accomplishment being by 
members known, used, and taken for granted, is, for 
members doing sociology, a fundamental phenomenon..... 
Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday activities 
as members' methods for making those same activities 
visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical- 
purposes, i. e., as "accountable", as organisations of 
commonplace everyday activities. ' (Garfinkel 1984 
[1967]: vii) 
An ethnoc,, ethodological approach thus rejects the assumption that 
accounts of paranormal experiences. furnish a series of passive or 
neutral comments upon those experiences. It suggests that these 
experiences are unavoidably constituted through accounts. That is, 
the sense or meaning of the events, the 'facticity' and 'objectivity' 
of the phenomena - the actual character of the experiences - are 
inextricably tied to people's natural language descriptive practices, 
and the 'lay' or common-sense reasoning which is embedded in those 
practices. 
These arguments entail two important implications for previous 
sociological studies of the paranormal. First, they indicate that 
an important issue - how members themselves provide for the 
recognisably paranormal character of experiences - has been 
systematically ignored in the attempts to furnish rational 
50 
sociological explanations. Second, they emphasise that the actual 
phenomena - the experiences - are inseparable from the discourse 
through which they are made available for public or analytic 
inspection. This lends a sociological dimension to Blackmore's 
statement that parapsychological 'phenomena are essentially accounts 
of people's experiences' (1988b: 56). 
ä Science and the Paranormal 
Throughout this chapter we have touched upon the relationship 
between science and the paranormal on several 3ccasions. In a 
previous section we noted that the occultists have sought credibility 
for their own knowledge claims by arguing for an underlying 
similarity between the forces they study and those studied by 
orthodox scientists. The development of a thoroughly scientific 
parapsychology exemplifies the attempt to establish the rationality 
of claims of the paranormal. It is useful to consider one approach 
to the sociological examination of this relationship because it 
connects with a theme central to this chapter, and which was 
discussed in the last section - the way in which a sociological 
project should proceed in dealing with the accounts of incidents, the 
ontological status of which is at best, problematic, or worse, 
controversial. 
Insofar as the occultists' claims often contradict the established 
body of knowledge about how the universe works, it is surprising 
that these have not received more extensive critical attention from 
members of the orthodox scientific community. Most scientists do not 
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attend to occult pronouncements because they regard these as being 
simply too ridiculous to merit serious attention. An example is the 
way that archeologists, physicists, astrophysicists and biologists 
ignored von Daniken's (1971; 1974) thesis that the Earth was visited 
by extraterrestrials who genetically interfered with primate life 
forms to evolve homo sapiens (Story 1976). Despite the lack of 
widespread and stringent critical analysis, however, there has been a 
consistent core of scientists who try to debunk the claims for the 
existence of anomalies. This is particularly evident in the 
skeptical attacks on the status of parapsychology, the scientific 
study of psychic phenomena, and on the concerted efforts of a small 
group of scientists to provide normal explanations for sightings of 
UFOs. The critical debate between parapsychologists and their 
skeptical colleagues has been of particular interest to sociologists 
of science. By debating parapsychology's claim to be a legitimate 
member of the community of scientific subjects, the protagonists 
publically display, and thereby make available to the sociologists, 
the usually tacit and undisclosed criteria concerning what is to 
count as valid science. In assessing the merits of a series of 
experiments, for example, the protagonists exhibit the assumptions 
that inform - their reasoning as to what constitutes correct 
experimental protocol. 
In an earlier section we discussed the history of the scientific 
study of paranormal phenomena. Critics have rejected 
parapsychologists' claim to scientific status, suggesting that their 
activities and alleged phenomena fail to meet the criteria for 
acceptable scientific activity. They argue that parapsychologists 
cannot produce a replicable demonstration of the existence of some 
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paranormal force or event. Also, they state that it provides no 
theoretical understanding of the phenomena it claims to study. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that some parapsychologists are committed 
to certain mystical or metaphysical beliefs which may influence their 
ability to take an objective stance to their work. Finally, critics 
can take any set of positive experimental results and reconstruct the 
protocol of the experiment to reveal how those results could have 
been produced fraudulently. The mere suggestion of fraud is often 
treated as sufficient to warrant skepticism not only of that set of 
experiments, but also suspicion of other work by the experimenters 
involved. (The criticisms of parapsychology have been comprehensively 
documented by Collins and Pinch [1979]). 
Many of the criticisms of parapsychology, however, can also be 
applied to established areas of orthodox scientific practice. For 
example, astronomers and geophysicists cannot provide replicable 
experiments to prove conclusively specific theories. Quantum 
mechanics, an established, albeit highly specialised, area of 
orthodox physics, provides little theoretical framework for the 
observations of the scientists. It is equally possible to argue that 
any orthodox scientist, committed to working within the domain of a 
particular theory, might be tempted to produce fraudulent results to 
support his/her viewpoint. A case in point is the work of the 
psychologist Sir Cyril Burt, - who, it is popularly believed, 
fabricated experimental results to ensure support for his theories 
about intelligence and genetic endowment. 
Pinch (1979) has noted that part of the appeal of the fraud 
hypothesis is that it can be employed as if it provides alternative 
scientific hypotheses to account for positive experimental results. 
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It is possible to argue, however, that the suggestion of fraud can 
not legitimately be used in this way insofar as it fails to meet the 
criteria for proper scientific practice: it cannot furnish replicable 
results, it is supported by no solid theoretical base and is 
supported by the 'metaphysical' bias of its users. In short, many 
of the criticisms directed at the parapsychologists can be equally 
applied to one of the main tactics employed by the critics. 
One perspective in the sociology of science suggests that the 
investigator should be impartial. to the truth or falsity of the 
knowledge claims advocated by the branch of science in question. 
Also, that the procedures of science by which the truth or falsity 
of an issue is decided are inherently social practices. That a 
branch of science proposes the factual character of one knowledge 
claim does not then mean that that claim is beyond the scope of 
sociological inquiry; rather, it means that the sociologist can 
investigate the social mechanisms through which that claim's status 
as an objectively-available fact is constructed. Furthermore, 
empirical investigation of the social production of such knowledge 
claims can reveal the processes through which the actual character of 
a phenomenon is negotiated. 
Collins (1976) studied the response of the parapsychological 
community to one scientist's claims to have shown that plants were 
able to detect, and respond emotionally, to the destruction of live 
shrimps through immersion in boiling water. Such a startling claim 
led to attempts to replicate the original experiment; these provided 
little support for the findings of the original research. The 
parapsychologist who conducted the original study, however, argued 
that the replications which had produced counter-evidence to his own 
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were not in fact replications at all, but were subtly different in 
design, and that these variables were responsible for the contrary 
evidence. For example, the original experimenter used one method to 
detect the physiological changes in the plants which, he claimed, 
were evidence of an emotional reaction to the death of the shrimps. 
Other scientists suggested alternative ways of measuring this 
reaction. Each method, however, inevitably imputed different 
qualities to the phenomenon. Thus, in the ways that scientists 
debated which were the proper procedures by which to study the 
phenomenon of plant response, they were actively, though not 
deliberately, engaged in negotiating the properties of the 
phenomenon. As Collins puts it: 
'Now, if in selecting a set of experiments to 
constitute a successful series of replications, 
believers in [the phenomenon] select one set as 
competent, and another as incompetent.... then in 
negotiating the acceptance of this set - in which 
project they may well succeed if they are persuasive- 
they have not only negotiated the existence of the 
phenomenon, but have also negotiated its character- 
i. e. it is of such a nature as to be affected by 
certain subtle psychic influences.... In this way, can a 
new phenomenon come into existence, and thus can its 
characteristics be socially determined' (Collins 1976: 
27) 
The debate within the parapsychological community as to the 
adequacy of the subsequent replications has the same character as 
equivalent debates in orthodox science; for example, in the attempts 
to replicate a working model of what is known as a T. E. A laser 
(Collins 1974), and in the debate following the claim that gravity 
waves had been detected (Collins 1975). In these relatively 
advanced areas of scientific activity, in which no consensus had 
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emerged, either with respect to the definition of the phenomenon or 
the ways to proceed experimentally, routine scientific debate 
concerning the most suitable procedure entailed a negotiation of the 
character of the phenomenon. 
The relativist position in the sociology of science clearly echoes 
many of the features of an ethnomethodological position on the study 
of accounts of paranormal experiences. Firstly, we have seen how, 
throughout previous sociological investigation of belief in and 
experience of paranormal forces, sociologists have implicitly or 
explicitly adopted a position with regard to the ontological status 
of the events and beliefs under study. Some have assumed that 
anomalies are real, and have conducted their research accordingly 
(for example, Nelson 1976), but the majority have assumed that these 
anomalies do not exist. The relativist perspective of the sociology 
of science suggests that not only is it unnecessary to adopt such a 
position, but that in doing so the more interesting sociological 
questions are obscured. 
Collins and Pinch's (1979; 1983) research into the production of 
parapsychological knowledge has revealed that what counts as valid 
knowledge is socially constructed. Furthermore, they have indicated 
that the actual character of phenomena, whether paranormal or not, is 
constructed through scientists' practices, and not objectively 
available 'in the world' waiting to be discovered. In doing this 
they have drawn attention to, and explicated, some of the resources 
which scientists use to do science. While they have explored this 
issue in their analyses of the ways that the scientific community 
generally negotiate the factual status of scientific claims, related 
questions can also inform the study of individual accounts of 
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paranormal experiences. For example, what linguistic resources do 
speakers use when describing anomalous events ? How are accounts 
organised so as to provide for the recognisable objectivity and 
facticity of the phenomenon ? Also, what tacit knowledge and 
assumptions about the paranormal inform accounts of actual 
experiences ? 
The primary advantage of asking questions such as these is two- 
fold. Firstly, the analyst is not compelled to adopt a position 
about the ultimate truth of the events which are reported; this in 
turn ensures that such assumptions are not explicitly or implicitly 
incorporated into the subsequent analyses. Secondly, this 
epistemological agnosticism generates interest in the ways that 
descriptions may provide for the actual character of the phenomena, 
rather then merely reflect it. 
6 Conclusions 
The sociological study of accounts of anomalous experiences is 
important for two reasons. First, Blackmore's sustained criticism 
of the contemporary form of parapsychology has led her to emphasise 
the importance of personal experiences as a proper subject matter 
for the discipline. In doing so, she has drawn attention to the 
fact that these experiences are available for subsequent 
investigation only through the descriptions of them provided by the 
experients. That is, the subject matter of parapsychology is 
inextricably connected to the medium through which those experiences 
are made public; indeed, until a method has been devised to obtain 
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other forms of data about these experiences, for the practical 
purpose of research, accounts are the phenomena. 
With notable exceptions, there has been no sociological interest 
in personal accounts of spontaneous experiences. Hitherto, the main 
objective was the description of the social-correlates of belief and 
existence, and the cultural conditions under which these may occur 
and flourish. Informing a variety of studies, however, was the 
assumption that the events which people have reported do not exist. 
This further ensured that personal accounts were deemed to be 
essentially accounts of error, and thereby uninteresting. 
While we may be correct to criticise these studies, they have been 
useful insofar as they have facilitated a sketch of the broad 
character of the sociological interest in accounts. We have noted 
Bourque and Back's (1971) argument that the linguistic resources 
available to speakers by virtue of their class position provides for 
the precise character of their transcendental experience. This 
implies that descriptions may not merely reflect the state of 
affairs to which they refer, but may in part constitute the events 
being reported. This connects with the ethnomethodological interest 
in the practical resources used by people when they describe their 
personal experiences. As an illustration of the 'constitutive' 
character of members' practical reasoning we looked to studies of 
science undertaken from a relativist position, in particular the work 
of Collins and Pinch. Their sociological agnosticism regarding the 
ontological status of scientific phenomena allowed them the 
opportunity to explicate the inherently social practices by which the 
character of these phenomena were negotiated. By establishing a 
similar positon with regard to the events which experients claim to 
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have witnessed, we can not only generate questions for empirical 
investigation, but also ensure that skeptical assumptions and 
judgements about the phenomena are not incorporated into the 
analysis. 
The discussion of ethnomethodology emphasised the resources people 
use and display in their activities. The resources available to 
speakers when describing their anomalous experiences are their tacit 
linguistic competences and communicative skills. Thus, to understand 
further the actvity of making an account, it is necessary to develop 
a more comprehensive appreciation of precisely these resources. In 
the next chapter, then, we will explore this issue by focusing on 
the practice of 'describing' as a social activity. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
'DESCRIBING' AS A SOCIAL ACTIVITY 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter I want to discuss in more detail the character of 
an ethnomethodological interest in accounts of paranormal 
experiences. , Within the sociological 
literature there is a 
considerable body of material devoted to exposition of Garfinkel's 
(1967) original works and their subsequent developments (Atkinson 
1978; Atkinson and Drew 1979; Benson and Hughes 1983; Douglas 1971; 
Garfinkel 1986; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970; Heritage 1984; Leiter 1980; 
Mehan 1975; Sparrock and Anderson 1986; Turner 1974). Consequently, 
to avoid unnecessary repetition, we will not here discuss the 
theoretical importance of his work, nor review the early history of 
ethnomethodological research. Instead, I will illustrate those 
ethnomethodological considerations which are germane to the present 
project by looking at the practice of 'describing' and arguing that 
it is a social activity. This will be done through a discussion of 
primarily empirical materials taken from occasions of talk in face- 
to-face interaction. 
This exercise. is useful for three reasons. First, by looking at 
actual instances of the activity of describing we gain a clear 
understanding of features of language use that would be difficult to 
explain through a simple exegesis of the relevant points. Second, as 
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the data to be analysed in this thesis are recorded verbal reports 
of personal experiences, it is useful to have an empirical 
illustration based on materials taken from talk in interaction. 
Third, since the increase in the availability of relatively 
sophisticated audio technology, parapsychologists and other 
researchers actively use audio recording facilities in data 
collection. Thus, it is increasingly becoming the case that the 
materials from which these researchers work are also verbal 
descriptions of paranormal phenomena. 
A second objective of this chapter is to review the ways that 
parapsychologists have used accounts of paranormal experiences as 
resources in their research. The vast majority of descriptions which 
parapsychologists have used have been written, rather than spoken. 
As the empirical chapters of this thesis will deal only with spoken 
accounts, it is important to clarify why it is useful to review this 
literature. 
In the ways that parapsychologists have used reports to investigate 
paranormal phenomena they have displayed some of the assumptions 
about language use, and the relationship between language and the 
world, which have informed their work. It will become clear that 
these assumptions are radically different from those that we will be 
adopting here. This exercise is useful, then, inasmuch as we can 
develop an understanding of alternative approaches to the study of 
accounts. Moreover, this exercise will reveal these assumptions to 
be fundamentally problematic, and that they impinge in the analysis 
of reports and also obtrude in the methodological procedures used by 
parapsychologists. Therefore, we can not only clarify the 
ethnomethodological position, but we may also illustrate why it is 
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preferable to traditional parapsychological approaches. 
2 Ethnomethodological analysis of language use 
The first point to consider is that no descriptive utterance can 
exhaust the particulars of the state of affairs to which it refers. 
The description of any event can be extended indefinitely. For 
example, with regards to the formulation of location, or 'place', 
Schegloff has written: 
'Were I now to formulate where my notes are, it would 
be correct to say that they are: right in front of me, 
next to the telephone, on the desk, in my office, in 
the office, in Room 213, in Lewisohn Hall, on campus, 
at school, at Columbia, in Morningside Heights, on the 
upper West Side, in Manhatten, in New York City, in New 
York State, in the North east, on the Eastern seaboard, 
in the United States, etc. Each of these terms could 
in some sense be correct.... were its relevance provided 
for. ' (Schegloff 1972b: 81) 
The point is, then, that any description or reference is produced 
from a potentially inexhaustible list of possible utterances, each 
of which is 'logically' correct or 'true' by any test of 
correspondence. By producing one descriptive utterance from a range 
of potentially usable items, however, the speaker 'brackets in' or 
indexes certain particulars of the referent of the description, and, 
at the same time, 'brackets out' other aspects of the referent. 
Thus, any description is a selection which brings to the recipient's 
attention specific particulars of the state of affairs being 
described. 
These features of the description, however, provide materials 
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which the recipient can inspect to identify the sense of that 
utterance which is relevant in that specific occasion. That is, the 
process whereby a descriptor actually comes to describe is a 
reflexive process: the recipient furnishes the sense of the 
utterance not only from what is said, but also from an inspection of 
the way in which it is said. As Garfinkel and Sacks put it: 
'We understand mastery of natural language to consist 
in this. In the particulars of his speech, a speaker, 
in concert with others, is able to gloss those 
particulars and is thereby meaning something different 
than he can say in so many. words; he is doing so over 
unknown contingencies in the actual occasions of 
interaction; and in so doing, the recognition that he 
is speaking and how he is speaking are specifically not 
matters for competent remarks.... The idea of 'meaning 
differently than he can say in so many words' requires 
comment. It is not so much 'differently than what he 
says' as that whatever he says provides the materials 
to be used in making out what he says. However 
extensive or explicit what a speaker says may be, it 
does not by its extensiveness or explicitness pose a 
task of deciding the correspondence between what he 
says and what he means that is resolved by citing his 
talk verbatim. Instead, the talk itself, in that it 
becomes a part of the self-same occasion of 
interaction, becomes another contingency of that 
interaction. It extends and elaborates indefinitely 
the circumstances it glosses and in this way it 
contributes to its own accountably sensible character. ' 
(Garfinkel and Sacks 1970: 344-5) [original emphasis] 
These points can be illustrated by a brief consideration of the 
following data, taken from a telephone conversation. 
(1) (Trip to Syracuse: 2) 
1C So tha: :t 
2I 
Lk-khhh 
3C Yihknow I really don't have a place tuh sta: y. 
4I 'hh0h"" :. h 
5 (. 2) 
6I 'hhh So yih not g'nna go up this weeken? 
7 (. 2) 
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8 C Nu:: h I don't think so. 
9 I How about the following weekend. 
10 (. 8) 
11 C 'hh Dat's the vacation isn't it? 





15 I Yihkno: w:: 
16 () 'hhh 
17 I: So we'll make it fer another ti: me then. 
(Drew 1984: 130) 
In this example C and I are talking about an arranged trip. 
Although one date has already been arranged I now explains that she 
cannot go on that trip. As an alternative she suggests another time, 
the next weekend. This extract, then, illustrates the way that the 
same state of affairs - in this case, a date . 
for a proposed 
arrangement - may be described in different ways For example, I 
refers to 'the following weekend' (line 9); it is noticeable, 
however, that C provides a re-description of the date of the proposal 
by substituting 'weekend' with 'vacation' (line 11). In doing so, 
he draws attention to features of that occasion which are glossed 
over, or not emphasised, by 'weekend'. These are that this suggested 
date for the trip, being also a vacation, or national holiday, cannot 
be treated as any weekend. In this sense, highlighting it as a 
vacation makes relevant not only that fact, but also makes relevant 
for that moment of the conversation certain inferences from the word 
'vacation' - that people routinely have events arranged for vacation 
weekends. That is, he provides a set of materials from which the 
recipient can infer that his selection of terms was designed to 
indicate why he would riot be able to go on that trip at that time. 
In tier subsequent utterances, I displays that she recognises this 
implication of C's re-description. 
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By re-describing the proposed occasion for a planned trip the 
speaker was able to achieve specific interactional tasks. He 
registered his inability to attend the trip on the dates suggested by 
his co-participant. He did not have to state explicitly that he 
could not attend; his selection of descriptive utterances 
accomplished this by permitting the recipient to analyse his 
utterance to locate its significance. His selection of the 
components of that utterance, then, was intimately relevant to the 
precise linguistic context of its use -a suggestion as to a possible 
date for a planned trip - and the action it constituted - an oblique 
but interactionally sensitive way of displaying his unavailability 
for that date. 
, 
We can observe from this example that the selection of a 
descriptive utterance may be influenced by the speaker's tacit 
reasoning about the actions it will perform. It illustrates further 
that such selection is not only informed by, but also displays, the 
speaker's practical reasoning as to the significant features of the 
precise location of the utterance. It is not that he is going away 
somewhere else that weekend, or that he dislikes the company of the 
caller, although these and other reasons may be correct; what 
matters, however, for the way that he deals with the caller, is that 
he can decline the suggested arrangement in such a way that he does 
not have to state explicitly that he is unable to go. Instead, he 
provides sufficient material for the recipient to come to this 
conclusion. 
When people talk they are presenting materials - what they say, how 
they say it - which may be used as the focus for and basis of moral 
and evaluative judgements. From the inspection of precisely these 
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materials co-participants can arrive at judgements and conclusions 
concerning the speaker's character, motives, intentions and so on, 
and the character of the talk in which they are engaged. In short, 
talk is a moral and inferential business. 
These features are displayed in the example used above. We can 
observe that the way the speaker re-describes the occasion for the 
suggested trip provides materials by which the recipient can infer 
that the speaker cannot make the trip. In doing this, he implies 
that the reason for not being able to make the trip rest in the 
features of weekends that are also vacations - visiting friends, or 
family, and so on. His unavailability, then. is not due to his 
reluctance, but rather the features of weekends that are also 
-vacations. Stating explicitly that he was not happy with the 
proposed date might lead to interactional difficulties: such a 
statement might warrant an account as to why he felt like this; it 
might seem unjustly abrupt, and possibly rude. Stating that he does 
not wish to go on a trip is a morally different business from 
stating that events beyond his control prevent him from complying 
with the caller's suggestions, or that, by virtue of the special 
place of vacations in people's calendars, his reluctance is related 
to the date suggested for the trip. 
This moral and inferential character of language has been noted by 
Sacks in his discussion of members' measurement systems. When 
discussing the ways that in which people order times, and the 
sequence of events in their lives, he provides a stark illustration 
of the bases for evaluations and judgements which are available in 
the materials produced in ordinary talk. He claims that such issues 
are interesting: 
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'when you can see that 'Tuesday' is the right sort of 
answer to the question, 'when did you have the cast 
taken off? ' under certain circumstances, and 'November 
the 11th' is an answer that would get you committed. ' 
(Sacks lecture 14, Fall 1967) 
The significance of this feature of language use is further 
demonstrated in the following data, taken from the transcript of a 
rape trial. In these extracts the counsel for the defence is cross- 
examining the prosecution's main witness, the victim of the alleged 
rape. Note that both parties produce what might be termed competing 
versions of ostensibly the same event. The point I wish to make is 
that the sense of the events being described is occasioned by the way 
it has been described. That is, the 'reality' of the incidents 















[referring to a club] it's where girls and fellas meet 
isn't it ? 
People go there. 
And during the evening, didn't Mr 0. (the defendant] come 
over to sit with you ? 
Sat at our table 
C [referring to a car journey taken by the witness and the 
defendant] some distance back up into the wood, wasn't 
it ? 
W It was up a path I don't know how far. 
(Drew forthcoming) 
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In (2) 'where girls and fellas meet' is countered by 'people go 
there'; in (3) 'sat at our table' contrasts with 'sit with you'; and 
in (4) 'it was up the path' is an alternative to 'some distance back 
into the wood'. These versions are not necessarily incompatible; 
they are not, in any logical sense, mutually exclusive. In ordinary 
conversation, furthermore, the provision of one such description 
would rarely merit the production of an alternative reading. The 
significance of these utterances rests in the way that the speakers 
have chosen to describe events so as to construct a specific set of 
inferable properties, from the inspection of which the over-hearing 
jury can come to those conclusions each party to the cross- 
examination wishes them to arrive at. 
. 
For example, in (3), the question 'didn't he come over to sit with 
you ?' implies that the witness was sufficiently familiar with the 
defendant that they might sit together in a club. From this the 
jury members might reasonably infer that the witness was in fact 
friendly with the defendant, and, possibly, not unaware of the nature 
of his interest in her. This information would be damaging to her 
testimony. By recasting the counsel's version of events, however, 
the witness makes it inferable that the defendant's behaviour was 
prompted not by any special relationship with her in particular, but 
was due to a familiarity with that group of people of which she was 
only one member. 
This extract suggests that the witness's choice of words with 
which to refer to events in question is in no way accidental, or 
determined by the properties of those events. These descriptions are 
inextricably tied to the moral business of building materials which 
warrant the inference that she was not in any way encouraging the man 
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who is alleged to have subsequently raped her. Furthermore, the 
descriptions of both the witness and the counsel reflect the 
relevance of their immediate circumstances -a courtroom trial. As 
such, they are designed with respect to the speakers' tasks in the 
course of the cross-examination. Through the construction of their 
utterances, both speakers are concerned to depict a version of 
reality favourable to their overriding objectives. 
To summarise, then, the ethnomethodological interest in language 
indicates a number of issues for analytic inspection. Firstly, that 
any description is necessarily a version of the state of affairs 
which has been composed from an indefinite range of possible 
utterances. And in the way that a description has been composed it 
displays the method by which this was accomplished; that is, the 
practical and methodic reasoning which informed the speaker's 
selection of precisely those items are displayed in the subsequent 
utterance. 
Secondly, that speakers design their utterances with a view to 
interactional concerns: that is, their descriptions are actions which 
accomplish specific tasks in the trajectory of the conversation. 
Furthermore, that the design of descriptive utterances is a resource 
by which the recipient can arrive at an understanding of the sense of 
that description for that occasion of its use. 
Thirdly, in the data examined above we can see that descriptions 
are designed to attend to moral issues: that is, descriptions can be 
constructed to provide material which furnishes inferences sensitive 
to the speaker's context and circumstances. 
An ethnomethodological perspective on language-use is indifferent 
to the ultimate truth or validity of the accounts. Instead, the 
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analytic interest focuses on the culturally-available, 'common-sense' 
sets of procedures which inform the production of accounts and 
descriptions. The correspondence of these to some state of affairs, 
supposedly independent of the linguistic resources through which they 
are described, is of no analytic interest. 
To conclude this section, then we can summarise those features 
involved in the process of constructing a description in ordinary 
language use, and which, therefore, are present also in the 
descriptions which constitute spoken accounts of paranormal 
phenomena: descriptive utterances are social activites; they are 
constructive, and are designed to attend to moral and interactional 
business, and thus are sensitive to the circumstances in which they 
are made. 
3 Parapsychology and the use of accounts 
In this section we will consider some of the ways in which 
parapsychologists have dealt with reports of paranormal events, the 
issues they have explored through these accounts and the assumptions 
about language use which have informed their approaches. 
As we observed in the previous chapter, parapsychology is primarily 
a laboratory-based scientific discipline. Throughout its history, 
however, there have been periods during which interest in spontaneous 
personal experiences flourished; during these periods 
parapsychologists turned to accounts as investigative resources. 
There are four phases of research which are relevant to this 
discussion: the early work of the founding fathers of the Society for 
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Psychical Research; attempts to employ statistics to analyse features 
of the experiences reported in accounts; the work of Louisa Rhine, 
and a recent resurgence of interest in the phenomenology of 
paranormal experiences. This latest development is particularly 
significant as it includes Blackmore's initiative to re-define the 
proper subject matter of parapsychology as the broader study of the 
experiential characteristics of the phenomena, which in turn points 
to a greater emphasis upon people's accounts of their experiences. 
[a] Early investigations 
When the Society for Psychical Reserch was founded in 1882 one of 
its principle aims was to produce evidence that psychical phenomena 
actually existed. The first major initiative by the Society looked 
at reports of spontaneous experiences to see if these could furnish 
such proof. The authors of 'Phantasms of the Living' (Gurney et al, 
1885) were not concerned solely with apparitions; they wrote in the 
introduction that the study was designed to deal with all types of 
cases where it appeared that the mind of one human being had 
influenced another without the apparent use of any of the ordinary 
five senses. Although apparitional cases were investigated they were 
significant only insofar as the authors believed that they indicated 
that telepathically-produced images could be created either as 
objective physical manifestations, or as mental images in the mind 
of the recipient. 
The investigation involved collecting and analysing accounts of 
spontaneous events. This reliance on human testimony was a matter of 
some concern to the authors as they considered that this was an 
inherently weak source of evidence, primarily due to the possibility 
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of lies, inaccurate description, distortions, misperceptions and so 
forth (Gurney et al 1885, Vol. I: 114-172). Thus, the investigators 
tried to find evidence which either corroborated or disconfirmed the 
stories of the principle witnesses or experients. This was done 
largely though soliciting evidence from other witnesses, cross- 
examining-witnesses and verifying the details of the reports. The 
researchers believed that a sufficiently detailed investigation could 
reveal the extent to which any one account was an accurate 
description of the facts of the incident, or, alternati%, ely, the 
product of 'unconscious exaggeration' from 'unskilled reporters' who 
were often 'emotionally implicated' in the phenomena they claimed to 
have observed (West 1946). 
There seems to be some confusion as to the precise number of cases 
which the investigators felt had been sufficiently verified: L. E. 
Rhine (1977) claims there were 702; Schouten (1981) claims there 
were 712. These cases had been most exhaustively investigated and 
were used as the material for the next stage of the research. This 
tried to identify the manner in which the telepathic images appeared 
in the percipient's consciousness. The analysis of the reports 
yielded two types of experience: where the impression was sensory and 
externalised, and where the impression was not sensory, but mental. 
Gurney et al believed they had provided convincing evidence that 
information transfer without the use of normal sensory channels did 
occur, and that they had identified some of the phenomenological 
features of these experiences. The importance of this research, 
however, was not that it proved the existence of telepathy and 
related phenomena (the scientific community of the day did not regard 
the evidence as conclusive): it is significant because it displays an 
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approach to the use of accounts which has persisted in parapsychology 
to the present day (for example, see Dow 1987a). 
Not all the early research explored psychic links between human 
beings. In his study of pre-cognition, Besterman (1932-1933) had 
subjects record their dreams. Of the 430 written decriptions he 
collected, 18 showed sufficient similarity to subsequent events to 
suggest premonition. Only 2 recorded dreams, however, were 
considered to be good cases. Thus, this research found no 
conclusive evidence for precognition. Saltmarsh (1934) analysed 
unsolicited written precognitions which had been submitted to the 
offices of the Society for Psychical Research. The 349 reports were 
analysed' in terms of two primary criteria: 'form' and 'content'. 
Form referred to whether the experience occurred as a dream, a waking 
experience or a hallucination, and so on. Content related to the 
message of the precognition: whether it concerned illness, death or 
merely trivial incidents. 
Tyrrell's (1942) research used as data only those cases of 
apparitions which had previously been investigated and verified. 
From these accounts of psychic experiences he located recurrent 
patterns and principle features from which he constructed a 
hypothetical or ideal type of the experience (Dale 1951; 1962). 
While these studies were certainly innovative and important at the 
time, a brief critical assessment illuminates some problematic areas. 
In all these studies the investigators were entirely dependent upon 
spoken or written accounts of experiences. By analysing the 
descriptions provided by experients the investigators sought to 
identify the primary features of the phenomena. As we have seen, 
however, descriptions do not merely correspond to a state of affairs 
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in the world: they are constructed from a vast range of possible 
descriptive items. Thus, any actual description is a version of the 
events to which it refers. Furthermore, the method by which a 
description has been constructed reflects the speaker's practical 
reasoning about the immediate circumstances, and what tasks the 
description is designed to do. Thus, the researcher is inevitably 
dependent upon the tacit interpretative work which is embodied in the 
accounts. A problem for the researchers, then, is that they 
inevitably have to reconstruct a version of what actually happened 
from materials which are already heavily imbued with the speakers' 
own tacit understandings and interpretations of the experience. (For 
a related discussion of these problems in the sociological study of. 
scientists' activities, see Gilbert and Mulkay 1984. ) 
Of course, early researchers were fully aware of difficulties 
involved in using human testimony. They considered misperception, 
elaboration and lies to be the primary obstacles to accurate 
information, and therefore tried to verify the details of the reports 
from the principle witnesses, usually by soliciting further 
descriptions from other individuals. In soliciting these 
corroborative statements, however, they obtained further 
descriptions which were, inevitably, also constructive and informed 
by the speakers' practical reasoning. Consequently, gathering more 
and more accounts only serves to increase the researchers' dependence 
upon the interpretative resources embodied in those descriptions. 
In the present research, however, we will focus specifically on the 
ways that speakers' practical reasoning (Garfinkel 1967) and 
interpretative practices (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984) inform the 
construction of accounts of paranormal experiences. By making these 
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the object of research the analyst is thus liberated from a 
dependence upon speakers' tacit communicative skills. Furthermore, 
as there is no emphasis upon obtaining the 'facts' of the case the 
analyst is relieved of the ponderous task of deciding which versions 
of events are the most 'accurate' or 'objective'. Finally, by 
focusing on the competences which inform accounts of paranormal 
experiences we can discard the view of language as a corresponding 
medium through which an investigator can, with varying degrees of 
success, obtain access to the 'objective' features of the world. 
Instead we may investigate empirically the descriptive practices 
through which speakers actively constitute the character of their 
experiences 
[b] Statistical analysis of features of accounts 
The conclusion that people's accounts provided inherently weak 
forms of evidence led to the attempt to employ statistics in the 
analysis of reported paranormal experiences. It was hoped that such 
rigorous techniques could overcome the problems caused by memory 
distortions and reporting effects. The objective was to isolate 
trends in accounts by content analysis, and subject these to 
mathematical analyses to locate any statistically significant 
patterns common to a wide number of reports. 
Green (1960) analysed 300 written reports of spontaneous phenomena. 
These accounts were coded, and a number of factors were assessed, for 
example, the type of extrasensory perception, the family relationship 
between the people involved, (if any) or the sense of conviction 
expressed by the percipient. Cases were then graded A to C according 
to their evidential value, in the assessment of which three factors 
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were taken into account: the quantity and quality of information 
claimed to have been telepathically transmitted; the corroboration of 
the account, and the time interval between the event and the 
subsequent report. It was felt that the greater the interval between 
the experience and the report, the greater the likelihood that 
'tricks of the memory' (Green 1960: 106) would obscure the 
experient's recollection of the event. Thus, Green shared with the 
authors of 'Phantasms of the Living' a view of the inherent 
fallibility of human memory. 
The procedure in this research was straightforward. The primary 
trends in the data were identified by the analyst and the 
relationship between these trends was then assessed statistically. 
The results of this analysis prompted Green to indicte the importance 
of various features associated with extrasensory experiences. For 
example, the percipients' attitude to the paranormal; the situation 
in which the event occurred; the 'motivation' of the incident (for 
example, did a family crisis precipitate telepathic communication 
between the members ? ); the dimensions along which ESP became 
manifest, and the psychological and neurological traits of the 
individuals involved. Green argued that her results were useful 
insofar as they indicate some consistent trends in the data, and 
that these recurrent features of the experience could be used by 
experimental parapsychologists to enable them to develop more 
sophisticated laboratory experiments. Thus, the interest in and 
importance of personal accounts was seen to rest in the way that 
these could be examined and exploited so as to enhance laboratory- 
based techniques. This exemplifies the way that parapsychologists 
have, in general, regarded personal reports as being somewhat 
76 
peripheral to the primary concerns of the discipline, thereby 
obscuring their importance as a topic for analysis; an observation 
echoed by Blackmore's recent appeals for a more experientially- 
oriented parapsychology. 
Statistical measures have been employed not only to assess the 
significance of relationships between consistent features of 
accounts, but also as a measure of the reliability of reports of 
spontaneous cases. The most exhaustive statistical analyses of this 
kind have been conducted by Schouten (1979; 1981; 1982). In each of 
these studies he employed the same methodology. He used accounts 
taken from collections which had already been employed in 
parapsychological analysis: collections gathered by Gurney et al 
(1885), Sannwald (1961) and L. E. Rhine (1981). In each case the 
collection was then coded into a variety of categories according to 
characteristics such as. the type of experience reported, the 
'seriousness' of the event, the relationship between the individuals 
involved, the sex and age of the percipient, the time interval 
between the event and the subsequent report, and so on. Schouten's 
statistical analyses revealed a high degree of consistency among 
reports of spontanous psychic experiences from different cultures, 
and which had been collected at various periods in the last hundred 
years. These consistencies, he argued, are good evidence that the 
principle features of psychic experiences are stable over time and 
are not influenced by culture; and which have, therefore, an 
objective existence independent of the individuals who experience 
them. 
Finally, Pratt (1969) employed statistics to study the accuracy of 
information produced by mediums. He devised an experiment in which 
77 
mediums were asked to use their clairvoyant powers to gather 
information about five subjects; the readings were conducted in the 
absence of the subjects. Each medium thus produced five reports 
which were then circulated to the subjects, who were not informed 
which of the various readings were meant to refer to them. The 
subjects then assessed each report: every item which they recognised 
to be an accurate comment about them was rated as a 'hit'. 
Statistics were then used to reveal if there was a significant 
number of hits when subjects rated those reports which were meant to 
be about them. 
There is a problem common to the three types of study exemplified 
by Green (1960), Schouten (1979; 1981; 1982) and Pratt (1969). In 
each case the research has an unexplicated dependence on the 
assumption that parts of an account can be unproblematically 
recognised as referring to, or corresponding with, a feature of the 
experience. To illustrate this we will consider Schouten's research. 
Schouten was interested in the relationship between various aspects 
of psychic experiences. Thus, in assessing the data - written 
accounts of spontaneous experiences - he had to decide the 
appropriate categories into which experiences could be coded. In 
order to do this, however, Schouten must have worked with some 
criteria by which he recognised certain features of accounts to merit 
classification in the appropriate category. These tacit assumptions 
about what counts as a specific characteristic of the experience are 
not explicated, yet they are crucially important: the criteria which 
are used when allocating aspects of an account into categories will 
in part determine the character of those categories. For example, 
Schouten considered the relationship between the type of experience 
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and the seriousness of the reported event; in particular, he wanted 
to test the hypothesis that ESP has a 'protective' function - that 
serious or traumatic information may be acquired and released into 
consciouness in such a way that the percipient is only vaguely aware 
that something is wrong. This is opposed to the sudden realisation 
of the facts of a serious incident. Thus, in these cases, ESP may 
inform the percipient that something awful has happened while not 
furnishing unambiguously shocking information. 
If we are to study the relationship between the type of psychic 
awareness and the seriousness of the incident then it is of 
paramount importance to know what counted as 'serious'. For example, 
would foreknowledge of a minor accident which happened to a close 
relative count as serious ? Would telepathic knowledge of the death 
of a distant friend count as serious ? That is, what procedures were 
used by the analyst to locate the 'serious' features of the events ? 
Equally in Green's analysis, there is no mention of the criteria 
which she used to. categorise accounts according to specific 
characteristics. The same arguments also apply to Pratt's study in 
which subjects were asked to read the mediums' descriptions and 
assess whether these contained accurate information about them. In 
order to make such decisions the subjects must have enaged in 
interpretative work through which they came to recognise the 
significance of some remarks, and the inaccuracy of others. That 
is, the extent to which a remark is seen to be an accurate 
representation of some feature of the subject is in part the product 
of the subect's use of tacit criteria by which assessments of 
accuracy are made. 
In each of these studies, then, statistical operations were used to 
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assess the mathematical relationship between apparently recurrent 
features of the experiences. In each case, however, these 
characteristics had been derived through the analysts' 
interpretations of accounts of those experiences. Thus, the 
categories subsequently assembled may not in fact reflect consistent 
features of the experiences, but more the consistent interpretative 
practices of the analyst. Consequently, the statistical operations 
may not tell us anything about the relationship of parts of the 
experience, but more about the relationship between the categories of 
the experience as constructed by the analyst. While there have been 
critical commentaries on the research by Schouten and Pratt (for 
example, Rush 1987; Scott 1972), there has been little attention 
given to identifying the range of problems that may arise from the 
ways in which data are coded prior to statistical analysis. 
[c] The work of Louisa Rhine 
Parapsychologists resorted to the use of statistics as a response 
to the problems of using human testimony. However, this was not the 
only response to these difficulties. In this section we will examine 
the work of Louisa Rhine, who has produced arguably the most 
extensive series of studies of spontaneous phenomena. Using as her 
data written reports of anomalous experiences she produced 18 
empirical research papers in the period from 1948 to 1981. The 
primary findings of this research were summarised in her book 'The 
Invisible Picture' (1981). 
In an editorial in the Journal of Parapsychology J. B. Rhine 
argued that information about spontaneous cases generated by reports 
could be useful to experimental parapsychologists (1948b). Voicing 
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an opinion shared by he and his wife, he claimed that laboratory 
research had produced sufficient evidence to prove the existence of 
psi. Consequently, further research should primarily explore the 
dimensions of this phenomenon. The Rhines felt that the base 
environment for these experiences was not the laboratory, but 
everyday life. Consequently, the reports which people made of their 
experiences could provide clues about the ways that the phenomena 
worked; these insights could then be used by experimental 
parapsychologists to refine their laboratory techniques. Largely 
due to the popular success of J. B. Rhine's earlier books, the 
Parapsychology Laboratory in which he and his wife worked had 
received approximately 14,000 unsolicited reports of spontaneous 
experiences. The task of analysing this material fell to Louisa 
Rhine. 
She began with the assumption that it would be impossible to try to 
verify all the accounts which had been submitted to the laboratory. 
There were too many, and a large number of the events had occurred 
many years before. Besides which, it was felt that the problems 
encountered by the early researchers' attempts to verify accounts 
proved that such a procedure, however meticulous, could not furnish 
sufficiently hard evidence. She considered that the massive number 
of reports collected by the laboratory presented a way by which she 
could avoid the reporting effects which had beleagured earlier work. 
She argued that these reporting effects were idiosyncratic, and 
influenced by the individual's psychology and the circumstances in 
which the account was made. She was convinced that laboratory 
research had shown that the phenomena were objective and stable. 
She reasoned, therefore, that over a large number of cases, the 
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reporting effects would not cause a consistent distorting influence. 
Consistencies in the accounts, however, would reflect robust aspects 
of the phenomena, and the way they worked in a natural environment. 
Isolating these features from a large array of reports would either 
reveal further information about the nature of the experience, or 
could be used as the basis for further statistical analyses to 
determine the relationship between features of the experience. 
In her procedure she classified each written account into one of a 
series of collections. Occasionally she would type versions of the 
accounts contained in the report, emphasising the important aspects. 
While this certainly eased the process of classifying such a large 
number of cases (Schouten 1981), it raises two issues: by what 
criteria did she code accounts into categories, and extract the 
'essential' aspects ? Also, when re-writing versions of people's 
letters, to what extent did she translate the account, or alter 
various parts of it ? Her own review of her work (1981) provides no 
information about the way these operations were performed. It 
appears that she assumed that the significant features of the 
experiences were glaringly self-evident, and that it was an 
unproblematic task for the analyst to identify them. For example, in 
her investigation of the forms of extrasensory perception (ESP) and 
psychokinesis (PK) she begins by observing that peoples' descriptions 
of their psychic experiences can be classified into three categories: 
some psi experiences are reported as appearing to the percipient's 
consciousness. like sudden photographs, some in the form of 
dramatisations, while others are symbolic in nature. Because these 
descriptions are commonly found in the data, she assumes that they 
represent stable properties of the phenomena. That is, they indicate 
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underlying processes by which psi-based information is transmitted. 
Her work is important because it emphasises the significance of 
systematic aspects of reports and accounts of experiences. By 
treating stable features of accounts as indicative of stable features 
of the underlying experience, she displays an analytic assumption 
which is common to many areas of sociological study: that if the same 
things are reported by a large number of different people, then this 
provides strong evidence that the events to which they all refer are 
objective features of the phenomenon, and not the product of 
distortions arising from 'reporting effects'. However, we have 
argued that descriptions are not vehicles for the passive 
representation of an external reality; rather, they are constructive. 
Furthermore, any'account is sensitive to, and will reflect, the 
circumstances in which it is produced; for example, the manner in 
which a description is designed will be senstive to interactional 
tasks which have been generated by the recipient's treatment of prior 
features of the account. Thus, any recurrent aspects of accounts may 
reflect the similarity in the social circumstances in which they are 
made, rather than any consistent properties of the state of affairs 
for which those utterances stand as accounts (Gilbert and Mulkay 
1984). Thus, it is more appropriate to examine descriptions to 
reveal how speakers systematically organise their discourse to 
address specifically interactional issues which recurrently arise in 
the process of making reports of paranormal experiences. 
By way of a conclusion to this section we may note that Rhine felt 
that 'reporting effects' - the ways that accounts were influenced by 
context, including the social context in which the account was made- 
were idiosyncratic, and therefore unworthy of analytic attention. 
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In constrast, the position outlined in this chapter suggests that the 
systematic features of accounts may be those aspects which are most 
sensitive to, and inextricably tied to, the recurrent social 
circumstances in which accounts are produced. 
[d] The phenomenology of paranormal experiences 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the 
phenomenology of paranormal experiences (Alvarado 1984; Schlitz 
1983). This was stimulated in part by a recognition of the 
importance of L. E. Rhine's work, and by a resurgence of interest in 
developing lines of parapsychological research which were not 
laboratory-based. (For example, see Dow's (1987a) plea for a more 
'active' approach to the study of psychic phenomena. ) 
The use of the term 'phenomenology' bears little resemblance to the 
sophisticated philosophical and sociological analyses which bear this 
title. Parapsychologists use the concept simply to refer to the 
primary features of an experience as the individual perceives it. A 
similar concern informs phenomenological studies in other areas of 
anomaly research: Evans' (1984: 1987) research on entity encounters; 
Hufford's (1982) study of 'Old Hag' attacks; Schwarz's (1977) study 
of Men-in-Black appearances, and Uriondo's (1980) work on UFO 
sightings. For the purpose of this discussion we will discuss the 
phenomenological approach in relation to research on out-of-the-body 
experiences, or OBEs. This has two advantages: it allows us to 
focus on its development as an alternative perspective; moreover, it 
takes us directly to a consideration of Blackmore's recent arguments 
for an experientially-based parapsychology, which have led her to a 
position which parallels the approach adopted in the present 
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research. 
Early research noted several phenomenological characteristics of 
the OBE: the sensation of floating and soaring, being able to see the 
physical body while separted from it, observing a cord linking the 
astral body to the physical, and the sensation of shock upon re- 
entering the physical body (Muldoon and Carrington 1951). Based on 
differences in the characteristics of the experience, Crookall (1961; 
1964) suggested a distinction between 'natural' and 'enforced' OBEs. 
Natural OBEs occur gradually,. and mental and perceptual awareness is 
heightened; enforced OBEs occur suddenly, and cognitive facilities 
are not qualitatively increased, but in many cases actually diminish. 
Crookall's analysis is based upon people's descriptions of their 
perceptions and thoughts during the experience, and upon their 
accounts of the circumstances leading up to the onset of the 
phenomenon. 
Alvarado (1984) failed to to find evidence to support Crookall's 
distinction between the two primary forms of the OBE. Blackmore 
(1982a) has suggested that a more useful distinction might be between 
spontaneous and induced OBEs; for example, there may be a qualitative 
difference between OBEs induced by meditation, and those which occur 
as a result of a sudden accident. 
A more radical departure 
analysis of the OBE is revealed 
the experience by virtue of 
paranormal phenomenon. Despite 
and Carrington (1951), Crookall 
she is not convinced that there 
of which is separable from 
from traditional parapsychological 
in her attitude to those aspects of 
which it is traditionally known as a 
the evidence from studies by Muldoon 
(1961; 1964) and Morris et al (1978), 
are two components to the self, one 
the physical body. Neither is she 
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sympathetic to arguments that the experience itself is merely the 
phenomenological expression of a period of heightened consciousness 
which facilitates extra-sensory perception. Aligning herself with 
more psychological theories of the OBE (for a review of these, see 
Rogo 1982), she attempts to devise an explanation which focuses on 
underlying cognitive and neurological processes. In contrast to 
many psychological theories, however, she tries to incorporate and 
account for the details of the percipient's reported experience 
(Blackmore 1982a; 1983; 1984b). 
As we have already mentioned, Blackmore's position is that 
parapsychology would be more productive if research was not primarily 
motivated by an attempt to find psi. She argues that the basis of 
the problem is that psi has always been defined negatively: that is, 
in terms of what it is not. Consequently, as orthodox science 
continues to provide rational explanations for an increasing number 
of phenomena which were hitherto considered to be indications of psi, 
the brief of the discipline actually diminishes. Furthermore, as psi 
becomes increasingly elusive, there occurs a corresponding urgency in 
parapsychologists' attempts to find it, and thereby furnish their 
study with a legitimate subject matter. However, this has led to a 
great emphasis upon the development of particularly sophisticated 
laboratory-based techniques, as a consquence of which parapsychology 
has not developed the range of empirical or theoretical innovations 
necesary to maintain its momentum as an emergent and radical science. 
Thus, Blackmore considers that, over the past century, parapsychology 
has failed to generate any novel lines of inquiry. Using Lakatos' 
phrase, there have been no 'progressive problem shifts' within the 
subject. 
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As a response to this dilemma she argues for a new parapsychology 
which is not hide-bound to psi, but which takes as its starting 
point the fact that people do report and describe anomalous 
experiences. It is this observation that leads her to recommend that 
greater analytic attention be paid to the accounts of these 
occurrences. 
Blackmore's arguments bring her to a position similar to that which 
forms the point of departure for the present research: an interest in 
people's accounts of their spontaneous paranormal experiences. 
Through a sympathetic but critical examination of her research, 
however, we can delineate the precise advantages of the analytic 
perspective which is derived from an ethnomethodological 
consideration of language use. We will consider her research on 
Near-Death Experiences, or NDEs, as this develops themes which she 
explored in her work on OBEs. 
A typical scenario may be: during an important operation a patient 
'dies': that is, she becomes clinically dead. While theatre staff 
try to resuscitate the patient, she undergoes a variety of 
experiences: the sensation of leaving the body, meeting deceased 
relatives and travelling through a tunnel towards a brilliant white 
light. Just before reaching the source of the light, however, the 
attempts of the theatre staff to resuscitate the patient are 
successful, and the patient 'regains unconsciousness' under 
anaesthetic. 
For many the NDE has a profound mystical and spiritual importance; 
indeed, many of those who have had this experience have subsequently 
developed an active spiritual life. However, Blackmore accounts for 
the phenomenological features of the experience in terms of cognitive 
87 
processes. For example, the 'tunnel experience' is a common feature 
of NDEs. Blackmore claims that we can account for this by tracing 
the neurological pathways through which electrical impulses are 
transmitted through the brain in times of physiogical crises, such 
as the initial stages of death. Thus, the experience of travelling 
down a tunnel is a function of cortical 'winding down' prior to the 
cessation of all activity. As she eloquently phrases it, Near-Death 
Experiences are 'visions from a dying brain'. 
This review is necessarily incohate, and many imaginative parts of 
her explanation have been overlooked (a more comprehensive outline of 
her theory can be found in Blackmore [1988c]). We can question 
whether this approach is a 'new' parapsychology, however: by looking 
to neurological processes to account for the perceived dimensions of 
the experiences, she seems to be claiming that the phenomenon is not 
paranormal at all. While she is careful to point out that these 
experiences may have a life-changing impact upon the individual, and 
that in no way does she wish to deny or undermine their profound 
significance for people that have them, it seems more appropriate to 
regard her work as largely skeptical of the paranormal, rather than a 
new approach within parapsychology. 
Blackmore attempts to account for the consistent features of 
experiences by building theoretical explantions which focus on 
cognitive procedures. She generates the consistent features which 
are to be explained in two ways: through survey methods, which she 
also used in her research on OBEs; and through her knowledge of 
reports which are available in the literature, or which she has 
acquired in the course of her research. Both of these methods may be 
problematic. For example, within the social sciences there has been 
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a sustained critical examination of the usefulness of survey methods 
(e. g., Cicourel 1964). Furthermore, in the discussion of L. E. 
Rhine's work we listed the difficulties involved in assuming that 
recurrent descriptive passages unproblematically represent stable 
features of the experience. Thus, there may be problems with the way 
that she uses reports to generate those aspects of the experience 
which she then tries to explain. 
Focusing on the organised ways that language is used by speakers 
when making accounts, however, allows us to make two significant 
advances. First, analysis of accounts is not conducted with a view 
to arbitrating on whether the reported experience actually 'happened' 
as described, or whether it was the product of determinant cognitive 
processes. That is, the 'ultimate' truth or falsity of accounts does 
not interfere with the goal of the analysis. In this respect, then, 
the ethnomethodological perspective on the study of accounts of 
anomalous phenomena may be regarded as a more radical development 
than Blackmore's new parapsychology. Secondly, we have emphasised 
that interactional considerations are addressed by and mediated 
through descriptive practices. Thus, recurrent features of verbal 
accounts can be examined to illuminate the ways in which speakers' 
attend to interactional issues which are commonly generated in the 
process of making a verbal report of a personal paranormal 
experience. 
Although we have subjected Blackmore's research to critical 
attention, by way of a conclusion to this section we should note that 
through her work she has displayed a single-minded determination to 
illuminate and tackle fundamental problems which beset 
parapsychology, while at the same time generating empirically- 
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investigable research topics and explanatory theories. Although we 
may disagree with some of her claims, and question some assumptions 
which have informed her use of accounts as a resource in studying 
paranormal phenomena, her work nonetheless represents a coherent, 
controversial and ambitious challenge to established 
parapsychological research. 1 
4 'Social Intelligence' about anomalies 
In the last chapter it was argued that the 'agnosticism' advocated 
by sociologists of science working in a relativist tradition is 
applicable to the analysis of accounts of paranormal experiences. In 
this final section we will consider the work of the sociologist Ron 
Westrum, whose own research is broadly related to the concerns of the 
present study, and which addresses issues generated by a relativist 
perspective on the study of scientific knowledge. 
In a series of papers, Westrum has attempted to identify the 
social processes which intervene between the production of an account 
of a direct experience of an anomaly, and the reception of the 
subsequent report by the relevant authorities and experts. The focus 
of his research is summarised thus: 'Where anomalies are concerned, 
then, the question of how one knows what one knows cannot be 
ignored' (Westrum 1977: 296). He is interested in the system of 
social intelligence through which reports of anomalies are 
transmitted to bodies such as scientific research groups, or in the 
1 For a useful discussion of Blackmore's position within 
parapsychology, see Beloff's (1987) review of her (1986a) account of 
her work as a 'career' parapsychologist. 
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case of Unidentified Flying Objects in the United States, the Air 
Force. He has examined social intelligence processes by looking at 
the progress of reports of meteorites (1978), sea monsters (1979b) 
and UFOs (1977; 1979a); to illustrate his work we will look at the 
transmission of UFO reports. 
Westrum observes that. there are a number of processes which 
influence whether or not a report comes to the attention of an 
official agency. Sightings of aerial anomalies are reported 
initially to friends, family or colleagues. If these accounts 
receive sympathetic hearings from these primary groups this increases 
the chance that the witness will then make a formal report to 
secondary agencies, such as the police or a newspaper. 
When reports are submitted to the press they may be filed, and not 
used immediately. Newspaper editors often work with the policy that 
when enough reports have been compiled only then will they run a 
story on UFOs, using the accounts they have collected. Such a story, 
however, may generate the impression that there has been a sudden 
increase in the number of sightings. Consequently, the story may 
create the effect of a wave or 'flap' of UFO reports. Similarly, 
media coverage may encourage reports from people who have had 
experiences, but who had hitherto failed to report them. Often these 
accounts report events which happened several years prior to the date 
of the newspaper article. Such details, however, are often omitted 
from any subsequent follow-up articles, thus substantiating the 
impression that there is a rapid increase in contemporary sightings. 
Westrum further notes that a sympathetic story will encourage others 
to come forward with their personal experiences, while a story that 
is flippant, or ridicules the witnesses, will deter others from 
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coming forward. 
During the 1950's and 1960's the United States Air Force received 
large numbers of accounts of UFO sightings. Even an official agency 
such as the Air Force, however, was not a neutral transmitter of 
information. The structure of military channels of communication 
ensured that reports made to a local office or camp had to be passed 
on to a central body authorised to investigate sightings. Thus, 
personnel in the local camps had to decide which reports to submit 
to their superiors for further investigation. Westrum argues that 
these personnel were under implicit pressure to submit only those 
cases which they felt the investigative teams could most easily 
account for in terms of natural phenomena, or misidentification. 
That is, they actively withheld reports which seemed most strange, or 
difficult to explain in conventional terms. The types of account 
received by official government agencies were influenced by the 
personnel's understanding of the tacit policy operated by their 
superiors. In the case of the UFO investigations, the Air Force 
policy was to 'debunk' reports (Hyneck 1972; 1978); particularly 
difficult cases were filtered out by subordinate personnel. 
Westrum emphasises the factors which intervene between the 
experience of a phenomenon and the receipt of the subsequent account 
by an appropriate body, and draws attention to the ways that these 
factors may crucially influence any subsequent knowledge about the 
nature of the events which are reported. The main problem with his 
work is that his consideration of social factors is limited only to 
the events which influence accounts after they have been produced. 
To complement his work, then, it is necessary to examine the 
sociological processes which inhere in the way that accounts are 
92 
produced in face-to-face interaction. 
We have seen in previous sections that descriptions can be analysed 
to reveal the interactional tasks for which they have been designed. 
These interactional tasks will be generated by the particular 
circumstances in which the account is made. For example, the 
immediately prior trajectory of an account will furnish a context 
which may influence the character of other aspects of the account. 
Furthermore, the speakers' analyses of the way in which the recipient 
appears to be reacting to the account will inform subsequent 
utterances. Thus, the issues which informed Westrum's work - the 
social processes that impinge upon and shape the nature of reports- 
can be explored also by examining the interactional environment in 
which accounts are produced. 
5 Conclusions 
The general advantages of an ethnomethodological perspective on the 
analysis of language use have been outlined elsewhere by various 
authors (e. g., Atkinson 1978; Atkinson and Drew 1979; Gilbert and 
Mulkay 1984: Potter and Wetherell 1987). In this chapter I have 
tried to illustrate these with specific reference to ways that 
accounts are used in parapsychological research, and also in 
Westrum's work on the social influences upon the transmission of 
reports. I have argued that spoken accounts of anomalous experiences 
are socially-organised, constructive and sensitive to the 
interactional environment in which they are made. This perspective 
has been contrasted with assumptions that implicitly inform the ways 
93 
that parapsychologists have treated accounts in their research This 
not only revealed some problematic features of parapsychological 
approaches, but also allowed us to clarify the character of an 
ethnomethodological approach. 
There are two approaches to the analysis of language use which, to 
a varying degree, have a common intellectual beckground in 
ethnomethodology: conversation analysis (e. g., Atkinson and Heritage 
1984), and discourse analysis (e. g. Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). Prior 
to any empirical analysis it is therefore necessary to examine these 
two approaches in more detail. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE USE 
1 Introduction 
In the last chapter we sketched the broad features of an 
ethnomethodological perspective to language use, and discussed how 
this differs to the ways in which parapsychologists have 
traditionally used accounts of paranormal phenomena as resources in 
their research. In this chapter I want to discuss the two 
contemporary empirical approaches in the study of naturally 
occurring talk: conversation analysis (CA) and discourse analysis 
(DA). 
2 Conversation analysis 
Over the past twenty years CA has emerged as one of the primary 
methodologies in the analysis of spoken interaction produced in 
natural settings. There are a number of introductions to, and 
overviews of, this research tradition (Atkinson and Drew 1979; 
Atkinson and Heritage 1984; Button and Lee 1987: Heritage 1984; 1989; 
Levinson 1983; Psathas 1979; Schenkein 1978; Sudnow 1972; Wootton 
1989). Consequently, we need only provide a brief discussion of this 
mode of analysis. 
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Initiated by the pioneering work of Harvey Sacks, and his 
colleagues Emmanual Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, conversation 
analysis sets out to detail the methodic and socially-organised 
character of the practical reasoning which informs the production and 
recognition of orderly sequences of naturally occuring talk. CA is a 
radical departure from previous forms of analysis, such as the 
discourse analysis informed by linguistics and Speech Act theory 
(Coulthard 1977; Brown and Yule 1983), and componential analysis 
(Becker et al 1961) in that the production of utterances, and the 
sense they obtain, is seen as an accomplishment, the achievement of 
which is inextricably tied up with the immediate linguistic context 
in which they are produced. That is, words used in talk are not to 
be studied as semantic units, but are products which are designed in 
terms of the interactions being negotiated through the talk -a 
complaint, a request, an accusation, and so on. The design that they 
exhibit is informed by the speakers' competences, methods and 
practical reasoning as to the character of these interactional tasks. 
The analytic objective, then is to explicate the procedures on which 
participants rely to make sense of other people's talk, and to 
furnish an occasioned sense for their own utterances. Insofar as 
the same sets of interpretative practices inform both the production 
and understanding of utterances, the orderly accomplishment of talk 
in interaction is regarded as the consequence of the operation of 
socially-organised cultural skills and competences. 
The bulk of conversation analytic research has focused on 
'ordinary' conversation, such as face-to-face and telephone 
interaction, and thus has not directly attended to issues relating to 
the context in which the talk occurs, or the overriding goals or 
96 
motives of the speakers, except where these 'contexts' or 'motives' 
may be oriented to by speakers, and may inform the trajectory of 
conversational sequences. The data to be studied in this thesis are 
accounts of paranormal experiences which are produced in the course 
of informal interviews. Insofar as these interviews were pre- 
arranged, and the objective behind them was to solicit accounts of 
precisely these types of experiences, these data cannot be treated as 
naturally-occurring materials in the same way as talk which occurs 
spontaneously in everyday interaction. This does not invalidate the 
applicability of conversation analytic forms of investigation for the 
purposes of this research. In recent years there has been a move to 
study talk which occurs in institutional settings; for example, in 
courtroom interaction (Atkinson and Drew 1979), in news interviews 
(Greatbatch 1983; 1988), in political speeches (Atkinson 1984a: 
1984b) in doctor-patient interaction (Heath 1984; 1986) and in the 
organisation of sales interaction (Pinch and Clark 1986). These 
studies show that the distinctive character of talk in specific 
situations is a consequence of the ways in which speakers adapt 
procedures which are recurrent features of everyday talk to the 
specific particulars of the circumstances. Thus, talk in naturally- 
occuring situations has a foundational or 'bed-rock' status in 
relation to language use in specific settings. 
In summary, then, CA is not restricted solely to the study of 
conversation. Indeed, by virtue of its sensitivity to the 
foundational character of interactional strategies and competences 
through which everyday talk is organised, it provides a particularly 
delicate tool for the analysis of talk produced in a variety of 
circumstances. (These and related issues will be discussed in more 
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detail in section 5. ) 
3 Discourse analysis 
The term 'discourse analysis' is used to refer to a wide range of 
analytic techniques and empirical and theoretical research. In this 
chapter I will use it to refer only to the form of analysis 
developed in sociology by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), and extended to 
social psychology by Potter and Wetherell (1987). Although DA seeks 
to analyse all forms of discourse, written and spoken, it has been 
used to deal with recorded materials produced from informal 
interviews, and is thus clearly relevant to the concerns of this 
project. Unlike CA, DA is a relatively new development, and while 
there have been debates which deal with specific aspects of the 
discourse analytic programme, (see, for example, the contributions of 
Gilbert and Mulkay, Gilbert, and Abell, in Gilbert and Abell [1983]) 
there has been little attempt to assess its broader significance as 
a methodological development. In this section, then, we will 
initially look at the development of DA, plotting its rise as a 
response to methodological problems which emerged in the sociological 
study of science. Although a plea for an emphasis upon the study of 
discourse was made in Mulkay et al's (1982) paper, a more 
comprehensive exegesis was presented in Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), 
and it is this text that we will concentrate upon. 
Gilbert and Mulkay (hereafter G&M) study one dispute in the area of 
biochemistry known as oxidative phosphorylation, which was concerned 
with the mechanisms by which chemical and other kinds of energy are 
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stored within cell structures. Their initial objective was to 
provide a sociological description of the nature of the debate. To 
this end they collected taped interviews with the various biochemists 
involved in the dispute, read the relevant research papers and 
obtained informal communications between the participants, such as 
letters and notes. Their preliminary analysis of this material 
presented them with a problem: within their data there were a variety 
of different versions of the debate, each of which was plausible and 
convincing. Furthermore, they noted that any one feature of the 
debate, such as the significance of a series of experimental studies, 
could be described and accounted for in a number of different ways. 
G&M realise that the variability they observed in scientists' 
discourse was not peculiar to their project, but is a constituent 
feature of any research which relies upon the use of accounts of 
behaviour as an investigative resource. The recognition that 
variability was an inherent feature of their data posed a serious 
problem: in the analytic enterprise of furnishing a single, 
definitive account of any specific state of affairs, how should the 
analyst account for and deal with the diverse range of versions 
available in the data ? 
They illustrate the customary procedures used by sociologists to 
negotiate these difficulties: 
(1) obtain statements by interview or by observation in a natural 
setting; 
(2) look fo-r broad similarities between the statements; 
(3) if similarities are found, these are taken at face value; that 
is, as accurate reflections of what is 'really' happening; 
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(4) construct a generalised version of participants' accounts and 
present these as an analytic conclusion. 
While they identify this procedure with regard to one specific 
study, they claim that this formula may be applicable to many other 
areas of sociological research. 
Based on their recognition of the variability of discourse, G&M 
identify a number of crucial problems in this traditional approach. 
Firstly, they cite Halliday (1978) to indicate that all discourse is 
inextricably bound up in the context of its production. They claim, 
therefore, that ostensible similarities between different accounts 
cannot be taken to indicate consistent features about the world. 
These may be due to the overriding similarities in the circumstances 
in which the discourse is produced. They argue that: 
'Without detailed examination of the linguistic 
exchanges between researcher and participant, and 
without some kind of informed understanding of the 
social generation of participants' accounts of action, 
it is not possible to use these accounts to provide 
sociologically valuable information about the actions 
in which analysts... are interested. ' (Gilbert and 
Mulkay 1984: 7) 
They go on to examine the role played by the researcher when 
confronted by a variety of accounts of ostensibly the 'same' event or 
circumstances. In particular, they address the argument that, on 
account of his/her expertise, the analyst can attend to the valuable 
information while locating and dispensing with the irrelevant 
material. They argue that this position rests on the assumption 
that any social event has one 'true' meaning. They indicate, 
however, that social activities are the 'repositories' of multiple 
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meanings, by which they mean that the 'same' circumstances can be 
described in a variety of ways to emphasise different features. Which 
particular formulation is invoked as a warrantable version at anyone 
time will not only depend upon the context in which the account is 
produced, but also the interactional tasks attended to in the course 
of producing that account. In this, they make a critical point 
which is applicable to various forms of ethnographic study of 
participants' talk. That is, a native language speaker's decision to 
use a particular word may be intimately related to specifically 
interactional circumstances. 1 There can be no privilege for the 
analyst's decision as to what constitutes an objective or accurate 
version of the world simply because any state of affairs can sustain 
a range of descriptions, the warrant for any one of which rests in 
the circumstances of its production. 
In recognition of these problems G&M advocate, as an alternative, 
the study of participants' discourse to reveal the interpretative 
practices, embodied in discourse, by which accounts of beliefs and 
actions are organised in 'contextually appropriate ways' (1984: 14). 
They do not attend to one set of statements about the world as if any 
one form of discourse can furnish more relevent or accurate material. 
Instead, they seek to explicate the systematic properties of 
language use through which scientists construct their accounts in a 
range of formal and informal environments. 
They note that their arguments have broader implications for 
sociological research. GSM observe that hitherto sociologists have 
displayed a commitment to provide one definitve account of that 
1 For an illustration, see Wootton's analysis of Frake's study 
of medical naming in primitive tribes (Wootton 1975: chapter 3). 
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feature of the social world being studied, and thus consequently, 
they are obliged to make inferences about participants' actions from 
discourse about those actions. (We may note, parenthetically, that 
this was true also of parapsychologists confronted with accounts of 
paranormal experiences. ) G&M argue that the analysis of 
participants' discourse ensures that the analyst is liberated from a 
dependence upon one specific set of interpretative practices. That 
is, instead of trying to reconstruct 'what actually happened' from 
accounts, the object of study becomes the ways that accounts are 
organised through certain sets of interpretative practices to 
construct a version of 'what actually happened'. Furthermore, 
insofar as no form of discourse can be considered to be superior to 
any other for the purpose of analysis, they are obliged to consider 
all forms of discourse, and all varieties of versions of events 
contained within that data. Thus, they claim to be able to remain 
'closer to their data' (1984: 14). Most importantly, they argue that 
the study of discourse is necessarily prior to, if not a replacement 
for, traditional forms of analysis: 
'Given that participants' use of language can never 
be taken as literally descriptive, it seems 
methodologically essential that we pay more 
attention... to the systematic ways in which our 
subjects fashion their discourse. Traditional 
questions... will continue to remain unanswered, and 
unanswerable, until we improve our understanding of how 
social actors construct the data which constitute the 
raw material for our own interpretative efforts. ' 
(Gilbert and Mulkay 1984: 15) 
Having provided a critique of traditional approaches in the 
sociological study of science, they go on to present examples of the 
analyses furnished by a DA perspective. For example, G&M identify 
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the scientists' use of two interpretative repetoires, or linguisitc 
registers: the empiricist and contingent repetoires. They analyse 
how these registers are systematically employed by scientists to 
produce asymmetrical accounts of error and correct belief which are 
appropriate to varying contexts. 
It is not necessary to review in detail the empirical analyses 
conducted by G&M; the purpose of this review is merely to indicate 
that the mode of analysis they devised echoes the analytic issues 
addressed in the present research. Furthermore, DA was generated 
from a consideration of methodological difficulties which also 
obtrude in the ways in which parapsychologists have hitherto relied 
upon accounts. of anomalous experiences. 
G&M's work makes three important contributions. Firstly, they draw 
attention to and articulate profoundly important methodological 
problems which beset sociological research in which the analyst 
relies upon accounts, descriptions and reports of the area of social 
life under study. Critics of G&M have noted somewhat dismissively 
that variability in discourse should come as no surprise (for 
example, Abell 1983). One reviewer has gone as far to belittle 
G&M's contribution by implying it amounts to little more than the 
observation that 'some scientists write their scientific papers in 
impersonal terms but in interviews talk about science personally' 
(Halfpenny, 1988: 177). These observations fail to appreciate the 
way in which G&M identify confounding issues which arise from the 
nature of language use, and fashion an analytic approach by which to 
deal with them. 
Secondly, DA generates a whole new range of issues for analytic 
inspection, and provides a methodology by which such questions can be 
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addressed. 
Thirdly, in drawing attention to the essentially reflexive and 
constructive character of discourse, it raises questions about the 
forms of language use in which analytic or sociological claims are 
made. 
Developing this last point, Mulkay (1985), has gone on to devise 
new forms of sociological analysis. In these the constitutive 
nature of discourse, especially the analyst's discourse in the 
construction of an academic text, is exploited as a resource to 
reveal more clearly the linguistic processes through which 
participants provide for the sense of, and thereby fashion, their 
social activities. While this specific development has generated 
further research (for example Mulkay, Ashmore and Pinch, 1988) the 
most sustained development of Gilbert and Mulkay's approach has been 
within social psychology, particularly Potter and Wetherell's (1987) 
attempt to explore the implications of the variable and constructive 
aspects of language use for traditional methodologies and theories. 
P&W's programme stems from the acceptance of the following points: 
(1) language is used variably; 
(2) language is constructed and constructive; 
(3) any one state of affairs can be described in a number of ways, 
therefore 
(4) there will be variation in accounts; 
(5) there is no foolproof way to deal with variation and sift 
through accounts so as to locate the best and most informative 
reports, 
(6) consequently, the purpose of analysis should be to study the 
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ways that language is used flexibly and constructively. 
While these points reiterate aspects of Gilbert and Mulkay's 
arguments, they are significant because P&W discuss them in relation 
to, and emphasise the implications for, many areas of orthodox social 
psychology. In subsequent chapters they deal with specific areas of 
research, exposing the methodological deficiencies of each area and 
drawing out the implications of these problems. They also provide 
illustrative examples of the ways in which their version of DA avoids 
these difficulties, while still furnishing analyses relevant to 
traditional social psychological concerns. 
As an example we can note P&W's discussion of the concept of 
social representations (Moscovici 1981; 1982; 1984). Social 
representations are mental entities, made up from concepts and 
images, which in each case have an identifiable structure. The 
theory argues that social representations provide the means by which 
people are able to understand and evaluate their social worlds. To 
understand thoughts, attitudes and attributions, then, it is 
necessary to grasp the social representations from which these other 
social psychological phenomenona emerge. The theory also draws a 
powerful link between varying social collectivities and different 
forms of social representations, insofar as it is claimed they mark 
the boundary of any social group. The all-embracing character of the 
theory promises a theoretical underpinning to a diverse area of 
issues in the subject. At the same time, it avoids coarse cognitive 
reductionism: that is, the level at which the theory works is 
intended to be irreducibly social psychological. 
P&W make a number of important criticisms of this theory, 
105 
employing the concept of linguistic repetoire developed in Gilbert 
and Mulkay (1984). First, they argue that the theory of social 
representations has been hindered by its attachment to a notion of 
the social group as a fixed entity which can be identified insofar as 
the members all subscribe to the same social representations. 
Research usually begins by looking at the social representations of 
homogenous groups. This procedure hinges upon the assumption, 
however, that common representations can be seen to indicate the 
limit of a group. As P&W state 'There is a vicious circle of 
identifying representations through groups, and assuming groups 
define representations. ' (Potter and Wetherell 198: 143) 
Second, the authors cite the predominantly. ethnomethodological 
argument that group membership is an occasioned phenomenon. That is, 
the way in which a speaker may allign with or reject membership of 
groups and categories may be related to the specific social and 
interactional context in which group membership becomes salient. 
(Garfinkel 1967; Sacks 1979; ). Thus, a claim to be a member of a 
specific group may not be taken to indicate a series of fixed and 
determinate statuses. This is clearly problematic for a theory which 
is informed by the notion that social groups are static entities. 
Third, P&W claim that the theory implicitly relies on the idea 
that social representations are, inherently, mental entities to which 
the analyst can obtain access through participants' discourse. This 
obscures the essential indexicality and variability of the language 
through which people talk about their group affiliations. 
As an alternative, P&W suggest that the notion of linguistic 
repetoires overcomes the problems they identify with the theory of 
social representations. For example, by emphasising the ways that 
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different people use language variably, in accordance with discrete 
contexts and specific interactional tasks, the analyst does not have 
to endorse a circular argument about the relations between groups and 
representations, nor subscribe to the view that social phenomena must 
be informed, at some level, by an underlying cognitive reality. 
Although P&W's discourse analysis is in most respects the same as 
the variety espoused in Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), there are some 
interesting differences. The P&W version, for example, addresses a 
wide variety of issues in social psychology, whereas Gilbert and 
Mulkay remain in one specific area of sociology. Unlike Gilbert and 
Mulkay, P&W explicitly acknowledge the ethnomethodological 
influences on their work. Furthermore, P&W draw extensively on 
conversation analytic studies of naturally occurring talk, rather 
than studies inspired directly by Garfinkel's (1967) writings. For 
example, their chapter on accounts uses Atkinson and Drew's (1979) 
research on courtroom interaction; and their critique of social 
psychological attempts to study categorisation is informed directly 
by material from Sacks' early lectures. 
Unlike Gilbert and Mulkay, P&W try to describe the process of 
'doing' discourse analysis. While they are moderately successful 
when dealing with the more mundane aspects of the process - for 
example, identifying research questions, collecting material and 
transcribing tape recorded interviews - their attempt to articulate 
the analytic processes which occur when they confront any actual data 
is, by their own admission, less satisfactory. The authors point 
explicitly to their inability to provide a coherent account of what 
they do. To compensate they invoke comparisons between the skills 
involved in riding a bike and analysing data. Both sets of skills 
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are, in Ryle's (1949) terms, 'knowledge how' rather than 'knowledge 
that'. They go on to emphasise the inductive search for recurrent 
patterns in the data, looking for broad similarities, not only in the 
ways that people use language to discuss any specific topic, but also 
in terms of the functions for which any stretch of discourse has been 
designed. 
Finally, P&W provide a brief discussion of reflexivity, an issue 
which has become centrally important to the form of DA pursued in 
Mulkay's subsequent research (Mulkay 1985). They acknowledge that 
their arguments about the constructive nature of language use apply 
also to their own writings, including the discourse through which 
such observations are made. This does not disqualify their work. 
They claim: 
'It is possible to acknowledge that one's own language 
is constructing a version of the world, while 
proceeding with analysing texts and their implications 
for people's social and political lives. In this 
respect, discourse analysts are simply more honest 
than other researchers, recognizing their own work is 
not immune from the social psychological processes 
being studied. Most of the time, therefore, the most 
practical way of dealing with this issue is simply to 
get on with it, and not to get either paralyzed by or 
caught tip in the infinite regresses possible. ' (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987: 182) 
In this passage the authors present a practical resolution to 
problems inherent in reflexivity. (For an alternative resolution see 
Ashmore, 1985). That is, although any academic text can be examined 
to see how it constructs one version of the world, it is permissible 
to suspend, or 'bracket off' that possibility when attempting to 
provide an analysis of a state of affairs. Consequently, the 
analyst can legitimately deploy the rhetoric of more 'positivist' 
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domains of social science research in the manner through which any 
'findings' are presented. 
To summarise, then, the objective of discourse analysis is to 
examine the functional use of language in a range of forms, and in a 
variety of contexts. Consequently, it is available as a technique by 
which to study spoken accounts of paranormal experiences. In the 
following section we will examine some problems with this mode of 
analysis, and thereby clarify the character of the analyses to be 
developed in subsequent chapters. 
4 Discourse analysis: a critical appreciation 
In this section we will take a critical look at some aspects of DA, 
developing points raised primarily in Gilbert and Mulkay's text, but 
which are also applicable to subsequent developments. The discussion 
will be organised around four themes: the processes by which word 
selection is accomplished, the notion of 'interpretative resources', 
the issue of occasioned social identity, and the relationship between 
talk and the context in which it occurs. 
[a] Word selection 
We may start with Gilbert and Mulkay's observation that discourse 
is variable. That is, in their research they recognised that they 
were being provided with different accounts of the same thing, by the 
same or different people, often by the same people within the space 
of a single interview. At the root of this observation is a series 
of philosophical issues which are highly germane to their overall 
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project. These concern the ways that words obtain their meaning. 
Garfinkel (1967) lists a variety of philosophers who emphasise 
the indexical nature of some classes of words: that is, that they 
obtain their meaning from the circumstances in which they are used. 
More recently, Barnes and Law (1976) argued that all words and 
utterances can be treated as indexical, and derive their sense from 
situations in which they are used. Clearly, then, the meaning of a 
word cannot be derived from some set of criterial features which 
inhere in the nature of the object or state of affairs in the world 
to which the word refers (Wittgenstein 1953; Pitkin 1972; Waismann 
1965). What Gilbert and Mulkay have observed, then, is one 
consequence of the fact that descriptions and referential utterances 
are not determined by the properties of the features to which they 
refer. Rather, utterances are composed of selections available to 
the speaker. Any description or reference is produced from a 
potentially inexhaustible list of possible utterances. As the 
literal correctness of an item cannot be cited as the warrant for its 
use insofar as any number of items may be equally waranted, this 
raises a crucial question: what principles inform a speaker's 
actual selections from this range of possibilities ? 
Gilbert and Mulkay attend to this issue by highlighting the 
context-dependence of accounts. In varying contexts, speakers may 
produce varying accounts. In their research, they found that 
scientists employed an empiricist repetoire in formal contexts, and a 
contingent repetoire in informal contexts. The emphasis on 
repetoires or linguistic registers requires comment. According to 
Potter and Wetherell, a repetoire is: 
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'constituted through a limited range of terms used in 
particular stylistic and grammatical constructions. 
Often a repetoire will be organised around specific 
metaphors and figures of speech (tropes).... ' (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987: 149) 
Discourse analysts are interested in the way that speakers use 
language functionally: to achieve certain ends in the course of 
interaction. In the interviews conducted by Gilbert and Mulkay, for 
example, the scientists were attempting to depict their work as being 
guided by their adherence to the correct procedure of scientific 
activity; they described alternative, contradictory work in terms of 
contingent, personal or social factors which were depicted as having 
prevented other scientists reaching the conclusions they did. That 
is, in constructing a persuasive account of the superiority of their 
work in the course of face-to-face interaction with the interviewers, 
they employed two repetoires by which to characterise asymmetrically 
the specific state of affairs being described. 
We have noted previously that no state of affairs constrains the 
referential items which may be used to decribe it; also, that 
speakers have a range of descriptive items from which to choose in 
constructing a description. Gilbert and Mulkay's emphasis upon the 
importance of linguistic registers offers a way to understand the 
procedures by which a specific series of selections is made: items 
are selected in accord with the linguistic repetoire being used, and 
the broader tasks which are negotiated through that repetoire. Thus, 
a scientist may select specific utterances to refer to another 
scientist's work to imply that he is not sufficiently objective, but 
motivated by personal interests. To understand the procedures of 
word selection, then, it is necessary to analyse the activity the 
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speaker is engaging in through the use of a specific linguistic 
repetoire. 
Such repetoires may be invoked over large sequences of talk. By 
implication, then, the actions being accomplished are located at a 
general level of the discourse. It is this point however, that is 
problematic: conversation analysis has revealed that the activities 
accomplished in talk are located at a sequential and interactional 
order of detail for which the notion of linguistic repetoire cannot 
provide an account. This feature of talk can be illustrated by 
reference to materials introduced in the previous chapter. 
(1) (Trip to Syracuse: 2) 
1 C So tha: r: t 
2 1 Lk-khhh 
3 C Yihknow I really don't have a place tuh sta: y. 
4 I hh0h:: .. h 5 (. 2) 
6 I 'hhh So yih not g'nna go up this weeken? 
7 (. 2) 
8 C Nu:: h I don't think so. 
9 I How about the following weekend. 
-10 (. 8) 
11 C 'hh Dat's the vacation isn't it? 
12 I hhhhh Oh:. hh ALright so: - no ha: ssle, (. ) 
13 sro 
14 C L. Ye: h, 
15 I Yihkno: w:: 
16 () hhh 
17 1 So we'll make it fer another ti: me then. 
(Drew 1984a: 130) 
A brief analysis of this extract illustrated three important 
points. Firstly, in substituting 'vacation' for 'weekend' the 
speaker displays his inability to comply with the co-participant's 
suggestion, but makes this inferable from his utterance, rather than 
stating it explicitly. Secondly, this indicates that the selection 
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of items from which to fashion an utterance is ordered at the most 
elementary level - single word selection. Thirdly, the reasoning 
which informs the composition and use of the utterance exhibits a 
sensitivity to the sequential environment in which it occurs. 
Gilbert and Mulkay invoke the concept of the linguistic repetoire 
to allow them to focus on the functional character of language use. 
This ensures, however, that the level at which they locate and 
analyse these functions in the scientists' reports is far too gross 
to take account of precisely these three delicate features of the 
moment-by-moment, practical accomplishment of talk. They can not 
provide either an account for, or an analysis of, the ways that 
speakers themselves resolve the problem of selection. Indeed, the 
mantle of the linguistic repetoire occludes from the range of issues 
to be investigated the fine-grained orderly production of talk. This 
is paradoxical in light of their claim that the 'detailed examination 
of linguistic exchanges', and an 'informed understanding of the 
social generation of participants' accounts' (1984: 7) should be a 
prelude to, if not a replacement for, traditional sociological forms 
of analysis. 
[b] Interpretative resources 
One of Gilbert and Mulkay's primary contributions is their 
emphasis upon the ways in which interpretative resources are embodied 
in accounts. Through analysis of these socially-organised resources 
they reveal the manner in which scientists provide for the character 
of their actions and beliefs. In their critique of traditional 
sociological studies they draw attention to the ways in which 
researchers have an unexplicated reliance upon precisely these 
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features of language use. However, conversation analytic studies 
indicate that Gilbert and Mulkay's formulation of these issues falls 
short of providing a detailed account of the character of these 
'interpretative practices', and how these may be utilised as 
interactional resources. 
The last set of data illustrated that speakers' resources in the 
business of talk are intimately related to the sequences in which 
they are produced. That is, the word 'vacation' obtained much of 
its sense, and inferential power, from the speaker's use of it in an 
utterance which was immediately after a proposal for the date of an 
excursion. The speaker was relying on the interpretative practices 
which were embodied, and thereby made available, through the 
structure of adjacency pairs, and this specific type of adjacency 
pairing in particular. A further example of this is Schegloff's 
(1984) analysis of one single misunderstanding between a radio 
presenter and a listener who is ringing in to participate in a 
discussion. 
(2) 
1 B An's- an () we were discussing, it tur- 
2 it comes down, he s- he says, I-I-you've talked 
3 with thi- si- i- about this many time. I said, 
4 it come down t'this: = 
5 B =Our main difference: I feel that a government, 
6 i- the main thing, is- th-the purpose a'the 
7 government, is, what is best for the country. 
8 A Mmhmm 
9 B He says, governments, an' you know he keeps- he 
10 talks about governments, they sh- the thing that 
11 they sh'd do is what's right or wrong. 
12 A For whom. 
13 B Well he says- he- L 
14 A By what standard 
15 B That's what- that's exactly what I mean. he s- 
16 but he says.... 
(Schegloff 1984: 28) 
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Schegloff is interested in the way that the utterance 'For whom' 
(line 12) is treated by B, firstly as a direct question, and then, 
after clarification by A (line 14), as a token of affiliation or 
agreement for the position A had been taking. His analysis reveals 
that the root of the misunderstanding - the ambiguity of the 
utterance - derives from its placement in a specific sequence of 
exchanges. For example, its occurrence after B's talk about the 
behaviour of governments, (lines 9 to 11), and its production as a 
'question', the type of which B may himself have produced as a 
statement in a sequence such as 'he said.... and I said "For whom? "' 
Moreover, and relevant to the point being made in this section, 
Schegloff argues that A's resolution of the ambiguity is informed by 
a. set of inferences available to the participant from a consideration 
of the structural features of the talk up to that point. That is, 
one set of resources to which participants can resort in coming to an 
understanding of the sense of an utterance are the structural and 
orgänisational properties of the way that it is produced. Speakers 
rely on resources which inhere in the trajectory of prior sequences. 
We may regard these resources as being locally occasioned: that is, 
furnished by the precise character of the preceding interaction. 
The point is this: Gilbert and Mulkay correctly emphasise the 
importance of interpretative resources in the ways that participants 
provide for, and recognise, the sense of an utterance, or series of 
utterances, produced by co-participants. They do not emphasise, 
however, that precise interpretations made by speakers may be 
informed by inferences which are available by virtue of the 
participant's analysis of the structural aspects and sequential 
trajectory of the prior interaction. This entails a further 
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implication: that the resources which are available to participants 
to furnish a recognisable sense for any specific utterance or stretch 
of talk are occasioned phenomena: that is, produced locally, and tied 
to the specific trajectory of the talk. 
[c] Negotiated social identities 
A related point is that Gilbert and Mulkay's approach fails to deal 
with the ways in which participants employ social identities, and 
assumptions deriving from category membership, as occasioned 
interactional resources. Discourse analysis tends to gloss the 
procedures by which identities can be negotiated and used by 
interactants for practical ends. For example, Gilbert and Mulkay's 
interview material comes from scientists talking about their 
research, and the research of their colleagues. In their analysis of 
these materials Gilbert and Mulkay attend only to the their 
interviewees' identities as scientists. That is, because it is 
'scientists' who are talking (rather than 'employees', 'loyal-but- 
reluctant colleagues', 'rigorously empirical scientists' or simply 
people talking about their jobs to a sociologist) it transpires that 
the talk is 'scientists' talk. Analysing a stretch of talk by 
reference to only one category, however, obscures the ways that 
category memberships may be fluid, and occasioned to attend to the 
fine-grained features of interaction. More seriously, an examination 
of discourse which was founded on the assumption that the materials 
being analysed were 'scientists' talk could furnish empirically 
incorrect analyses. This could occur, not only in the way that the 
actual details of the talk had been adumbrated under the gross 
categorisation accorded to the respective statuses, but also in the 
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way that the analyst's expectations of what is actually occurring in 
the talk may be influenced by knowledge relating to scientists and 
their activites, or any other pre-analytic variable the analyst might 
impute to the data. That is, the use of broad categories to define 
the character of an interaction, prior to any detailed empirical 
analysis, may in fact distort the very features of the data in which 
the analyst is interested. 
This is not just an analytic observation: the application and 
negotiation of category membership is a 'real life' concern for 
interactants. This is illustrated in Drew's (1987) analysis of 'po- 
faced' receipts of teases. He reveals that these types of humorous 
remarks recurrently occur after a sequence in which a speaker has 
been engaging in a stretch of talk that is recognisably overdone, or 
exaggerated. A tease, then, acts as a form of social control of 
minor conversational transgressions. Of more interest, however, are 
the procedures by which interactants contruct the teases. He shows 
that the teaser focuses on category memberships which are inferable 
from the speaker's prior stretch of over-elaborated talk, and subtly 
amends them to provide a 'tease implicated deviant identity' (Drew 
1987: 246). By producing a po-faced responses, recipients of teases 
display a recognition of the deviant identity ascribed to them, and 
produce responses which are essentially defensive, and designed to 
re-affirm a non-deviant identity. 
When teasing, speakers are using as a resource commonly available 
knowledge about category membership, and the way any membership can 
be used as the basis for inferences about the people to whom the 
category applies. This set of common-sense knowledge is highly 
organised (Sacks, 1972) and has been shown to be a resource for 
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interactants in a variety of circumstances: in police interrogations 
(Watson 1983; Wowk 1984); in the assessment of 'deviant' identities 
(Smith 1978; Watson and Weinberg 1982); in courtoom interaction (Drew 
1978; 1984); in the ways that members' themselves control the 
membership of certain categories (Sacks 1979; Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt forthcoming); as a resource employed by sales people 
(Schenkein 1978) and as a resource in the reporting of extraordinary 
events (Jefferson 1984a; see also Chapter Four, section 3). Each of 
these studies explicates the way that speakers rely on socially- 
organised, culturally-available means by which to provide for the 
locally-occasioned character of either their identity, or the 
identity of someone else. 
[d] The relationship between talk and context 
In this final section I want to look briefly at how notions of 
'context' may inform analytic considerations. To illustrate these 
points it is necessary to discuss the ways in which previous 
sociological research has treated this issue. 
In traditional sociolinguistic studies, the analyst employs the 
context of the talk as a resource to analyse exchanges. An example 
is Becker et al's (1961) ethnographic study of medical students. To 
understand the argot of the medical students Becker observed the 
occasions in which the students used words and phrases of in which he 
was interested. From the contexts of their use, Becker tried to 
identify the meaning of the word and its relationship to the 
student's peception of his/her activity. This method, however, led 
Becker to make some questionable interpretations, on one occasion 
ascribing a meaning to a word which the students themselves 
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subsequently rejected. 
Atkinson and Drew (1979) set out to indicate the order of problem 
which emerges if common-sensically available devices - members' 
abilities - are used as unexplicated resources for analytic purposes, 
especially with regard to ethnographic research. They note, 
firstly, that an ethnographer's description of any scene can be 
indefinitely extended; any closure is therefore a practical 
achievement. Merely being present at a scene to observe the 
circumstances in which a word is used, then, does not immediately 
ensure that the observer has a more objective, or even informed, 
perspective on the events being studied. Furthermore, and as 
discourse analysts have been keen to point out, language is a 
constructive medium: any description, then, is consitutive of that 
to which it refers. This is not only a problem for the ethnographer 
in compiling a description of some event; it obtrudes when using 
participants' descriptions to gain a better access to the meaning or 
use of the utterances in which the analyst is interested. Even if an 
ethnographer can argue for the validity of the description of the 
circumstances in which an utterance occurs, it is still necessary to 
warrant the claim the participants themselves were orienting to these 
features as being the relevant aspects of the context. 
Schegloff (1987a) has elaborated this point. He argues that most 
social science research which deals with discourse has emphasised 
that differences in such discourses are essentially the products of 
the context in which they occur. Thus, for example, in hospitals, 
talk will be analysed as representative of, and inextricably tied to, 
the statuses and roles commonly found in such institutions: doctor- 
patient, doctor-nurse, or nurse-patient discourse. In a courtroom we 
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will find lawyer-witness speech patterns. The same applies in 
classrooms, boardrooms, therepy counselling sessions, and so on. 
Now while it is clearly possible for a sociologist to assemble a 
description of the context, it is not clear that this will help 
clarify the discourse in that circumstance. We have already seen 
that any state of affairs in the world can legitimately be described 
in a massive variety of ways. Thus, to use a description as a 
sociological tool in analysis is to elevate one possible description 
above all others. 
While Gilbert and Mulkay are in no way guilty of the same errors, 
their research does not attend to the ways in which context is a 
relevant issue, only for the analyst, but also for the participants 
during interaction. Conversation analytic research, however, seeks 
to explicate the participants' orientation to features of the 
circumstances, and reveal how these orientations inform the 
production of utterances, and are thereby displayed as being relevant 
for practical reasons. One important corollary of this emphasis is 
that the actual trajectory of the prior talk is itself a contingency 
of the interaction, and may be oriented to as an immediate context by 
which the relevance of an utterance may be displayed. For example, 
the relevant aspects of an interaction may be embarrassment, a 
question, an excuse, a repair, an instruction, and so on. Moreover, 
such relevancies may be fluid, and variable between specific 
utterances, or even within single turns, and reflect not 'macro' or 
institutional features, but the specific path of the interaction. 
These features of the way that speakers orient to context are 
examined primarily through conversation analytic studies. 
During interaction speakers orient to features of the environment, 
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whether physical, social, or the sequential trajectory of their 
talk. Insofar as they are being produced for the benefit of co- 
interactants, utterances will be designed to display these occasioned 
relevancies. They are available also, therefore, for the overhearing 
analyst. A more useful understanding of the 'context' of any 
utterance, then, is to see how speakers exhibit in their talk their 
understanding of the context, and display the manner in which it is 
relevant for their talk. In Schegloff's words: 
'a notion like "context" will have to remain 
substantively contentless, and uncommitted to any 
prespecified referent and be instead "programmatically 
relevant" [that is] relevant in principle, but with a 
sense always to-be-discovered rather than given-to-be- 
applied. ' (Schegloff 1987b: 112) 
There are, then, a number of features of naturally occurring talk 
which are overlooked in a discourse analytic research programme. 
Firstly, the orderly features of utterance design which occur in the 
fine-grained detail of interaction, including single word selection 
procedures, are obscured by the emphasis upon the broad linguistic 
repetoires which inform stretches of talk. Secondly, conversation 
analysts have indicated that structural and sequential features of 
discourse are themselves resources available to participants, either 
to understand another's talk, or to furnish a sense for their oun 
utterances. These features of the 'interpretive practices' and 
'organisation' of talk do not receive detailed attention in 
discourse analysis. Thirdly, research has revealed that category 
membership and occasi. uned social identities are resources by which 
participants can assemble their activites in interaction. Finally, 
t1'c" results from participants' analyses of the relevancies to which 
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their talk is related will inform the production of utterances, and 
the intepretation of other's utterances. Insofar as these analyses 
are displayed primarily for the benefit of co-participants, they are 
thereby made available for analytic inspection. Thus, the 
'relevant' features of the context of any talk will be those which 
are oriented to by speakers themselves. Occasioned social 
identities, and the practical accomplishment of the relevance of 
specific circumstances, are central features of naturally occurring 
talk, yet they do not receive a systematic treatment within discourse 
analysis. 
In this section I have delineated the features of language use 
which are of analytic interest in this research by comparing the 
broad features of discourse analysis with some objectives of, and 
insights from, conversation analytic studies. By this comparison we 
have been able to detail the range of issues which may be explored in 
subsequent chapters, and to account for the use of a conversation 
analytic framework. Lest this review of discourse analysis seem 
overly critical, however, by way of a conclusion to this section I 
want to discuss briefly the complementary features of discourse and 
conversation analysis, and also point to the primary contributions 
from the former. 
I take it that both forms of analysis share a common objective in 
examining the ways in which members use natural language resources 
to furnish the sense of their activities, and of their social worlds. 
Indeed, it is only by virtue of the underlying similarities between 
the two approaches that we have been able to use one to illuminate 
the finer details of the other. However, whereas conversation 
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analysts have largely neglected to tackle the implications of their 
approach to language for more traditional areas of sociology, the 
critical arguments from discourse analysis have had important 
consequences. (We may note, parenthetically, that the assessment of 
parapsychological methods in Chapter Two was informed by, and 
reflected, arguments used to emphasise the importance of discourse 
analysis. ) This is particularly true of Potter and Wetherell's 
impact on social psychology. Prior to their work, the study of 
discourse in social psychology was concerned largely with drawing 
links between actual utterances and the underlying cognitive 
dispositions they were taken to index. Furthermore, the 
methodological problems which beset the sociological study of science 
applied also to a range of important issues in social psychology. By 
providing the same type of critical arguments, focusing on the 
constructive and variable dimensions of language, and particularly 
informed by an ethnomethodological position, Potter and Wetherell 
have been able to draw attention to the deficiencies in traditional 
social psychological methodology, the implications of which are only 
beginning to become apparent to social psychologists. At this stage 
it is not clear what the ultimate impact this body of sustained 
criticism will be. However, in a time when the discipline is heavily 
informed by a distinctly 'cognitive' and experimental philosophy, 
Potter and Wetherell's overriding achievement is to have indicated 
the need for psychologists to attend to, and account for, the 
complexity of human behaviour as it naturally occurs. By making this 
point in relation to the study of language use they have begun to 
draw closer the links between sociology and social psychology. 
Discourse analysts have indicated, and investigated, the 
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constructed and constructive features of language use. Furthermore, 
by looking at specific areas - for example, the sociological study of 
science and scientists, or topics within social psychology - they 
have examined the implications of these aspects for our understanding 
of the broader relationship between social reality and discourse. Of 
particular importance in this respect is the argument that discourse 
is functional, not only at the level of detailed interactions, but 
also in terms of wider social practices and beliefs. Thus, discourse 
analysis has been used to tackle 'traditional' sociological and 
social psychological problems, such as civil disturbance (Potter and 
Reicher 1987), racism (Billig 1985: Potter and Wetherell 1988) and 
gender and employment (Wetherell et al 1987) in a way that is 
informative, but which resists methodological and theoretical 
problems which beset previous attempts to deal with these issues. 
Whereas conversation analysis primarily developed from the lectures 
and publications of Harvey Sacks, discourse analysis is able to boast 
a more eclectic pedigree, drawing on observations and insights from 
a variety of related disciplines: sociolinguistics, semiotics, 
structuralism, speech act theory and literary criticism. We have 
already noted the way that Potter and Wetherell's analysis of social 
categorisation draws on work from Sacks (1979), and their discussion 
of 'accounts' borrows analytic observations from Atkinson and Drew 
(1979). Thus, while the goals of discourse analysis are considerably 
broader than those pursued in the study of naturally-occurring 
conversational materials, results from conversation analyses may be 
employed as a resource in the pursuit of specifically discourse 
analytic goals. 
Both conversation and discourse analysis have been concerned with 
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the reflexive character of language use. It is only in the latter 
domain, however, that the implications of this have been thoroughly 
explored. In particular Mulkay (1985) and Ashmore (1985; and 
forthcoming) confront reflexivity and its implications for 
sociological investigations. In doing so they devise innovative 
forms of analysis which take reflexivity as a resource for, rather 
than an obstacle to, empirical research. 
5 Conversation analysis and monologue talk 
The data to be investigated in this thesis are accounts of personal 
paranormal experiences, in the production of which speakers engage 
in long uninterrupted stretches of talk. Such accounts are 
monologic, rather than overtly dialogic, as in ordinary conversation 
where two or more parties produce regular turn exchanges. Within 
discourse analysis, this type of data would be treated as a text, as 
is any other form of discourse, spoken or written. Consequently, it 
has been the discourse analysts who have hitherto examined long 
stretches of talk, although this is not all that they have used as 
data. In this research we are adopting a conversation analytic mode 
of investigation. There is a problem, however, in the attempt to 
employ a 'conversation analytic mentality' (Schenkein 1978b) to the 
study of one-speaker talk. 2 To illustrate this problem it is 
necessary to look in greater detail at the range of issues addressed 
2 For an illustration of the type of work on monologic data 
conducted within 'traditional' discourse analysis - that is, research 
informed by speech act theory and linguistics - see Coulthard and 
Montgomery (1981b). 
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in this work. 
Conversation analysis can be distinguished from linguistic and 
speech act theory-inspired approaches to the study of talk in terms 
of the emphasis placed upon the importance of the immediate 
sequential context in which an utterance is produced. Whereas 
speech act theory tends to focus on single utterances, removed from 
any actual environment in which they may occur, conversation 
analysis begins with the assumption that utterances must, in the 
first instance, be contextually understood by reference to their 
placement in a sequence of utterances. This recommendation is not a 
product of an analytic preference. Rather, it reflects the ways 
that participants themselves rely on the context-shaped and context- 
renewing character of turns within a sequence as a resource in the 
orderly production of talk. That is, in the way that a speaker 
responds to an utterance, the producer can infer whether it has been 
interpreted in the manner for which it was designed. This either 
allows the producer to see a misinterpreation, and rectify it, or 
reveals that the recipient has made and exhibited the analysis of 
the utterance the producer desired, and can therefore continue with 
the exchange. The way that participants display their understanding 
of the moment-by-moment production of conversation provides a central 
resource by which speakers can ensure that the orderliness of the 
exchange is displayed at all stages in the interaction. 
There is a more technical point. The design of any utterance is 
in some way influenced by the prior utterance. That is, any first 
utterance will provide for a range of relevant next utterances; these 
in turn will circumscribe the range of relevant options for a next 
turn. This is particularly clear in the case of adjacency pairs 
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(Shegloff and Sacks 1973). These are sequences of two utterances 
that are: 
(1) adjacent, 
(2) produced by different speakers, 
(3) ordered as a first part and a 
second part, and 
(4) typed, so that the first part 
requires a particular second part 
(or range of second parts). 
(Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 396-6) 
In the way that utterances provide for the 'conditional relevance' 
(Schegloff 1972a: 363ff) of subsequent turns, speakers have a 
valuable resource by which to analyse the on-going character of any 
stretch of talk. As Schegloff has written: 
'When one utterance (A) is conditionally relevant on 
another (S), then the occurrence of S provides for the 
relevance of the occurence of A. If A occurs, it 
occurs (i. e. is produced and heard) as 'responsive to' 
S, i. e. in a serial or sequenced relation to it; and, 
if it does not occur, its non-occurrence is an event, 
i. e. it is not only non-occurring (as is each member of 
an indefinitely extendable list of possible 
occurrences), it is absent, or 'officially' or 
'notably' absent. That it is an event can be seen not 
only from its 'noticeability', but from its use as 
legitimate and recognisable grounds for a set of 
inferences (e. g. about the participant who failed to 
produce it). ' (Schegloff 1972b: 76) 
There is no need to discuss the evidence that speakers orient to 
the conditional relevance of second pair parts after the production 
of a first (for a review of the evidence. see Greatbatch 1983: 91- 
95). The important point to make here is that the sequential 
constraints of adjacency pairs provide the basis for inferential 
operations concerning speakers' 'motives', 'intentions', 'attitudes', 
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'feelings', and so on, which may be relevant to the specifics of the 
on-going talk. In the way that speakers can exploit the inference- 
rich properties of the turn-taking procedures they display some 
measure of the morally accountable nature of social interaction 
(Schegloff and Sacks 1973). 
Thus, it is not only that one utterance will delimit the range of 
relevant possible next turns; it is also the case that such 
sequential considerations allow speakers to attend also to normative 
features of the interaction. And, in the way that these are dealt 
with publically - that is, in the next turns through which speakers 
display their understanding of, and reasoning about, the trajectory 
of the interaction - they are available not only to co-participants, 
but also for the overhearing analyst. The importance of this is 
emphasised by Sacks et al: 
'while understandings of other turns' talk are 
displays to co-participants, they are available as well 
to professional analysts who are therby afforded a 
proof criterion (and search procedure) for the analysis 
of what a turns' talk is occupied with. Since it is 
the parties' understandings of prior turns' talk that 
is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is 
their understandings that are wanted for analysis. 
The display of those understandings in the talk of 
subsequent turns afforded both a resource for the 
analysis of prior turns and a proof procedure for 
professional analysis of prior turns - resources 
intrinsic to the data themselves. ' (Sacks, Schegloff 
and Jefferson 1978: 45 [1974]) [original emphasis] 
This does not mean that the analyst's task is solely to provide a 
translation of the analyses inherent in the manner in which a turn 
will be produced; nor that such a task inevitably provides access to 
the 'true' or 'intentional' operations through which utterances are 
designed. It means simply that conversation analysts have a major 
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resource in their investigations which is unavailable to 
'analysts of isolated sentences or other "text" 
materials that cannot be analysed without hypothesizing 
or speculating about the possible ways in which 
utterances, sentences or texts might be interpreted. ' 
(Heritage and Atkinson 1984: 9) 
With regard to the analysis of accounts of paranormal experiences, 
we might ask: can we legitimately claim to provide a distinctly 
conversation analytic investigation of materials which are 
essentially monologic in character; and if this is possible, what 
alternative resources are available to the analyst to compensate for 
the absence of the 'proof procedure' afforded by the analyses of each 
others' talk provided by interactants themselves ? 
Firstly, we may note that conversation analysts have argued that 
conversational interaction has a foundational or 'bedrock' status 
compared to any other domain. Consequently, the investigation of 
interaction in specific institutional settings seeks to analyse the 
distinctive adaptation of culturally-available sets of procedures for 
'doing' talk. Indeed, it is through the manipulation of such 
procedures that talk in institutional settings obtains its distinct 
character. An illustration of this is Greatbatch's (1983; 1988) 
analyses of the manner in which the institutional character of 
interview talk is interactionally produced and sustained on a turn- 
by-turn basis. (See also Atkinson and Drew 1979; Drew 1984b; for a 
more extended discussion, see Schegloff 1987a. ) Thus, when speakers 
are engaged in non-conversational interaction, such as producing 
accounts of paranormal experiences, the sets of methodic procedures 
by which their talk is produced are of the same order as those 
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displayed for analytic inspection in conversational material. That 
is, there is no qualititative difference between long stretches of 
uninterrupted talk, and talk which is constituted through a turn- 
taking system. Although it may be more difficult to explicate the 
'rules, techniques, procedures, methods, maxims' (Sacks 1984: 413) 
which inhere in the detail of long stretches of talk, it is not a 
task beset with intractable problems. 
A related point is that the accounts treated as data in this 
research were produced in a variety of informal interview 
situations. Consequently, it may be objected that it is unwise to 
proceed as if this material provided naturally-occurring data. The 
objection would be, then, that the context, to some degree, crucially 
influences the character of the talk subsequently produced. We have 
already argued, however, that the most suitable perspective on the 
issue of the context in which talk occurs is to see how the features 
of any such environment are oriented to, and thereby displayed as 
being relevant at that moment, by the speakers themselves. Thus, 
when making accounts of their anomalous experiences, the speakers 
will, through the design of sequences of utterances, display those 
features of the context which they have analysed to be significant to 
their immediate concerns. By treating utterances as context-shaping, 
as well as being sensitive to any local, occasioned feature of the 
environment in which an account occurred, we may reject the argument 
that it is necessary, or indeed possible, to isolate any formulation 
of the context as, in principle, the definitive root, basis or cause 
of features of the speaker's subsequent account. 
Adopting this position also draws links with an argument put 
forward by Potter and Mulkay (1985). They claim that a discourse 
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analytic perspective does not regard interviews as a method by which 
the analyst can extract a definitive version of the state of affairs 
being reported on. Rather, they regard interviews as useful in that 
they generate the interviewee's interpretative work, which can then 
be the subject of analysis. The same argument is applicable to 
people's accounts of their paranormal experiences. By virtue of the 
interview situation the speaker is presented with the opportunity to 
display, through the production of the subsequent account, the 
various descriptive practices which are of analytic interest. 
The third important objection to the application of a conversation 
analytic mentality to the study of one speaker talk is that, because 
CA attends to the interactional activities negotiated through talk, 
it, is of little use to sets of data which do not have such an 
interactional dimension (i. e. two or more participating parties). A 
consideration of the primary objection to this argument is important 
insofar it touches upon some of the issues with which the analytic 
chapters of this thesis will be concerned. 
While the speakers are producing their accounts, they are doing so 
in the presence of someone else - namely, the inteviewer/researcher. 
Furthermore, the accounts are produced for the benefit of this 
recipient. That is, the purpose of the meeting is to allow the 
speakers to recount the experiences they have had. Also, speakers 
are relying on resources which are, in an important respect, 
culturally-available, and which are sensitive to specifically moral 
and inferential activities negotiated through talk. Thus, when 
producing accounts, although the recipients may not be not actively 
participating in the interaction, the descriptions will display the 
speakers' sensitivity to, and reasoning about, the interactional 
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consequences of the utterances so produced. These utterances, 
therefore, may then be investigated to reveal the various recipient- 
design features employed in their construction. 
Thus, there are no in-principle obstacles to a conversation 
analytic study of monologic, multi-unit turn accounts. Furthermore, 
we may conclude this section by sketching some of the analytic 
resources which can assist the researcher in the study of one speaker 
interaction when access to the proof criterion afforded in 
interaction between two or more active parties is not available. 
In this respect, one avenue to be explored are those occasions in 
which speakers provide clear self-interruptions of their talk. In 
the manner in which they proceed - having either changed the 
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trajectory of the account, or 'repaired' a problem with the prior 
word or utterance(s) - they display an analysis of the on-going 
accomplishment of their talk. In this, the analyst is afforded not 
so much a proof criterion, but a foothold in the explication of the 
speaker's methodic construction of the experience. (This point will 
be illustrated in Chapter Four. ) 
Although the interviewer may be largely inactive throughout the 
interview, insoafar as the speaker is not interrupted by questions 
about the account, occasionally the interviewer may produce minimal, 
non-vocal signs of interest or encouragement: for example, 'mm hm', 
and 'yeah'. This class of utterances has been shown to have orderly 
properties (Jefferson 1984b; Schegloff 1981). Their occurrence, 
then, may be of analytic interest in that they are displays of the 
recipient's orientation to a specific aspect of the speaker's 
account. That is, minimal continuers may indicate that the speaker 
is dealing with, or premonitors the speaker's dealings with, issues 
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which are in some ways sensitive to the business at hand - talking 
about personal encounters with anomalies. 
Finally, we may look to see if speakers produce two or more 
different descriptions of the same events in the course of their 
accounts. If there are such multiple versions, these alternatives 
can be analysed to reveal their distinctive design features, thereby 
providing insight as to the character of the interactional business 
for which they have been designed. 
6 Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with two approaches to the study of 
naturally occurring talk which may be employed in the analysis of 
accounts of paranormal experiences. While there are underlying 
themes common to both conversation analysis and discourse analysis, 
for the purpose of the present research we will adopt the analytic 
mentality of the former. This is not to deny the relevance of 
discourse analysis, both in sociology and social psychology, and I 
have tried to illustrate the significant critical and empirical 
contributions it has made. Through an examination of the main 
features of discourse analysis, however, we were able to delineate 
certain dimensions of language use which require a conversation 
analytic approach: for example, the procedures by which specific 
words, and combinations of words, are selected in the composition of 
descriptive utterances; and the use of occasioned social identities 
as interactional resources. 
Finally, I have argued that monologic data, such as spoken accounts 
133 
of paranormal experiences, are legitimate material for conversation 
analytic research. Thus, we may proceed to an investigation of 




A SINGLE CASE ANALYSIS 
1 Introduction 
The majority of conversation analytic research investigates a 
conversational phenomenon, or its variants, that occurs in a variety 
of interactional circumstances. The object of this chapter, however, 
is the examination of one short piece of data, an extract from an 
interview in which the interviewee provided a number of accounts of 
personal paranormal experiences. Before moving to the analysis of 
this extract it is important to be clear why such an exercise should 
be undertaken. 
. 
The analysis of single cases has been a long standing feature of 
conversation analytic work. In his early lectures Sacks often 
illustrated analytic observations by examining in detail one fragment 
of conversational data. As he stated in one of his lectures: 
'The idea is to take singular sequences of conversation 
and tear them apart in such a way as to find rules, 
techniques, procedures, methods, maxims (a collection 
of terms that more or less relate to each other and 
that I use somewhat interchangeably) that can be used 
to generate the orderly features we find in the 
conversations we examine. The point is, then, to come 
back to the singular things we observe in a singular 
sequence, with some rules that handle those singular 
features, and also, necessarily, handle lots of other 
events. ' (Sacks 1984b: 413) 
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Within conversation analysis there are two approaches to the study 
of single extracts. One method is to tackle a data fragment to 
explicate a specific phenomenon, and thereby reveal its organised 
properties. Perhaps Schegloff is the most notable proponent of this 
form of work. For example, his (1984) analysis of a misunderstanding 
in a radio interview hinges around the way in which the structural 
resources provided by the immediate linguistic context furnish for 
one participant an ambiguous interpretation of the on-going talk. ' A 
more recent paper examines an instance of a mechanism for the 
production and recognition of bad news (Schegloff 1988). Drew's 
(1989) examination of the some of the organisational procedures 
through which a display of the non-recognition of another person is a 
further example of the same type of analysis. Of particular note in 
this respect is Whalen et al's (1988) examination of a telephone call 
to a Dallas Fire Department. They reveal the conversational basis 
for the breakdown of the call, as a consequence of which a medical 
team was not dispatched in time to save a life. 
The second approach, however, is not so common. This takes as its 
point of departure the examination of one piece of data to explicate 
the range of resources which are being employed by the participants 
to manage the interactions detailed in that fragment (Schegloff 
1987b). That is, it is not the case that the data under examination 
stands as an illustration of one specific phenomena to be 
unpackaged. Rather, the object is to display the ways in which 
conversation analysis can reveal that the specifics of any phase of 
interaction are produced as orderly phenomena, and how this 
1 For a further discussion of the data used in Schegloff's 
paper, see Chapter Three, section 4. 
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orderliness is accessible on a moment-by-moment basis, both to the 
co-participants and to the analyst. In this sense, then, the second 
approach to single case analysis seems to echo most closely the 
concerns which motivated Sacks' recommendation to take 'singular 
sequences of conversation and tear them apart' (Sacks 1984b: 413) to 
locate the procedures through which they were initially assembled. 
A further feature of data analysis which is not directed towards a 
particular phenomena is that it generates a range of issues for 
subsequent investigation. For example, with regard to the target 
data to be investigated in this chapter, revealing some of the 
resources employed by the speaker will provide a general insight as 
to the range of interactional tasks and issues which are relevant to 
her production of these utterances at this specific time. These 
concerns may then be used as the focus for further analyses over a 
larger data corpus. 
The object of the analysis will be, therefore, to explicate some of 
the resources which are used by the speaker to construct this 
extract, and thereby to illustrate the utility of a conversation 
analytic approach to data of this type. Furthermore, a by-product of 
the analysis will be the specification of issues which will be the 
focus for subsequent analytic investigation. 
137 
2 Data 
The target extract for this exercise comes from the following 
account. This was produced during a taped interview with a woman who 
is a professional medium, who, largely by virtue of her work, claims 
to have had a number of paranormal experiences. The speaker provides 
this report approximately twenty minutes into the interview. 
Immediately beforehand she had been trying to differentiate between 
forms of mediumistic powers, drawing a distinction between 'mere' 
psychic powers and 'true' clairvoyant abilities. She furnishes this 
specific account as an example of the type of experience which may 
occur to those with clairvoyant powers. 
>it's very interesting< because 'hh (. 5) something like 
this happened to me hhh a few years ago (. ) when I was 
living in Edinborough (. ) every time I walked into the 
sitting room (. 3) er: m (. 7) right by the window (. 3) 
and the same place always I heard a lovely (. 3) s: ound 
like de Ide y dede T dedede 4, dededah just a happy (. ) 
little tu: ne (. 5) a: nd >of course< I tore apart ma 
window I tore apart the window frame I >did Everything< 
to find out what the hell's causing that cos nobody 
else ever heard it 'hhh (. 2) >yuknow< (. ) there could 
>be ten people in the room nobody'd hear it but me< 
(. 7) er: m: and I wanted to know what was the: (. ) 
material cause of this 'hh well: (. 4) I never could 
figure it out and it didn't (. ) upset me in fact it was 
quite a lovely little happy sound un: d so I just let it 
go (1.7) one night however a friend was with me (. ) and 
we're just watching the tele (. 3) and she was also very 
psychic a: nd urm (1.3) its- (. ) th- the s: ound started 
the litt(le) musical (s) tu- s:: ound started again (. 3) 
and uhm: (. ) >she said what's THaght< >I said oh (. ) 
have you heard it< ah (s) >oh'(`thats wonderful you're 
the first person who's ever heard it besides me< 'hh 
((coughs)) she was frightened by it (. ) got up and ran 
out of the room (. 7) and so I sat at the table an' I 
got very angry cos I thought well I don't wanta 
fright- I don't want this to frighten her (. ) doesn't 
frighten me (. ) anyway in my mind I (1) denied this 
could be a spirit (. 7) cause ((clears throat)) an' in 
my mind I shouted I said well 'fill yuknow you're just 
trying to frighten m- us end ehm: if you're really real 
(. ) if you're really a spirit bang hard (. ) >n it went< 
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((banging sound)) I thou(ght) o:: h huhh you're real 
huhh hahh t an I ran outs the room (. 7) 'hhh so: about 
two or three days later (. 3) ahr (. ) I went to: a 
seance (1.3) the medium came to me almost immediately 
and >she sed< o: h (. ) by the way (. 2) she >didn't know 
me< she jus: t (. ) came straight to me however, 'nd she 
said ehm (. ) you know that ehm musical (. ) sound you've 
been hearing in your li4. ving room 'n I dy(e) h huhh 
hah I said yeah hh 'hhh and she said ehm (. 7) that 
was Bo: b a ma: n who passed over quite a long time ago 
In this chapter I will be concerned with the following section 
which is taken from the early part of the account. 
(1) b1E A 287 - 293 
1 every time I walked into 
2 the sitting room (. 3) er: m (. 7) 
3 right by the window (. 3) 
4 and the same place always 
5 I heard a lovely (. 3) s: ound 
6 like deT de,, Bede 1('dedede ydededah 
7 just a happy (. ) little tu: ne (. 5) 
8 a: nd >of course< 
9 I tore apart ma window 
i0 I tore apart the window frame 
11 I >did Everything< 
12 to find out what the hell's causing that 
13 cos nobody else ever heard it 'hhh (. 2) 
14 >yuknow< (. ) 
15 there could >be ten people in the room 
16 nobody'd hear it but me< (. 7) 
17 er: m: and I wanted to know what was 
18 the: (. ) material cause of this 
I am specifically interested in lines 5 to 18 (lines 1 to 4 are 
included merely to provide some immediate context). This section has 
been chosen because it is particularly rich source of events for 
analytic investigation, and also because it details information 
relevant to other research interests. For example, there is a 
description of a paranormal phenomenon, and this should be of 
interest to parapsychologists. Also, the speaker decribes her 
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reaction to the phenomenon, and this may be illuminating for 
psychologists and psychiatrists who are interested in the ways that 
people react to extraordinary experiences. Thus, not only can the 
analysis illuminate the methodic procedures by which this sequence of 
utterances is constructed; it can also reveal significant differences 
between approaches which focus on what the talk is about, and an 
interest in the way that the talk is put together. 
3 Analysis 
For the purpose of analysis I will deal with this section in four 
parts. 
[a] Initial description of the phenomenon: lines 5 to 7 
5I heard a lovely (. 3) sound 
6 like de Ne l dede t dedede4, dededah 
7 just a happy (. ) little tu: ne (. 5) 
In this sequence the speaker introduces the first reference to the 
phenomenon. She has already spoken about aspects of it; for 
example, remarking that its occurrence was confined to one physical 
spot. By virtue of the fact that she has reported some consistent 
feature of the phenomenon which could only be gleaned from a 
consideration of a variety of such encounters, it is evident that 
she is not here making a first reference to a specific encounter. 
A notable character of this description is the structure. There 
are three separate components: 'a lovely sound', a sung 
exemplification and 'just a happy little tune'. This reference to 
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the noise has been constructed as a list of three qualities. 
Three-partedness in the construction of lists has been found to be 
a recurrent practice in ordinary conversational materials (Jefferson 
forthcoming). For example: 
(2) 
1 while you've been talking tuh me, 
2I mended, 
3 two nightshirts, 
4a pillowcase? 
5 enna pair'v pants. 
(3) 
1 That was a vicious school there- 
2 it was about 
3 forty percent Negro, 
4 'bout twenny percent Japenese, 
5 the rest were rich Jews, heh hah 
(Jefferson forthcoming: 63) 
The phenomenon is common in all forms of discourse and suggests 
that three-partedness may be a culturally-available resource for list 
construction. Moreover, speakers who begin a list are rarely 
interrupted prior to the completion of the third item, even when the 
speaker pauses while trying to recall from memory a final component. 
This implies that parties to a conversation orient to lists as 
complete only upon the provision of the third item, suggesting a 
normative constraint operating to structure list production. 
In ordinary conversation three part lists can be used to indicate a 
general quality common to the items in the list. In example (2) 
above, the speaker provides a summary of the items she has mended. 
By virtue of their placement in a list, the reference to these items 
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is hearable as the speaker indicating 'look how much I've done'. 
Furthermore, listing these items displays to the recipient their 
(occasioned) co-class membership: that is, the way that they are used 
conveys that general class of objects to which the speaker's 
activity has been directed - mending household linen. This feature 
of listing is often employed as a resource in political speeches. 
For example: 
(4) Tebbit, U. K. General Election 1983. 
1 Labour will 
2 spend and spend, 
3 borrow and borrow 
4 and tax and tax 
(Atkinson 1984: 60) 
In the extract above the speaker is not concerned with spending, 
borrowing and taxing as separate features of the Labour Party's 
policies; by listing these three features he is able to convey the 
general point that their economic policy is inherently flawed. 
In the utterances that we are focusing on, it is apparent that by 
building her decription of the noise in three parts the speaker is 
using her own 'lay' knowledge of the techniques of listing to 
furnish a description which is recognisably complete. Also, this 
reference is designed so that the qualities she indexes will not be 
heard as specific particulars, but are hearable as pointing to a 
general feature of the noise. 
Analysis of the qualities she indexes in the description allows an 
insight as to the range of interactional concerns for which this 
sequence is organised. All three components of the description 
portray positive attributes of the phenomenon. The use of items 
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such as 'tune', 'lovely' and 'happy' ensure that other 
characteristics of the events are not referenced. For example, the 
sudden manifestation of a noise, the source of which is unidentified, 
is not a routine occurrence in most people's homes; yet in these 
utterances the speaker does not allude to any element of mystery or 
puzzlement. That is, despite it being the kind of event which it 
would be legitimate to notice and comment on, she makes no storyable 
feature of the simple fact of the appearance the noise. 
We may note a number of issues raised by preceding considerations. 
In this account, as in all the data, the speaker is reporting her 
memory of the events. Moreover, in the process of telling the story, 
she is recasting herself as innocent of the cause of the sounds. 
That is, she is trying to capture and portray the sequence of events 
as they unfolded at the time. However, by virtue of her own 
knowledge of the subsequent denouement of these episodes we may note 
that this report is, inevitably, a reconstruction. 
Parapsychologists have traditionally considered memory to be an 
obstacle to their research by virtue of its intrinsic unreliabilty. 
The types of processes which afflict ordinary memory storage and 
retrieval constituted a major difficulty in their project of 
identifying and then analysing the detailed facts of specific 
incidents. That is, they did not assume that people were telling 
them lies (although obviously this did happen); rather, they felt 
that experients would inevitably have a distorted memory of their own 
experiences. 
The analytic considerations generated so far indicates that, 
indeed, the speaker is reconstucting her memory of the events. 
However, this reconstruction is not the outcome of declining 
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cognitive facilities, distortions which have occurred over time, 
reporting effects and so on; rather, it is the product of pragmatic 
work. To expand upon this point, and to provide an analytic 
leverage for the target data, we need to consider some of the 
broader issues related to reporting extraordinary events. 
When people engage in talk they are presenting materials - what 
they say, and how it is said - which may be used as the focus of and 
basis for. interpretive work by the recipient. From an inspection of 
precisely these materials co-interactants can arrive at judgements 
and conclusions concerning the speaker's character, and the nature of 
the topic of their utterances. Conversation analytic research has 
revealed that 'these moral and inferential concerns inform not only 
the recipient's analysis of prior turns, but also the way in which 
speakers initially design utterances which are to be subjected to 
such analysis. That is, speakers fashion their utterances to 
circumscribe the character and range of inferences which may be 
drawn from them. 2 These constructive and inferential activities 
occur in myriad occasions of everyday social interaction. 
Jefferson's (1984a) study of reports of events such as shootings, 
hijackings, accidents and so on, reveal some of the linguistic 
practices which are sensitive precisely to these interpersonal and 
evaluative concerns. Witnesses to these extraordinary events often 
2 For further illustration of the way that descriptions can be 
designed with respect to the inferences which may be drawn from them, 
see Jefferson's (1985) paper on the interactional unpackaging of 
'glosses'. In particular, her first data extract: here, the speaker 
claims that she 'lay down' as a result of stomach ache; this is 
subsequently unpackaged by the co-interactant as 'went back to bed'. 
The point that Jefferson makes is that 'went back to bed' clearly 
indicates that the speaker had 'given up' on the day, and had no 
intention to go to work, whereas 'lay down' formulates a more 
temporary 'time out' from normal daily routines. 
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employ a format Jefferson identified as 'At first I thought.... but 
then I realized'. The following example comes from Sacks' (1984b) 
initial identification of the phenomenon. 
'I was walking up towards the front of the airplane and 
I saw the stewardess standing facing the cabin and a 
fellow standing with a gun in her back. And my first 
thought was he's showing her the gun, and then I 
realized that couldn't be, and then it turned out he 
was hijacking the plane. ' (Sacks 1984b: 419) 
Another well-known example is the way that witnesses to the 
shooting of J. F. Kennedy reported a loud bang, which they first 
thought to be a car backfire, but which they then realized was 
gunfire. 
Jefferson's analysis begins with the observation that in the first 
part of the device speakers proffer their incorrect conclusions from 
an initial assessment of the events they observed. In many cases, 
these incorrect first thoughts are themselves quite strange; for 
example, in the extract cited above, the speaker reports that his 
first thought was that the man was showing the stewardess the gun. 
Close inspection of the details of his report, however, suggests 
that had the speaker truly drawn this conclusion then his reasoning 
processes must have been informed by gross naivety or a staggeringly 
optimistic view of human nature. That is, he appears to be reporting 
that he found nothing strange about a man with a gun on an areoplane, 
and that he assumed that, by placing the gun in the stewardess's 
back, the man was merely showing it to her. 
Jefferson argued that however extraordinary these formulations 
were, they were not so strange in comparison with what the 'reality' 
turned out to be. In the extract above, for example, it transpired 
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that speaker was involved in a hijacking; compared to this, a man 
showing a stewardess a gun is not so dramatic. Jefferson's 
subsequent analysis revealed that what speakers are doing with the 
first part of the 'At first I thought.... ' device is to present, as 
their normal first assumption, an innocuous reading of the state of 
affairs on which they are reporting. That is, through their 
descriptions, they display that they did not immediately assume that 
anything untoward was happening. Moreover, the composition of their 
first thought formulations reveals that they have attempted to 
assemble an unexceptional version of the events to which they were 
witness. They are presenting the kind of 'first thoughts' any normal 
person may have. In doing so, they are providing materials, an 
inspection of which may lead the recipient to infer the normality of 
their reasoning processes about the world. 
Having a recipient come to see that one's reasoning and assumptions 
about the world are quite ordinary is clearly an important concern 
for people who are reporting extraordinary experiences such shootings 
and hijackings. The extraordinary character of these experiences, 
however, rests partly in their statistical rarity. Although most 
people may never encounter incidents of this kind, it is 
conventionally known that they do happen. Furthermore, there are 
explanantions available for why they happen, whether these concern 
political motivations for the actions of people, or, in the case of 
transport accidents, scientific explanations for technological 
malfunctions. 
The strangeness of paranormal events, however, derives from the 
fact that they present an implicit challenge to scientific 
declarations about the world, and, moreover, undermine common-sense 
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knowledge of what sorts of things are possible. That is, although as 
we saw in earlier chapters, the incidence of anomalous experiences 
may be higher than hitherto imagined, this fact alone has little 
bearing on the culturally-available knowledge and assumptions 
associated with experiences of this kind. Thus, claims of the 
paranormal may be investigated with a view to explicating the ways in 
which these wider conventions are oriented to, and negotiated by 
speakers through their pragmatic work. Furthermore, following the 
line established by Jefferson's analysis, we may focus on the ways in 
which fine-grained moral and evaluative concerns are mediated through 
the specifics of accounts. With this in mind, we may return to the 
speaker's initial description of the noise to explicate the 
interactional tasks for which it has been designed. 
Individuals who report every strange event as indicating the 
manifestation of some paranormal agency might be taken as, at best, 
gullible, or worse, slightly unbalanced. 'Ordinary' people do not 
interpret every stimuli in their environment as the product of non- 
normal, non-material causes. Even when those stimuli are not part of 
the regular and routine features of daily life they are not 
immediately accorded any supernatural status. In lines 5 to 7 the 
speaker builds her description of the phenomenon by selecting items 
which refer to one of its features - its pleasing, tuneful quality. 
Thereby, the speaker omits material from which it may be inferred 
that she thought the noise had any mysterious connotations. That is, 
she is giving the type of description which would be produced by any 
normal person in those circumstances. Thus, she claims for herself 
membership of the category of 'ordinary' people (Sacks 1984b), and in 
so doing exhibits a sensitivity to the evaluation of her story a 
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recipient might make; a sensitivity which is itself informed by an 
appreciation of the conventions associated with experiences of this 
kind. 
[b] Speaker's investigation of the noise: lines 8 to 12 
8 a: nd >of course< 
9I tore apart ma window 
10 I tore apart the window frame 
10 I >did Everything< 
12 to find out what the hell's causing that 
In this section the speaker outlines some of her actions subsequent 
to the occasions upon which she heard the noise. Two related 
observations can be made. First, that these actions are depicted as 
a, response to the noise; second, that this response is a search. 
Before moving to a detailed consideration of the way in which this 
response has been constructed, we may note the work done by the 
utterance 'and of course'. 
In the description of her response the speaker makes it clear that 
at the time she did not know the cause of the noise. Her search for 
the cause, however, is not portrayed as an unmotivated inquiry. By 
prefacing the description of her response with the utterance 'and of 
course', the speaker orients to the normatively-prescribed character 
of her actions. That is, it is not that she chose to conduct a 
search, or that this course of action seemed appropriate. Rather, 
she displays a recognition that this is the expected way to react in 
circumstances like these. This not only elevates 'searching for a 
cause' to the status of a normative requirement for people who are 
confronted by anomalies, but also permits her to affiliate with this 
convention by demonstrating that her behaviour was in accord with 
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that of other 'ordinary' people. 
The search is also described in three parts. The first two deal 
with the type and extent of the search. We have previously noted the 
way that three part lists convey general features which are common to 
the discrete items so listed, but which would not be immediately 
available from a separate consideration of those items. In this 
list the speaker makes use of other resources to emphasise further 
the overall or general character of her search. 
We have already observed that, when listing, speakers orient to the 
list as complete only upon the provision of the third item. For 
example, where speakers are clearly having difficulty in locating a 
relevant third item, co-interactants may volunteer candidate third 
parts (Jefferson, forthcoming). Another resolution to the problem of 
accountable list completion is the use of a 'generalised list 
completer' (Jefferson, forthcoming: 66). Where an appropriate third 
part does not come easily to mind, speakers may use utterances such 
as '... and everything', '... and all that', '... and things' after the 
first two items as a way of completing the list in three. For 
example: 
(5) 
1 And they had like a concession 
2 stand like at a fair 
3 where you can buy 
4 coke 
5 and popcorn 
6 and that type of thing. 
(Jefferson, forthcoming: 66)' 
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With respect to our target data we can observe that the third part 
of the sequence in lines 8 to 12 is not only a generalised list 
completer, but also displays the properties of an extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz 1986). Other such formulations are: brand 
new, forever, nobody, always, never, and so on. These formulations 
serve to maximise the object, quality or state of affairs to which 
they refer. Research into the use of these formulations in ordinary 
conversation has revealed that speakers use them to influence the 
judgements or conclusions of co-interactants, especially when 
speakers may have grounds to suspect that their accounts will receive 
an unsympathetic hearing. This is illustrated in the following 
extract. 
(6) (The following is an excerpt of a call to a Suicide Prevention 
Centre; 'D' is the member of the Centre's staff, 'C' is the caller. ) 
1 D Do you have a gun at home? 
2 (. 6) 
3 C A forty fi: ve, 
4 D You do have a forty fi: ve. 
5 C Mm hm, it's loaded. 
6 D What is it doing there, hh Whose is it. 
7 C It's sitting there. 
8 D Is it yours? 
9 (1.0) 
10 C It's Da: ve's. 
11 D It's you husband's hu_h? = 
12 C =I know how to shoot it, 
13 (. 4) 
14 D He isn't a police officer_r, 
15 C No:. 
16 D He just ha: s one. 
17 C Mm hm, It-u-Everyone doe: s don't they? 
(Pomerantz 1986: 225) 
Owning a gun may well be the type of behaviour for which an 
explanation is sought. In this extract the speaker describes the 
practice of keeping a gun by using the extreme case formulation 
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'everyone does', thereby proposing that this is normal and non- 
accountable; that is, something for which she does not have to offer 
a mitigating explanation. 
In the target data the speaker is describing her search for the 
cause of the noise, and she employs various resources to provide for 
the throroughness of her endeavours. First, the use of 'tore apart' 
twice implies, at least, urgency. Second, the use of a three part 
list to portray the general extensiveness of her search. Third, the 
speaker's use of an extreme case formulation as a generalised list 
completer further enhances her attempts to persuade the recipient of 
the extent and the meticulousness of her efforts. 
ire routine conversation actions and events can be prefaced by 
formulations of intention or expectation. For example: 'I wanted to 
arrive on time', or 'I tried to arrive on time'. When people use 
prefaces such as these it is noticeable that the intended action 
usually does not occur, as in utterances like 'I tried to arrive on 
time, but the train was delayed'. People do not routinely construct 
sentences such as 'I tried to arrive on time, and I did' unless they 
are specifically emphasising the virtues of effort, or some peculiar 
feature of the circumstances relevant to the occasion of the talk. 
There is, then, a way of formulating intended actions which 
premonitors the failure of those actions and events to occur. 
In lines 13 to 15 the speaker chooses to describe her search for 
the source of the sound. In doing so she details particulars of her 
effort to locate the cause: that is, she 'tore apart' the window and 
frame. Presumably, however, the object causing the noise is of more 
consequence than her attempts to locate it. That is, there is a 
hierarchy of relevance: if she had discovered the source of the 
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noise, paranormal or otherwise, this discovery would diminish the 
significance of her search. Her efforts to locate the cause acquire 
a reportable status only insofar as they are unsuccessful. Thus, the 
fact that she reports the search premonitors its failure. 
Further evidence that the speaker's attempts to find the source of 
the noise were thwarted comes from the following section, taken from 
a later part of the extract. (This will be examined in detail in 
section (d). ) 
(7) 
17 er: m: and I wanted to know what was 
18 the: (. ) material cause of this 
Here, the use of 'wanted' plainly orients to the speaker's failure 
at that time to succeed in her efforts. 
In the way that the search is described the speaker makes 
available materials, an assessment of which would suggest the 
normality of her thoughts and actions regarding the noise: that she 
acted like any ordinary person might and looked for the cause of the 
sound, and that this search was extensive and conducted with urgency. 
Her 'competence' as an ordinary person is further reinforced in her 
description of where she looked: in and around the physical vicinity 
of the noise. Insofar as she 'tore apart' the window she directs the 
search, and the recipient's attention, to physical and material 
objects. Thus, she makes it inferable that she did not immediately 
assume the noise was anything but a normal, as opposed to paranormal, 
sound, and one which could, therfore, be traced to its natural 
physical origin. 
We may note finally that the speaker provides an explicit reason 
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for her response: to find out the cause of the noise (line 12). 
In these five lines, then, there are a variety of resources being 
employed to attend to a number of inferential issues, and it is 
useful to provide a brief summary of the work being accomplished. 
1 The noise stimulates a response. 
2 The response is a search, thus implying the speaker did not at 
that time know of the source of the sound. 
3 The speaker portrays her search as motivated by an orientation 
to normative expectations associated with the way people 
should act in these circumstances, thereby displaying her 
affiliations to these conventions. 
4 The search is directed towards physical objects, thus 
demonstrating that she acted like any ordinary person and 
assumed that there was a material cause for the phenomenon. 
5 The manner in which the search is formulated indicates its 
thoroughness. 
6 The search is formulated to display that it failed. 
So far the speaker has not addressed the paranormality of the 
noise. She has provided sufficient material, however, from which a 
recipient may infer that the source of the noise is not usual. That 
is, she has conducted an extensive search in physical locations, 
despite which the cause has not been located: therefore, 'normal' 
procedures for locating 'normal' nuisances have not been successful. 
The implication to be drawn from this is that the sound is non- 
material. Therefore, the recipient can assign the sound to that 
class of objects with non-material, and possibly paranormal, causes. 
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[c] Building the paranormality of the phenomenon: lines 13 to 16 
13 cos nobody else ever heard it 'hhh (. 2) 
14 >yuknow< (. ) 
15 there could >be ten people in the room 
16 nobody'd hear it but me< (. 7) 
So far the speaker may be said to have provided only indications as 
to the paranormal qualities of the noise. I will argue in this 
section that she presents materials which are designed to generate 
more forcefully the conclusion that the sound is far from normal. 
This is achieved through reference to those occasions when other 
people were present during the manifestation of the phenomenon. 
In these lines the speaker focuses on the exclusivity of the noise. 
This in itself is insufficient to suggest that it has paranormal 
qualities: she may have been the only one in the room when the noise 
started, she may have been the only person to use the room, she may 
have been the sole occupant of the house, and so on. The speaker's 
exclusive perception of the phenomenon is made explicable by 
reference to any of these possibilities. In these lines, however, 
the speaker makes a stronger case for the anomalous quality of the 
sound by constructing an example of an occasion when others were 
present during the manifestation of the phenomenon. 
This example may be termed a 'hypothetical'. That is, it is 
prefaced by the utterance 'there could be', and does not refer to any 
specific instances. Instead, it is used to extract recurrent 
features from actual situations and distil them into an illustrative 
example of the kind of thing which generally happened. 
Using this hypothetical example the speaker is able to claim that 
she could hear the sound when others, co-present with her, could not. 
This suggests that she was 'hearing things', or that the sound has 
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some quality so that it is directed specifically to her, or that she 
has some special facility for hearing noises of this kind. Any 
interpretation will permit the recipient to come to see that the 
sound has an element of mystery involved with it. 
The use of a hypothetical illustration, instead of, for example, 
reference to actual events, has a number of interactional 
consequences. It permits the speaker to distil regularly occurring 
features of events and bring them together in a form which may not 
strictly represent the occasions of their occurrence in 'real life'. 
Furthermore, as these events are recognisably designed to be a 
general vesion of the type of thing which happened, any claims 
contained within this utterance are not available for direct 
examination. Had the speaker formulated this example in the 
following manner 'One night there were ten people in the room 
when... ' she would have been citing one specific event. The details 
of this event could then be subject to investigation: when did this 
happen, what time of day, who were the people present at the time ? 
With a hypothetical example no such direct interrogation of the 
details is possible. Finally, as this example is structured to be 
bearable as a hypothetical, we may speculate that it registers to the 
recipient that it is parenthetical to the overriding goals of the 
speaker: to relate those details of the account which are of primary 
importance. Any questions directed to it, and the information it 
provides, would, therefore, be secondary to, and disruptive of, the 
main concerns of the speaker. 
These materials do not only strengthen the recipient's 
interpretation that the noise was not normal. In the way that the 
example has been built the speaker has made available certain 
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properties of the phenomonen. For example, that it occurred in the 
presence of other people, but that they could not hear it. These 
substantiate the properties provided in the earlier part of the 
account: that the noise always manifested in a certain part of one 
specific room, and that the cause was elusive. That is, the 
detailed characteristics of the phenomenon are being constructed in 
the speaker's description of her experiences. Insofar as her 
descriptions are designed to address moral and inferential business 
generated in the course of making a face-to-face report, the actual 
features of the phenomenon are mediated through the various pragmatic 
tasks accomplished by the speaker. 
In this one hypothetical example the speaker is able to achieve a 
variety of tasks. She has addressed the issue of the paranormality 
of the noise, and she has furnished information from which the 
recipient can begin to deduce that the phenomenon is not ordinary. 
Also, in the ways that these materials have been introduced, she has 
dealt with interactional concerns regarding the practical, moment-by- 
moment prodution of the account. Finally, she has continued to 
construct the fine detail of the phenomenon which she is describing. 
[d] Substantiating the 'normality' of the noise: lines 17 to 18 
17 er: m: and I wanted to know what was 
18 the: (. ) material cause of this 
The analysis has so far pointed to some of the ways by which the 
speaker has incrementally furnished material to support a paranormal 
interpretation of the noise. In this section I want to begin by 
observing that the speaker appears to be engaging in contradictory 
work: having constructed prior utterances to provide for a paranormal 
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interpretation, she then describes her activities as being motivated 
by a desire to locate the material cause. This paradoxical situation 
has a systematic basis, the- explication of which reveals the 
character of the speaker's detailed analysis of her own prior talk. 
To clarify the issues to be examined, we may note that in the 
previous section the speaker provides a description designed to 
represent recurrent features of occasions on which the noise 
occurred, and which points very strongly towards a paranormal 
interpretation. Immediately after this, however, she explicitly 
mentions, and thereby draws attention to, her interest in finding the 
material cause of the noise. That is, she is doing the type of work 
addressed by some of her earlier utterances: displaying that she 
initially assumed that the phenomenon had a natural explanantion, 
thereby revealing herself to have reasoned about the phenomenon like 
any ordinary person might. Thus the issue is, why, having built a 
hypothetical example which suggests a paranormal cause, does she then 
produce an utterance which claims that she was looking for a normal 
cause ? 
In single-speaker multi-unit turns there are occasions in which 
speakers display an analysis of their own prior talk, and, in their 
next utterance, make some correction, amendment or elaboration of 
that talk. For example: 
(8) HS 17 
1S ah came home from work at lunchtime 
2 (1) 
3 an I walked into 
4 the sitting room door 
5 (. ) 
6 in through the sitting room door 
((continues)) 
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In this extract the speaker makes a clear 'slip of the tongue' in 
that she claims she walked into the sitting room door (lines 3 and 
4). Her subsequent utterance shows that she recognises this mistake 
and she makes the necessary correction. 
In the next extract the speaker's analyses are more sophisticated 
insofar as the utterances to which he attends are not in any logical 
sense incorrect. 
(9) DN 22: 159 (This extract comes from an account of a series of 
poltergeist disturbances. ) 
1SI said do you want some more tea 
2 >oh yeah ah said< oh:: dear the pot's 
3 empty I'll have to go and make some more 
4 'so ah grabbed the pot and the kitchen 
5 was on the floor above an ah (. ) 
6 went up (. 9) flew up the stairs 
7 in all this sunlight an (. () 
8 lovely place it was (. 2) 
9 anyway I got to the kitchen door 
10 an as ah ' hh 
11 1 had the teapot in my hand like this 
12 and I walked through the 
13 kitchen door (. 5) 'hhh 
14 as I was going through the doorway hh 
15 (. 7) 
16 I was just (. ) jammed against 
17 the doorpost (. 3) 
((continues)) 
The first correction by the speaker concerns his description of 
the way in which lie went up the stairs. His initial formulation is 
'went up', which lie then embroiders as 'flew up' (line 6). 
Furthermore, initially he describes his movement into the kitchen as 
'I walked through the kitchen door' (lines 12 and 13), and then as 
'as I was going through the doorway' (line 14). In this second 
version the speaker has amended the tense in which the utterance is 
constructed, moving from 'walked through' to 'going through', and 
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also the way in which the actual location of the incident is 
described, substituting 'kitchen door' with 'doorway'. 
We need not investigate the interactional business addressed by 
these specific examples. What is important is that they illustrate 
that speakers may assess their own prior talk and, in various ways, 
re-fashion it, thereby displaying some of the immediate practical 
concerns to which they are orienting in the course of building and 
re-building parts of their accounts. 
In the target data it is possible that the speaker has analysed her 
own prior utterances and arrived at the conclusion that she has 
furnished too strong a case for the paranormal cause hypothesis, and 
that, for the purpose of the account at this stage, this needed to be 
rectified. The nature of the utterance in lines 17 and 18, then, can 
be seen as an attempt to accomplish this through the nomination of a 
material hypothesis reason for her search. 
The speaker's pragmatic work stems originally from her own prior 
talk - the hypothetical example in which the paranormal-cause 
hypothesis is most strongly outlined. What is not clear, however, 
is the reason why the speaker produced the hypothetical example in 
the first place. 
When discussing the ways in which members report their experiences 
Sacks (1984b) wrote: 
'You could figure that, having severe restrictions on 
your chances to have experiences, which turn on, for 
example, something, in some fashion important, 
happening to cross your path, that having happened, 
well, then you are home free. Once you got it you 
could do with it as you pleased. No. You have to form 
it up as the thing that it ordinarily is, and then mesh 
your experience with that. 
That is to say, the rights to have an experience by 
virtue of, say, encountering something like an 
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accident, are only the rights to have seen "another 
accident", and to have perhaps felt for it, but not, 
for example, to have seen God in it. You cannot have a 
nervous breakdown because you happened to see an 
automobile accident. You cannot make more of it than 
anybody would make of it. ' (Sacks 1984b: 426-7) 
The point that Sacks is making here is that there are 'right' ways 
and 'wrong' ways of going about doing descriptions. To describe 
something as it normally would be described is to display a 
competence to describe, and to assert a validity for the description 
provided. We have already seen the importance of the constraints 
associated with describing extraordinary events in Jefferson's work 
on 'normalizing devices'. 
Sacks' point is that there are 'correct', or normatively prescribed 
ways to construct descriptions. However, we may formulate a more 
elaborate version of this argument: where a description of an event 
or a state of affairs is produced, and further information is then 
reported and appears, loosely, as a form of response to the items 
mentioned in the previous utterance, then those two items should be 
decribed consistently. For example: 'I saw a terrible car crash and 
I was really upset by it' or 'It was a beautiful morning and it made 
me feel very happy' are consistent in that the description of the 
response to, or consequence of, the first part, is designed to 
correspond with the decriptive work done in that first part. To tie 
in with Sacks, then, we might say that there is a limit to what one 
is entitled to do with a description once it has been characterised 
in a certain way. Or, more formally, it may be a maxim that, in 
building descriptive sequences which contain some statement which is 
bearable as a result of or response to the previous part of those 
sequences, those sequences of utterances are to be designed to 
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display their consistency. That is, produce the response or 
consequence part to display what the speaker is entitled to say given 
the construction of the first part. 
Bearing this in mind, we may reconsider some of the earlier parts 
of the target data. 
5I heard a lovely (. 3) s: ound 
6 like de T de ,, dede T dedede ý dededah 
7 just a happy (. ) little tu: ne (. 5) 
8 a: nd >of course< 
9I tore apart ma window 
10 I tore apart the window frame 
11 I >did Everything< 
12 to find out what the hell's causing that 
We have seen in previous sections that the speaker does 
considerable work to construct a specific decription of the noise, 
and then does further work to contruct a version of her reaction. 
That is, in lines 5 to 11 there is a report of a state of affairs and 
then a report of one of the consequences of it. Furthermore, the 
speaker focuses on the pleasant, happy qualities of the sound: it is 
no more than just a 'little tune', for example. However, in 
describing her search for the cause she emphasises the urgency and 
extensiveness of her endeavours. Thus, there might appear to be an 
inconsistency, then, between the design of the description of the 
noise, and the design of the search for the cause of it. That is, 
the way she has reported her response to the noise is inconsistent 
with the way she characterised the initial stimulus to which her 
search was a response. 
There is some evidence from the trajectory of the target data that 
suggests that this inconsistency is a matter of practical concern for 
the speaker. In line 12 she provides a reason for her search: to 
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find out the cause. In line 13, however, she embroiders this reason 
by providing the hypothetical example, thereby making a stronger case 
for her response. The additional material provided in the 
hypothetical example reveals that the nature of the noise - its 
character as something which is selectively perceived - is now 
elevated to the forefront of the account, at the expense of its 
musical and tuneful atributes. That is, she introduces material 
about the phenomenon which makes the urgency of her reaction quite 
explicable. Thus, the deficiency to which this reparative work was 
addressed lay in the discrepancy between the description of the noise 
and her reaction to it. 
Focusing on the mysterious quality of the sound provides a warrant 
for the the form of the description used to characterise the search 
for the cause of the sound. Doing this reparative work, however, 
itself produces a further problem for the speaker: re-orienting the 
story from the trajectory initiated in the repair of its problematic 
aspects back to that established prior to the corrective work. To do 
this the speaker furnishes the utterance in lines 17 and 18. By re- 
emphasising the material-cause hypothesis this utterance meshes with 
the concerns of the speaker prior to the hypothetical example: to 
build a description of her early encounters which reveal her to have 
arrived at any normal person's conclusions about the nature of the 
phenomenon. 
By way of a summary to this section we can re-instate the problem 
with which we began: that the speaker engages. in the apparently 
contradictory business of emphasising the material-cause hypothesis 
immediately after having built an elaborate example of the 
appearances of the noise which points strongly to a paranormal-cause 
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hypothesis. It has been argued that a maxim connected with the 
construction of descriptions is that, where the sequence of 
utterances deal with a state of affairs and a consequence of, or 
response to those states, there should be a consistency between the 
terms employed to refer to both parts of the description. It is not 
suggested that this is a 'rule' of speaking; the data presented here 
indicate that it is not an unyielding constraint upon the 
construction of descriptive remarks. However, it is a constraint to 
the extent that the breach of this 'maxim' becomes an accountable 
matter for the speaker(s) involved. In the target data we can see 
that the speaker orients to this 'maxim' in the manner in which she 
attempts to repair a breach of it. The initial attempt to address 
the perceived inadequecy of her account subsequently 'sidetracked' 
the trajectory of her narrative, and this then became a problem to be 
resolved. This was accomplished through the utterance analysed in 
this section. Thus, the problem and the solution are inextricably 
tied with the speaker's analysis of the moment-by-moment production 
of her account, and the conventions associated with descriptive 
consistency. 
4 Conclusions 
Through this analysis we have explicated some of the resources 
which the speaker employs to build this sequence of utterances, and 
it is useful to summarise these. Firstly, the speaker orients to 
normative conventions associated with listing practices to accomplish 
descriptions which convey specific inferable properties. So, for 
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example, in constructing a description of her initial impressions of 
the phenomenon, she uses a three part list to emphasise the way in 
which she first perceived it during its early manifestations. 
Similarly, in her report of the search she combines the same listing 
practices with an extreme case formulation to convey the urgency of 
her search. 
Throughout this sequence the speaker displays a concern to portray 
herself as having behaved like any normal person during her initial 
encounters with the phenomenon, and her response to it. That is, 
listing and formulating practices are employed to display her 
occasioned social identity as a 'normal', 'ordinary' person. Thus, 
another set of resources used by the speaker are tacit, common-sense 
understandings about the organised ways in which inferences about 
people are drawn on the basis of their category membership. 
Finally, through the explication of the speaker's analyses of her 
own prior talk we have gained a preliminary insight to one convention 
which informs a specific class of descriptive practices. Moreover, 
we have observed the ways in which the speaker explicitly attends to, 
and does reparative work for, a breach of this maxim in the course of 
her account. 
Thus, the speaker is attending to specific particular tasks which 
are generated in the course of the account of her experience: 
building inferences about herself, providing the character of the 
noise, occasioning a social identity, and so on. These tasks are 
addressed against a background of, and informed by, wider, 
culturally-available knowledge. Using Jefferson's (1984z) analysis 
of the 'At first I thought.... but then I realised' device, it was 
argued that the conventions associated with paranormal experiences 
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assures the speaker of an inauspicious environment in which to report 
a personal experience of this type. That is, the speaker's practical 
reasoning as to the possibility that her account may receive an 
unsympathetic hearing informed the construction of the section 
analysed in this chapter. 
This raises an interesting issue, which may be illustrated by 
reference to some ethnographic detail. The account from which this 
extract was taken was provided by a woman who is a professional 
medium. That is, she earns money by talking to the dead on behalf of 
the living. According to the information she provided in the 
interview, her life is populated by numerous encounters with a range 
of elementals, demonic and angelic forces, and spirits of various 
kinds. For her, then, these events are utterly normal. By virtue 
of the fact of her clairvoyant abilities, these experiences are a 
routine and unexceptional feature of her daily life. She realises, 
however, that for other people, these would be treated as anomalous 
experiences. 
In the interview the speaker emphasises that these experiences are 
a recurrent and normal feature of her life and work. Thus, we might 
reasonably expect that her description of specific incidents would 
reflect the fact that she treats them, or claims to treat them, as 
ordinary events. Yet close examination of the details of this 
sequence reveals that she is orienting to norms and conventions 
regarding paranormal experiences which she would reject as having no 
relevance to her. Thus, there is a discrepancy between what she 
would say is normal and acceptable to her, and what sorts of issues 
and concerns actually inform the descriptions she makes. It appears 
that, despite claiming that these experiences are normal, she orients 
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to the wider, socially-organised conventions regarding the 
inauspiciousness of reporting paranormal experiences, and the 
cultural conventions which are associated with paranormal 
experiences. 
In earlier chapters we discussed some of the critical arguments 
made against the way that traditional sociological or ethnographic 
approaches treat accounts of events as in some way 'mirroring' those 
events. In the light of the discrepant relationship between the 
speaker's articulated attitudes and beliefs, and the reasoning 
processes which informed these specific utterances, some observations 
are relevant. 
Ryle (1949: 28ff. ) provided a distinction beteen two types of 
knowledge: 'knowledge that', which refers to the kind of information 
which can be acquired through conscious learning, and 'knowledge 
how', which refers to tacit and commonsense skills. In this analysis 
we have explicated some of the 'knowledge how' on which the speaker 
has relied to construct this section of her account. We may note 
that this knowledge is inextricably tied to the interactional 
environment in which the account is made, and also reflects the 
speaker's reasoning about the wider conventions associated with they 
type of experience she is claiming to have had. Thus, it is clear 
that what is relevant in this extract are not the broader 
classifications and categories to which the speaker may consciously 
assign herself, or the attitudes and beliefs to which she explicitly 
orients, but her reading of the practical, moment-by-moment 
production of the account. 
Two themes have run through the analytic sections presented above, 
and by way of a conclusion I want to discuss briefly how these issues 
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may inform subsequent analyses. First, the speaker is engaged in 
the business of reporting an experience which actually happened: that 
is, she is making factual claims about an event which was external to 
her. The analysis revealed, however, that the speaker is orienting 
to the possibility that her account may receive an unsympathetic 
hearing: that the recipient may try to locate a normal explanantion 
for the experience, thus undermining the claimed objectivity of the 
phenomenon. 
In ordinary conversation there are circumstances in which an 
account may receive an unsympathetic hearing, and thus speakers use 
various resources to display the 'out-there-ness' of the phenomenon 
or event they report (Pomerantz 1986; Potter and Wetherell 1988; 
Smith 1978). Thus, some issues for further investigation are the 
procedures by which speakers display the external and factual 
character of the phenomenon they are reporting. 
Second, the particulars of the account reported in the target data 
are the speaker's memories of those events, and we noted that these 
are reconstructions. That is not to say that the speaker is lying, 
or subject to declining memory facilities. Rather, it implies that 
descriptions of memories, like the descriptions of the phenomenon 
and the subsequent reactions to it, are composed by the speaker with 
a view to pragmatic circumstances at the time. The relationship 
between memory formulations, and the dynamic and constructive 




A DEVICE FOR RECALLING PARANORMAL EXPERIENCES 
1 Introduction 
Accounts of encounters with paranormal phenomena are narrated 
recollections of dramatic personal experiences. In the following 
data extracts the speakers are describing some features of their 
memory of their first encounter with the anomaly on which they are 
reporting. 
(1) DN 22: 159 (The speaker is providing a description of one of a 
series of encounters with poltergeist phenomena. ) 
1S I said do you want some more tea 
2 >oh yeah ah said< oh:: dear the pot's 
3. empty I'll have to go and make some more 
4 so ah grabbed the pot and the kitchen 
5 was on the floor above an ah (. ) 
6 went up (. 9) flew up the stairs 
7 in all this sunlight an (. ) 
8 lovely place it was (. 2) 
9 anyway I got to the kitchen door 
10 an as ah 'hh 
11 I had the teapot in my hand like this 
12 and I walked through the 
13 kitchen door (. 5) 'hhh 
14 X as I was going through the doorway hh 
15 (. 7) 
16 Y I was just (. ) jammed against 
17 the doorpost (. 3) like this 
18 with the teapot stihl h stuhhck 
19 out in front of me 
((continues)) 
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(2) MD 2: 9 (At the time of the experience the speaker had been 
thinking about the nature of conversion to religious faith through 
direct encounter with the numinous. ) 
1S because yuh get yer blindin' light 
2 on the road to Damascus 
3 sort u(f) thing un eh 'hh (. 6) 
4 there's no problem (so you) 
5 yuh know as far as you're 
6 concerned you measure all things 
7 according to that experience 
8 the experience was exterior 
9 to yourself an' so therefore 
10 (1.3) 
11 yuh viewed it h (. 6) 
12 as a star: t (. 5) (y'know) 
13 >yeah< 
14 X I were just thinkin' 
15 (. 7) 
16 er: m: 
17 Y and then suddenly 
18 (. ) 
19 I was aware of 
20 (1) 
21 almost (. ) the sensation was almost 
22 as if a veil was lifted 
((continues)) 
In both these extracts the speakers are able to formulate a 
recollection of what they were doing just before the onset of their 
first experience of the phenomenon. In extract (1) the speaker 
claims that he encountered an invisible presence which forcibly 
pressed him against a door frame. He describes this as happening 'as 
I was going through the doorway' (line 14). In extract (2) the 
speaker reports that his activity prior to his first awareness of the 
onset of a mystical experience was 'just thinkin " (line 14). 
A preliminary observation concerns the way in which these 
recollections have been constructed. Both speakers employ the same 
two part format by which to introduce into the account the first 
experience of their respective phenomena. This format can be 
identified as 'I was just doing X.... when Y', where the 'X' component 
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is used to describe the speakers' activities at the time, and the 'Y' 
component reports the speakers' first awareness of phenomenon. For 
example, from extract (1) the speaker claims that 'as I was going 
through the doorway' ('I was just doing X... ') he was 'just (. ) 
jammed against the doorpost' ('... when Y'). 
'Going through' somewhere and 'thinkin'' something, furthermore, 
seem like the type of routine or everyday activities which are not 
in normal circumstances immediately memorable or notable. These 
extracts, then, suggest that the speakers can recall the mundane 
circumstances prior to the onset of their experience. 
These data indicate certain consistencies in the way that these 
speakers have described their first awareness or experience of a 
paranormal phenomenon. They recall! their routine activities 
immediately prior to the event, and they employ a two part format by 
which to describe their initial perceptions of the event. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of this format it is important to 
note that these characteristics are not peculiar to accounts of 
paranormal experiences. For example, it occurs in the following 
data. This extract is taken from a telephone conversation between 
two sisters, Emma and Lottie. Lottie has just returned from holiday 
during which she visited her friend and her friend's new husband, 
Dwight. 
(3) NB: IV: 10: R: 20-21: Standard Orthography 
1L Yeah you just got to be care We_11 see: 
2 'hhtDwight only has (. 2) u-one: ga: 1l 
3 bladder? 
4 (. 7) 
5E °Mm f *hm, 
6LL He ha Td e-and then The has to be 
7 careful what he eats he can't eat anything 
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8 greasy you r know? 
9 E °Mm-° °Mhm:, ° 
10 L Go: d what a ma: n he was out there this: 
11 morning and he (. ) They have these 
12 great big olive trees a: ll over 
13 you kn ow hhh I 
14 E Mm: hm, 
15 L 't'h An: d the t wind was so ba: d that 
16 the the th- (. ) the branches were 
17 hitting the hou: se and (. ) God (. 3) 
18 *uh:: I got up abou: t (. ) 
19 'well it was about ei: ght o'clock, 
20 E Mmr: hm: 
21 L 'hh Land HERE HE'S UP THERE s: awing those 
22 o"ff you know? 
X 
Y 
Early in this account of Dwight's activities Lottie says 'Go: d what 
a ma: n' (line 10). She then goes on to tell a story to illustrate 
some of his exceptional qualities, culminating in her description of 
his early morning tree-shearing prowess (lines 21 and 22). What is 
interesting is that this story is presented as an account of an 
unusual event -a man with physical problems getting up early in the 
morning to shear the branches of a tree. Before producing a 
description of Dwight's unusual behaviour, however, she provides a 
report of her activity at the time: 'I got up abou: t (. ) well it was 
about ei: ght o'clock, ' (lines 18 and 19). 
There are a number of similarities between extract (3) and extracts 
(1) and (2). Firstly, the event upon which she is reporting- 
getting up early in the morning to remove offending branches from a 
tree - is produced as one which is unusual and out-of-the-ordinary. 
Secondly, she prefaces her first reference to Dwight's extraordinary 
behaviour with a description of her circumstances at the time she 
witnessed this event - she had just 'got up in the morning'. 
Thirdly, Lottie packages her first perception of Dwight's unusual 
behaviour in the two part format identified as 'I was just doing 
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X..... when V. This would suggest that this is a recurrently used 
device through which speakers relate dramatic events. 
Further evidence to support this comes from the following passage 
which is taken from McGuinniss' (1983) analysis of Captain Jeffrey 
MacDonald, the American Army doctor whose wife and two children were 
murdered in their home in February 1970. MacDonald told the police 
that a group of drug-crazed hippies broke into his house and began to 
assault him, knocking him unconscious. He claimed that upon 
regaining consciousness he discovered the mutilated remains of his 
wife and two young daughters, and immediately alerted the military 
police. 
From an early stage in the subsequent investigation the police 
suspected that MacDonald had committed the murders. For several 
weeks after the attack, however, they had insufficient evidence to 
charge him, and, therefore, he was not taken into custody. 
In the course of his research McGuiniss conducted numerous recorded 
interviews with MacDonald. In the following extract MacDonald 
describes the occasion on which he first learned that he was named as 
the prime suspect. This happened during a mealtime in the Officers' 
Mess at his army camp. 
'I was standing in line getting food, [X] and I had 
just gotten through the cash register area and was 
beginning to sit down, [Y] when they had a news 
bulletin that Captain Jeffrey MacDonald, the Green 
Beret Officer from Fort Bragg who six weeks earlier had 
claimed that his wife and children were brutally beaten 
and stabbed by four hippies, was himself named chief 
suspect. 
And I remember the truly -I don't mean to use 
cliches, but I don't know how else to explain it - the 
room was spinning again. ' (McGuinniss 1983: 168) 
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In this passage MacDonald describes hearing for the first time that 
he was considered to be responsible for the savage murder of his 
entire family. Receiving such news is obviously a traumatic 
experience. ' In describing this event he displays similar 
characteristics found in the previous data. For example, he is able 
to recall what he was doing immediately before receiving the news: 
he had 'just gotten through the cash register area and was beginning 
to sit down'. Furthermore, this activity is clearly not the type of 
event which would normally be reported in ordinary conversation. 
Indeed, 'beginning to sit down' seems conspicuously routine. 
Finally, the activity he cites prefaces his description of the first 
time he heard the traumatic news. 
As final evidence that these observations are not restricted to 
accounts'of paranormal events, it is useful to consider psychological 
studies of the extent to which people recall the details of their 
circumstances at the time of dramatic experiences. For example, in 
recollections of either hearing about, or witnessing, political 
assassinations. In 1899 F. W. Colegrave asked subjects to try to 
recall when they first heard the news that President Lincoln had been 
assassinated, an event which had happened thirty-three years before 
the study (Colegrave 1982 [1899]). His respondents were able to 
provide detailed information of their circumstances at the time. For 
example: 
1 Presumably, if he had committed the murders, then lie would 
then know that the authorities were on to him; if he didn't do it, 
then he would know that he had been charged of a crime of which he 
was innocent. Either way, hearing such news would be traumatic. 
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X 'I was standing by the stove getting dinner: 
Y my husband came in and told me. ' 
R 'I was setting out a rose bush by the door. 
Y My husband came in the yard and told me. It 
was about 11 o'clock. ' 
X 'I was fixing fence [sic]... 
Y Mr. W came along and told me. ' 
(Colegrave 1982: 42) 
These results suggested that these individuals were able to recall 
perfectly well that moment from over thirty years before when they 
first heard of the President's murder. (See also Pillemer 1984; 
Yarmen and Bull 1978) Moreover, it is clear that the type of 
activities they recalled are similar to the range of circumstances 
reported in data on accounts of extraordinary experiences. That is, 
routine activities are recurrently mentioned: 'standing by the 
stove', and 'setting out a rose bush' for example. Furthermore, 
these memories display the 'I was just doing X.... when Y' format. 
These similarities are interesting in the light of the fact that they 
were produced in written, rather than spoken, reports, and elicited 
from people who lived over one hundred years ago in a different 
culture to our own. 
Colegrave's results led him to conclude that there is a 
psychological facility by which such recollections can be formed. 
He attributed the ability to form such recollections to the abiding 
and durable quality of vivid experiences. That is, the sheer novelty 
or drama of the event ensured that the mundane, routine and trivial 
features of the speaker's environment at the time were stored in 
memory. 
Within contemporary cognitive psychology there continues to be an 
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interest in the character and cause of memories of dramatic events, 
and the un-eventful circumstances of the experiences which are also 
recalled. One psychological explanation will be considered shortly. 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to state briefly why work in 
cognitive psychology need be addressed at all. 
The present study of this class of memory formulations concerns two 
related issues: their character as socially-organised devices, and 
the interactional concerns which inform their design and use in the 
production of spoken reports of paranormal experiences. Colegrave's 
research, albeit dated, suggests strongly that the features of this 
device can occur in contexts other than spoken accounts of the 
paranormal. This in turn could be taken as evidence for the 
operation of a psychological process by which memories of this type 
are recorded, stored and produced. If it is the case that the 
production of this class of memory formulation occurs as the product 
of psychological, cognitive or neurophysiological operations the 
scope for sociological investigation becomes limited. For example, 
conversational rememberings of the type displayed in the 'I was just 
doing X.... when Y' format can then be accounted for by reference to 
determining cognitive facilities. That is, there are fixed 
representations in the brain which can be recalled - 'read off' - in 
the appropriate place when people are making accounts of their 
experiences. Furthermore, it could stand as evidence that the social 
and interactional circumstances in which these devices are used are 
of little consequence when compared to the the underlying processes 
which govern the form and use of the device. In short, the 
appearance of this device might be regarded as no more than the epi- 
phenomenon of determinant cognitive events. An assessment of 
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psychological analyses of this device, therefore, is a necessary 
preliminary to an attempt to furnish a sociological account. 
In the following section Brown and Kulik's (1977) 
neurophysiological explanation will be discussed. Their work is 
important in two respects. Firstly, it provides a particularly 
strong case for the operation of distinctly cognitive procedures: the 
type of memory they study is regarded as being largely exempt from 
processes of distortion and reconstruction which occur in other 
types of memory recollections. Secondly, a critical examination of 
their position permits the introduction of a number of analytic 
issues which will be explored in later sections of this chapter. 
2 Psychology and the recollection of dramatic events 
Brown and Kulik (1977) begin by noting that their own personal 
recollections of the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 are 
qualitatively different from other types of memory. They have 
'a primary "live" quality that is almost perceptual. 
Indeed, it is very much like a photograph that 
indiscriminately preserves the scene in which each of 
us found himself when the flashbulb was fired. ' (Brown 
and Kulik 1977: 74) 
Hence, Brown and Kulik call these 'flashbulb' memories, and claim 
that they occur not only in the recollection of receiving dramatic 
news, but in any case where the individual has a particularly 
unusual experience. They argue for the following explanation. 
When the dramatic incident originally happens the individual 
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concerned recognises the novelty or import of the event. This 
recognition occurs at a conscious and unconscious level. For 
example, a novel experience may result in an unusual pattern of 
neuronal stimulation and firing. Processes within the reticular 
cortical system assess this novel experience to determine if it has 
any biological or emotional significance for the individual. If it 
is decided that this is the case, a neural mechanism is triggered 
which automatically registers and records, not only the stimulus 
event, but also any other information which is being processed at the 
same time, such as routine, everyday activities. This accounts for 
the ability of people to recall their seemingly inconsequential 
behaviour at the time of extraordinary experiences. 
If this theory is correct it provides an explanation for the 
association between speakers' reference to the paranormal phenomenon 
they experienced and their formulations of their state when it 
occurred. That is, psychological mechanisms operated to record all 
information being processed by the brain at that time. This 
information was indelibly ingrained in cognitive mechanisms, and is 
thus available to speakers when recalling their experience in the 'I 
was just doing X.... when Y' format. 
There are, however, a number of objections to the explanation 
proposed by Brown and Kulik. Firstly, as Neisser (1982b) points out, 
flashbulb memories can be incorrect. This casts doubt on the utility 
of the photographic or flashbulb metaphor which prompted Brown and 
Kulik to look to psychological processes for an explanation. 
Secondly, some events become noticeable or traumatic only in 
retrospect. This is illustrated in the following extract. 
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(4) ME B 10 
1S I mean a simple example which 
2 everybody's had something similar 
3 to 'hhhh I was living in uhm (. ) 
4 inglan years ago: 
5 and all of a sudden 
6X I was sitting in bed one night (. ) 
7 getting ready to go to sleep (. ) 
8Y and I decided to write to a friend 
9 I hadn't seen for four years (. ) 
10 in Massachusetts (. ) a: nd 
11 I found myself congratulating her 
12 on (. ) the engagement of her oldest 
13 daughter (. 3) I said congratulations 
14 Miriam's getti- Miriam's gotten 
15 engaged (. 5) ar: hm and 
16 I sent the letter (. 7) and eh (. ) 
17 er: ah II felt totally (r) (. ) 
18 right in doing so (. 5) 
19 ah mean i(t) it was just as 
20 normal to me to know that 
21 her daughter had just gotten 
22 engaged as to know that I've got 
23 five fingers on my right hand 
24 "hhhh an eh hh she wrote back 
25 to me hhh in total chaos 
26 saying (. ) how the Hell did 
27 1-you know she started the letter 
28 huhh hah T 'hh she said 
29 1 received your letter at nine 
30 o'clock in the morning (. ) 
31 and you were congratulating me 
32 on (. ) Miriam's getting engage: d: 
33 and I said what the Hell is 
34 she talking about 'hhh 
35 at twelve o'clock that morning (. ) 
36 she walked in and announced 
37 her engagement 
((continues)) 
In this extract the speaker reports on an impulse to write to a 
distant friend to congratulate her on the engagement of her 
daughter. The report of this impulse is constructed in the 'X... then 
Y' format. Furthermore, the activity she describes prior to her 
decision to write the letter is uneventful and routine: she was 'just 
sitting in bed one night (. ) getting ready to go to sleep ' (lines 6 
and 7). Later on, the speaker goes on to report that her friend's 
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return letter revealed that, at the time the speaker was celebrating 
the engagement, no-one knew anything about it, including the 
speaker's friend, Miriam's mother. The daughter announced the 
engagement after the speaker's letter had arrived. Thus, the impulse 
to write was based on a precognition of an impending event. 2 At the 
time of writing, then, there was nothing dramatic about her decision 
to write the letter which could have triggered the psychological and 
neurophysiological processes postulated by Brown and Kulik's 
explanation. In short, nothing had happened which was at that time 
known to be unusual by which we can account for the speaker's ability 
to recall that she was 'just sitting on the bed' before the 
extraordinary event. 
The following data provides further disconfirmation of Brown and 
Kulik's theory. In this extract the speaker is describing an 
incident which happened in his early childhood, some forty years 
prior to the interview in which he produced this account. At the 
time of the experience he was suffering from a severe attack of 
pneumonia. In the first part of the extract he is describing the 
effects of this illness on his sleeping habits at that time. 
(5) BY 3: 13 
1S so:: anyway (. 5) when you're in bed 
2 that length o' time you don't sleep 
3 re ular hours like (. 3) 
4 when you normally go to bed at night 
5 yuknow if you've been up all day 
6 you go to bed you go to sleep (. ) 
2 There is evidence to suggest that the speaker's formulation 
of her activity is done in spite of of her subsequent knowledge that 
it transpired to be of consequence: in line 5 she begins to preface a 
reference to her decision to write with 'all of a sudden', which 
seems to indicate strongly that the speaker had classified the 
impulse as significant in the light of later events. 
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7 'hhhh an' you wake up in the morning (. ) 
8X an' I musta bin do: zin there or 
9 something (. ) unuhr: 
10 Y suddenly this: light 
11 a very small light (. ) 
12 must've started playing (. ) 
13 s: i: lly devils 
((continues)) 
The speaker introduces a reference to the phenomenon with the 
state formulation 'an I musta bin do: zin there or something' (line 
8). This recollection of his activity at the time of the experience, 
however, seems to be qualified by his comments 'musta bin... ' and 
'or something... '. That is, he appears to be lacking a precise 
recollection of the routine circumstances which were disrupted by the 
phenomenon. Yet according to the Brown and Kulik explanation, the 
mechanical operation of neurophysiological processes should have 
ensured that this information was stored in his memory. 
Despite a lack of a clear recollection of his activities at the 
time of the experience, the manner in which he qualifies his state 
formulation suggests that he is providing a description of that type 
of activity in which it is likely he would have been engaged. The 
provision of this 'candidate' description implies that the speaker 
recognises, and responds to, a cultural convention to furnish an 
example of this class of utterance. 
There are some further problems with the Brown and Kulik 
explanation, and these concern the relationship between the activity 
used in constructing a description of the circumstances of the 
experience, and the nature of the phenomenon or event being reported. 
In extract (1) the speaker's experience consisted of being pressed 
against the frame of a door by an invisible agency. His state 
formulation was 'as I was going through the doorway' (line 14). 
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There is a 'fit' between the activity selected and the type of 
experience he had. This occurs also in the following extract. 
(6) LE 4: 29 (The speaker's husband bad been a pilot in the R. A. F. 
He had a military funeral service which was held in an aeroplane 
hanger. ) 
1S an I went in there (. ) er: m: 
2 w-with my mother in law and uhm: (. 4) 
3 friends that were with me 
4 (1.3) 
5 'hhh (. ) 
6X and I was just looking at the coffin 
7Y and there was David standing there (. 3) 
8 he was in Blues 
9 (1) 
10 'hh he wasn't wearing his hat 
11 his hat was on the coffin 
12 and he was there 
((continues)) 
Here, the speaker's saw an apparition of her recently deceased 
husband standing next to his coffin at his funeral. Her state 
formulation is 'I was just looking at the coffin' (line 6). In this 
extract, and in extract (1) there is a relationship between the 
speaker's recollections of the experience and the circumstances at 
that time. This is even more strikingly illustrated in extract (3). 
The speaker provides a description of her circumstances which reveal 
what time of day it was when she observed the extraordinary behaviour 
of her friend's husband: 'I got up abou: t (. ) well it was about 
ei: ght o'clock' (lines 18 and 19). What made this behaviour so 
extraordinary, however, is that, despite Dwight's health problems, he 
was up and active so early in the morning. By introducing this 
information into her description of the circumstances at that time 
the speaker is able to provide material from an inspection of which 
a recipient can come to see what was so out-of-the-ordinary. Indeed, 
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the provision of this feature of the speaker's circumstances 
furnishes a warrant for her description of this behaviour as unusual 
and notable. 
In these extracts, then, there is a contingent relevance between 
the activities indexed in the first part of the format, and the 
paranormal or unusual event referred to in the second. That is, the 
activities reported in the first part are not coincidentally related 
to the subsequent experience: it is not that they are mentionable 
because they were happening, and then something extraordinary 
happened. Rather, the descriptions of these activites are designed 
to elevate features of the speakers' experiences made relevant by the 
subsequent event. They attain a reportable status by virtue of what 
the event turned out to be. 
The contingent relevance beween the two parts of the device is 
difficult to account for in terms of a flashbulb metaphor. If the 
brain records all information being processed at the time, why is it 
that the eventual description of the speaker's activities at the time 
should so neatly dove-tail with the phenomenon which had been 
experienced ? 
According to the Brown and Kulik hypothesis, the information which 
is recalled in recollections of dramatic events is 'accidentally' 
stored - that is, the brain just happened to be processing it - when 
the events originally occurred. However, the brain is monitoring a 
considerable array of information at any one time: peripheral visual 
images, aural input, the sensations from skin contact, olfactory 
sensations, the speaker's biological and emotional state at that 
moment and so on. Therefore, any actual memory formulation is a 
selection from a range of possible features recorded by the 
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'flashbulb' operations of the brain. Thus, even if we accept Brown 
and Kulik's flashbulb metaphor, it is still difficult to account for 
the selection of one specific feature from the total quantity of 
information dormant in the brain. 
Furthermore, the psychological study of this class of memory 
formulation has primarily employed written examples. There has been 
little attention given to occasions in which these formulations are 
produced in the course of naturally occurring talk. This position is 
perfectly legitimate for psychological research given that the 
object of such investigations are the underlying and determining 
cognitive procedures which are operating. The examples of these 
formulations which occur in accounts of paranormal experiences, 
however, display features which do not seem to be explicable solely 
in terms of cognitive procedures. For example, the contingent 
relevance between the speakers' activities at the time, and the event 
to which these activites were prior. This observation suggests that 
these formulations are designed. This in turn invites analysis of 
the methods by which they are designed and constructed, and also the 
tasks these formulations are designed to accomplish. These issues 
can only be explored through analysis of formulations produced 
spontaneously in accounts of paranormal experiences. 
Neisser (1982b) proposes an alternative explanation for the 
occurrence and organisation of these types of memories. Rejecting 
the idea that there is a neural or chemical basis for them, he 
argues: 
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'they seem to be like narrative conventions.... News 
reporters and novelists, mythmakers and autobiographers 
have a fairly consistent idea of how events should be 
described, of what readers and listeners want to know. 
Everyone in our culture is at least roughly aware of 
these conventions. In effect we have a schemata for 
the arrival of important news.... ' (Neisser 1982b: 47) 
[original emphasis] 
Neisser's argument is that, when making reports about dramatic 
personal experiences, speakers rely on culturally-available 
conventions which inform the ways that accounts are produced. This 
argument has two immediate implications. 
On a positive note it suggests that the investigation of the 'I was 
just doing X.... when Y' format does not have to answer to the 'facts' 
of cognitive procedure which are deemed to govern its organisation 
and content. This is not to claim that such cognitive procedures do 
not exist, or that they are unimportant. Neisser has indicated 
merely that there is a social dimension to them, a feature obscured 
by the emphasis upon cognition and neurophysiology. 
In doing this, however, he implies too strongly that the use of 
this class of memory formulation results from exposure to culturally- 
available procedures for the arrival of dramatic news. That is, it 
is implied that the production of this device in accounts of 
extraordinary experiences is a form of ritual activity. They are 
produced this way simply because this is the way that members of a 
culture have learned to present information of this kind. Criticisms 
which applied to Brown and Kulik's explanation, therefore, are also 
pertinent to this position. For example, it is difficult to explain 
the descriptive 'meshing' between the two parts of the format. 
To produce a more satisfactory account, therefore, it is necessary 
to consider the 'I was just doing X... ' format as an environment in 
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which distinctly interactional concerns are mediated. That is, we 
will consider how speakers use this format to accomplish specific 
tasks in the course of producing verbal accounts of paranormal 
phenomena. Analysing the functions mediated through this device 
permits us to retain Neisser's insight as to their character as 
culturally-available resources, while at the same time providing an 
empirical basis in which to explore the fine detail of their 
organisation. 
3 State formulations 
In the following extracts there are more examples of way in which 
speakers produce descriptions of their activity immediately prior to 
their initial encounter with an anomalous phenomenon. 
(7) WER 52 (the speaker is providing an account of a series of 
apparitions and associated poltergeist activity. ) 
1S so II think I remember I 'ad a dish 
2 in hand I was out in the kitchen 
3 it was different like (. ) yu know (. ) 
4 to this sort'uve flat (. 5) 
5 an it was like a (. ) big entrance hall (. 7) 
6 with one (. ) door (. 5) and then it came 
7 straight the way through 
8 there was a door there and a 
9 door there (. 5) a door there 
10 an (. 5) it was a kitchen 
11 (1) 
12 and I was right by this unit part 
13 (1.5) 
14 an (. ) 
15 X I were lookin out that way 
16 Y an it seemed to be like a figurer (. ) 
17 coming through that ha'tll (. 7) 
18 all I could see was ah (a) 
19 the top part 
((continues)) 
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(8) LE 5: 39 (The speaker had her husband's funeral service video 
recorded for relatives who were unable to attend the ceremony. ) 
1S I also wanted it video'd for my 
2 children: who were 
3 (1.7) 
4 two and four at the time 
5 and they didn't come to the funeral 
6 (2.4) 
7 and so perhaps a wee: k later 
8 (1.3) 
9 >must've bin about< a week afterwards 
10 'h I:: (. 5) put the recording on 
11 and was: (. 5) watching it 
12 I was obviously extremely upset 
13 (. 8) 
14 X and I was sat on a chair 
15 (. ) 
16 uhnd 
17 (. 5) 
18 Y when I looked down David was (. ) 
19 kneeling at the side of me 
((continues)) 
(9) VA 1 100 (The speaker has been providing the 
experience, which occurred at work. She has 
worked very early in the morning. ) 
1S I got there very early 
2 in the morning simply because 
3 my mother was ill at the time 
4 with cancer 'h 
5 and I used tuh have to 
6 nurse her so I (. 3) got 
7 there early to do the work (. 5) 
8X 'hh as I went up (. ) one of 
9 the staircases with all my (. ) 
10 cleaning equipment (. 3) um:: 
11 (1) 
12 Y a man (. ) pushed passed me 
13 (1) 
14 he was spirit it w- 
15 or whatever you want to call it 
((continues)) 
(10) IIY 14 
1SI was in that state between (. ) 
2 sleeping and waking I was not 
3 alseep (. ) butch ya know in that 
background for her- 
just stated that she 
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4 very relaxed (. 3) state (. 5) 
5X a: nd I was >thinkin' to myself< 
6Y au: GHh:: I'm cold (. 7) y'know 
7 a: nd the bedclothes (. 3) 
8 came up from the 
9 bottom of the bed 
10 (1) 
11 and covered me 
12 (1.3) 
13 without me (. ) taking any 
14 kind'uve (. ) action whatsoever 
((continues)) 
(11) ME B 88 
1S I had ear plugs in my ears 
2 cz I couldn't stand all the 
3 noise I had (. ) dark glasses on 
4 >because I didn't want 
5 to see anybody< 
6X an' I was standing right there 
7 on the platform (. 7) waiting for 
8 this damned train to come (. ) 
9Y all of a sudden 
10 (2.3) 
11 I (. ) I began to feel as total 
12 totally (. ) absolutely (. ) 
13 insubstantial that is 
14 I had no bodily feeling 
((continues)) 
The first observation to make is that, in describing the 
circumstances surrounding their first perception of the phenomenon, 
speakers provide information which attends to more than one issue. 
For example, it is possible to use the first part of the 'I was just 
doing X.... ' format to refer either to an activity or a place: in 
extract (7) the speaker produces the description 'I was sat in a 
chair'. This utterance provides information which addresses both the 
location of the speaker - on a specific chair in the room - and what 
she was doing at the time - sitting. The same is true of the 
description provided by the speaker in extract (8). In this case 
the speaker's formulation is 'as I went up (. ) one of the staircases 
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with all my (. ) cleaning equipment' (lines 8 to 10). This utterance 
can be used either to place the speaker on the staircase, or to 
locate that she was going up it at the time of the experience. 
Therefore, instead of attempting to characterise these descriptions 
in terms of one overriding feature, it is more useful to refer to the 
first part of the 'I was just doing X.... ' format as the speaker's 
state formulation. 
It has been noted in passing that the activities reported in state 
formulations, for the most part, seem on first inspection to be 
routine, bland or commonplace: in short, unexceptional. Moreover, in 
addition to this, these descriptions portray a minimal character of 
the activity to which they refer. For example, in extract (6) the 
speaker's state formulation is 'I were lookin' out that way' (line 
15). In extract (9) the speaker claims that, prior to her first 
awareness that something strange was happening, she 'was >thinkin to 
myself<' (line 5). Finally, in extract (8) the speaker claims her 
first encounter with the phenomenon occurred as she 'went up (. ) one 
of the staircases' (lines 8 and 9). 'Lookin', 'thinkin' and 'went' 
gloss only the broad character of the speakers' actions at the time. 3 
The recollection of inconsequential events was treated as 
significant in the Brown and Kulik model, insofar as it was assumed 
that only by virtue of the occurrence of an extraordinary event was 
it possible to be able to recall mundane aspects of the 
circumstances. This suggests that Brown and Kulik recognised the 
unexceptional nature of the circumstantial events described in what 
they termed flashbulb memories. It is not at all clear, however, 
3 We may note that the 'unreportable' character of these 
activites may in part stem from the fact that so much of everyday 
life could be legitimately glossed by these terms. 
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that the activites and events reported in the first part of the 
device identified here can be treated as being literal descriptions 
of the state of affairs in the world to which they purportedly refer. 
In Chapter Two it was argued that any description is inevitably a 
a selection from a range of available possibilities. Thus, the 
state formulations in the 'I was just doing X.... ' device are also 
composed of items selected in preference over other items. The 
blandness or inconsequentiality of the speakers' recollections of 
their circumstances at the time, therefore, may in fact be the result 
of a preference for the selection of words through which to construct 
a description of these memories, rather than a reflection of a fixed 
set of internal images. In the next section we will focus on the 
ways that speakers select certain items with which to build their 
state formulations. 
4 The mundane environment of paranormal experiences 
In this section we will see that speakers design their state 
formulations''to provide for the unexceptional character of their 
activities at the time. The first source of evidence emerges when 
specific data extracts are considered in detail. This exercise is 
somewhat unsatisfactory insofar as it considers what is excluded 
from the account, rather than what is actually present in the data. 
Thus, it cannot be treated as providing more than guidelines as to 
the procedures by which specific utterances are composed. 
We will start by examining extract (6). 
189 
(6) LE 4: 29 
1S an I went in there (. ) er: m: 
2 w-with my mother in law and uhm: (. 4) 
3 friends that were with me 
4 (1.3) 
5 'hhh (. ) 
6X and I was just looking at the coffin 
7Y and there was David standing there (. 3) 
8 he was in Blues 
9 (1) 
10 'hh he wasn't wearing his hat 
11 his hat was on the coffin 
12 and he was there 
((continues)) 
In this extract the speaker is reporting on one of the first of a 
number of experiences involving the apparition of her dead husband. 
This occurred during the funeral service held for him in an R. A. F. 
areoplane hanger. The actual state formulation she provides is 'I 
was just looking at the coffin' (line 6). There are a number of 
relevant observations to be made about this description. First, it 
excludes reference to a massive array of potentially reportable 
features of her environment. For example, she does not report 
information about her non-physical environment; for example, she does 
not furnish a state formulation such as 'and it just went quiet and 
then... ' or 'and it just turned cold when suddenly... '. Furthermore, 
she does not mention where the coffin was in relation to the 
aeroplanes situated at either side of it. Nor does she indicate her 
physical position in relation either to the coffin or to other 
people at the funeral. Moreover, she makes no reference to her 
emotional state. Indeed, given the range of features that she could 
have legitimately selected from which to build a state formulation, 
the activity of 'just looking' seems particularly bland. 
According to Brown and Kulik's explanation the brain records, and 
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thereby makes available for subsequent recall, the mundane details of 
the circumstances at the time of extraordinary experiences. Yet in 
this single extract it is clear that the speaker produces as mundane 
a description as is possible. In the way she 'brackets in' only 
certain aspects of her environment she constructs a routine state 
formulation in spite of the emotive and traumatic circumstances at 
the time. 
A second source of evidence emerges in extracts where speakers 
themselves overtly display a preference for the way in which their 
state formulations are constructed. In this respect the following 
data is useful not only because we can see the speaker selecting 
items to build the mundaneity of his activites at the time, but also 
because it illustrates the kind of descriptive items which are 
rejected in the production of state formulations. 
(12) DN 22: 162 
1SI had the teapot in my hand like that 
2 and I walked through the kitchen door 
3 (. 5) 
4R 'hhh as I was going through the doorway hh 
5 (. 7) 
6YI was just (. ) jammed 
((continues)) 
In this extract there are two descriptions of the same event: 'and 
I walked through the kitchen door' (line 2), and 'as I was going 
through the doorway' line (4). Only after the second description of 
his circumstances does he go on to refer to the phenomenon. This 
implies that the speaker did not want the first utterance to stand as 
a state formulation, and, therefore, that he orienting to a 
preference for the design of this description. 
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In the first utterance the speaker selects to describe his physical 
progression into the kitchen as 'walked'. He then subsequently 
amends this and characterises himself as 'going through'. Although 
both utterances address his physical movement there is a subtle 
distinction in that the first attends directly to the means of 
ambulation: a description of how he got into the doorframe. The 
second refers more generally to the action of movement rather than 
the method whereby that movement was achieved. It is also noticeable 
that there is a change in the tenses through which the activity is 
described: from 'walked' to 'going'. This shift is from a 'passive' 
to an 'active' past tense. (This will be discussed later in more 
detail. ) 
In this extract, then, the speaker provides alternative 
descriptions of two separate features of his circumstances at the 
time of the experience: his movement and his location. In both cases 
the first, specific version is replaced by a more general reference, 
suggesting that the speaker is orienting to a preference to use bland 
and unexceptional descriptive items from which to construct his state 
formulation. From the range of possible options he actively selects 
specific words, the use of which is intended to provide for, rather 
than merely reflect, the mundane character of his circumstances. 
This extract is useful insofar as it permits an analytic 
inspection of the methodic character of the speaker's reasoning 
about what should and should not be used in a state formulation. 
Fortunately this data is not the only material which contains 
occasions in which speakers exhibit the method employed when 
constructing the first part of the 'I was just doing X... ' device. 
In some cases, speakers use state formulations to provide upshots or 
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gists of their prior talk. This material will be examined in the 
following section. 
5 State formulations as gists and upshots 
In this section we will consider state formulations which are 
constructed so as to provide a summary of some aspect of the 
speakers' own prior talk. In the way that these summaries are 
produced speakers display the practical reasoning which informs their 
design. An analysis of these procedures further confirms that the 
speakers actively provide mundane, bland glosses of previous 
stretches of talk in which they deal with traumatic or evocative 
material. 
In the following extract the speaker provides an account of the 
circumstances leading up to his experiences, and then describes the 
onset of the experience through the 'I was just doing X... ' format. 
(13) MD 1: 1 
1I well what s- sort of experiences 
2 have you had 
3 (1.4) 
4S er: m: 
5 (2.3) 
6 >ah suppose< 
7 (2.7) 
8 the one that sticks in me mind 
9 most was (. ) when I had (. ) 
10 I was working a(h)- 
11 I used tuh have a workshop 
12 where I used to make 
13 furniture (. 4) I'm a 
14 wood cab- cabinet maker by 
15 trade 'hhh and I'd walked 
16 down t(t)- village to get 
17 some cigarettes 'cos at that 
18 time I used to smoke (. 4) 
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19 un I was thinkin' about religion 
20 un eh (. 5) I was thinkin' well (. 4) 
21 () on the lines of it (. 3) 
22 i(t)- i- must be very easy 
23 to be Saint Paul because 
24 yuh get yer blindin' light 
25 on the road to Damascus 
26 sort u(v) thing un eh 
27 'hh (. 6) *you've no problems* 
28 (*so you°) yo: u: know 
29 as far as you're concerned 
30 you measure all things 
31 according to that experience 
32 the experience was exterior 
33 to yourself an' so therefore 
34 (1.3) 
35 you viewed it (. 7) 
36 as a star :t 
37 (. 5) 
38 (>°yu know<°) 
39 yeah 
40 X I were just thinkin' 
41 (. 3) 
42 er: m: 
43 Y and then suddenly (. ) 
44 I was aware of 
45 (. 7) 
46 almost (. ) the sensation was 
47 almost as if a veil was lifted 
((continues)) 
It is noticeable that the speaker talks for a considerable stretch 
before producing the first part of the device. Much of his talk 
concerns his reflections on religious conversion through direct 
encounter. with mystical, religious forces. These meditations are 
summarised by the state formulation 'I were just thinkin'' (line 40). 
'I were just thinkin'' is related to the previous stretch of talk 
insofar as it attends to and describes the speaker's activity. That 
is, it provides a version of the sense of the prior talk. While 
retaining the activity 'thinking', however, it deletes the specific 
features of the speaker's contemplations. That he had been 
explicitly considering direct confrontation with the numinous, for 
example, is not adumbrated by the truncated state formulation. The 
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speaker's method for providing this description, therefore, involves 
the active rejection of a range of potentially storyable items in 
preference for a minimal and mundane version. 
Heritage and Watson (1979) explored the ways in which participants 
in news interviews formulate versions of prior talk, and the 
interactional tasks accomplished through these formulations. They 
identified two methods by which speakers can reflexively constitute 
the character of the preceding talk, and these are illustrated in 
the following extracts. 
(14) (This extract comes from a face-to-face interview with the 
'Slimmer of the Year' which was relayed on the radio. ) 
1S You have a shell that for so long 
2 protects you but sometimes 
3 things creep through the shell 
4 and then you become really aware 
5 of how awful you feel. I never 
6 ever felt my age or looked my age 
7 I was always older - people took me 
8 for older. And when I was at college 
9 I think I looked a matronly fifty. 
10 And I was completely alone one weekend 
11 and I got to this stage where I 
12 almost jumped in the river. 
13 I just felt life wasn't worth it any 
14 more - it hadn't anything to offer 
15 and if this was living 
16 I had had enough 
17 1 You really were prepared to commit 
18 suicide because you were 
19 a big fatty 
20 S Yes, because I-I just didn't 
21 see anything in life that I had 
22 to look forward to.... 
(Heritage and Watson 1979: 132) 
At the stage where the speaker has introduced her thoughts about 
suicide the interviewer interjects and asks the question 'You really 
were prepared to commit suicide because you were a big fatty' (lines 
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17 to 19). Here the interviewer uses material provided by the 
speaker to form the basis of his question. He provides a summary 
assessment of what she had been saying, drawing out the 'gist' of 
her remarks - namely, that her obesity led to a suicidal depression. 
(15) (This extract comes from a radio interview with Mr. John 
Gouriet (G) after his successful application to the Court of Appeal 
for leave to take out an injunction against a boycott of mail to 
South Africa planned by the Union of Post Office Workers. ) 
1 I If occasion - if occasion rises again 
2 will you take similar action ? 
3 G Well we have never hesitated so far 
4 to er take action where 
5 freedom is being abused. 
6 I So there might be another occasion 
7 on which you will use the law 
8 against unions 
9 G Not necessarily against unions 
10 but against any body which has 
11 become over mighty er and is abusing 
12 its responsibilities 
(Heritage and Watson 1979: 134-5) 
In this extract G, in response to the interviewer's first 
question, makes the statement that he has never refrained from action 
in those circumstances where he feels freedom is being abused. The 
interviewer's next question (lines 6 to 8) takes this assertion and 
draws implications from it, using these as the core of the question. 
Thus, the interviewer addresses his remarks to the 'upshot' of G's 
previous comments. 
Heritage and Watson note that gists and upshots allow speakers to 
do a combination of three things. By formulating prior talk in this 
way certain features of it can be preserved, some deleted and others 
transformed. For example, from extract (14) the interviewer's phrase 
'a big fatty' preserves the essential feature of the speaker's prior 
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descriptions - her weight problem. At the same time, the way in 
which the issue is described ensures that it is transformed; for 
example, 'a big fatty' does not invoke the seriousness of the problem 
as revealed by the speaker. Indeed, this re-characterisation of the 
problem serves to delete the more depressing implications and 
consequences associated with obesity. 
In the following extract the speaker provides a lengthy account of 
his psychological state at the time of his sighting of a series of 
unidentified aerial objects. In illustrating his thoughts and 
feelings he produces extensive descriptions of a range of personal 
problems. After this descriptive work he constructs a state 
formulation which also furnishes the upshot of his prior talk (line 
147). 
(16) WIR 1: 7 
1 S I was (at) art school at 
2 the ti: me 
3 (. 3) 
4 I you were in art school yeah (. 3) 
5 mm 
6 (. 5) 
7 S er do you want the psychological 
8 frame of mind I was in at that 
9 time 
10 I yes: that would be (. ) 
11 very er (. ) helpful 
12 (. 2) 
13 S er: m: (. 2) undergoing 
14 (1) 
15 sort of fus- frustrations for being 
16 in an art school because (. 4) 
17 therefore you have to create 
18 a:: nd (. 5) if there's a sort 
19 of policy at the art school 
20 is (. 3) of a specific (. 4) policy which 
21 is at that time hard line 
22 abstractionism and 'hh any 
23 figurative work was very much 
24 frowned upon 
25 I °mm hm° 
26 S I felt (. 4) that there was sort 
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27 of like a policy to tow (. 3) and in 
28 this climate of (. 5) of: >°sort uv°< 
29 creative (. 3) miasma was above my 
30 head that I couldn't (. ) break out 
31 so there was a whole group of us 
32 that w(uh) (. ) very frustrated 
33 with the art school 
34 (. 2) 
35 I mm hm 
36 S °because° it wasn't really 
37 wanted (. ) in th- in Winchester 
38 itself 
39 (. ) 
40 I mm hm 
41 S "it was er er a >°sort uv°< 
42 a s- an afterthought (. 2) stuck 
43 onto into the marshlands of 
44 of literally the Winchester 
45 I 1mm hm 
46 S () hundred feet into 
47 the marshland (. ) stuck a 
48 w(a)- art sc- art school there (. 5) 
49 a:: nd (. 7) >you know< i(t) it was 
50 a very unviable feeling that th- 
51 the'ar(t) th- th- th- this little 
52 twee toytown of a place (. 4) 
53 really wasn't (. 6) didn't want 
54 these these aliens huhh h to 
55 put it a better way 
56 I °mm° 
57 S 
E 
w(in)- sort of artists creative 
58 people so (. 3) ehm erm erm 
59 (1) 
60 so there was (>some<) certain 
61 people who felt that I had 
62 affiliated with (. ) and we 
63 joined together one evening (. 4) 
64 er er (. ) and and an my girlfriend 
65 had just had an abortion 
66 (1) 
67 and I'd just (. ) had a cruder 
68 sort of psoriasis (. 2) sort of 
69 episode at the time which wa: s 
70 (1.5) 
71 aggravating the whole frame of 
72 mind and so: (. 3) I think psy- 
73 pyschologically I was 
74 psychosomatically 
75 (1.4) 
76 exhibiting symptoms of stress 
77 anyway r so 
7 I Lmmhm 
79 (. 3) 
80 S and and to try to create on 
81 top of all that I think was er 
82 ehm is too much to ask for so (. 3) 
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83 we: I think just wo- burst out of 
84 the place we went (. ) wandering 
85 across right across the (. ) 
86 the water lake the water meadows 
87 (. 2) 
88 1 mm hm 
89 S a: nd 
90 (1.3) 
91 wandered out to the hill: (. 3) 
92 on: a (. 3) S: unday evening 'hh (. ) 
93 all the time (. ) I was aware of the 
94 th- th- th- th- the school called 
95 (Whicker's) school which is like a sort 
96 of (. ) the: public school (. ) 
97 I rmm 
98 S L of the of the south (. ) really 
99 very privileged people all playing 
100 cricket and we wandered past them 
101 and we saw (. 3) the whole (. ) 
102 crass class system 'hh and it 
103 was all we saw it all in 
104 perspective it was like (. 3) 
105 a very (. ) m:: editive clear 
106 perspective type walk where we 
107 we could s: ee the: >th- th- th-< 
108 the class structure as as its 
109 as its very 
110 (1) 
111 obvious 
112 1 mm rhm 
113 S and we were (. 7) dishevelled 
114 diskempt unkempt (. 7) people all 
115 wandering round three of us wandered 
116 past them up the hill (. 3) called on (. ) 
117 a friend called Jim who was (. 5) over 
118 (Middlesex) area (. ) north (. 4) 
119 °wandered° (. 5) right up up to 
120 the other side of er: m: (. 3) 
121 Saint 
122 (2) 
123 erm (. 5) I didn't got there on 
124 Saturday by the way I said I 
125 ws going to go there (. 7) 
126 erm: I >can't remember the name< 
127 but it was S: aint Hilda's (. ) 
128 quite a sort of hallowed ground (. 3) 
129 for some people because there's a (. 4) 
130 circular 
131 (1.3) 
132 maze like thing on the top which 
133 you can wander through 
134 I it's an ancient (. ) place is it 
135 S it is an ancient pla ce 
136 1 
1 
yeah I see 
137 S it's been refurrowed all these years 
138 yuh know 
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139 1 oh yes 
140 S follow it (. ) f- in a sort of spiral 
141 s- shape on top of it 1 
142 I mm 
143 (. 3) 
144 S but there was another (. ) brow 
145 another hill which we went up to 
146 (, 4) 
147 X and we were contemplating our 
148 state of mind at about (. 2) two 
149 o'clock in the morning 
150 (. ) 
151 I mm hm 
152 S three of us (. 4) looked across the 
153 north (charkum) where (. 3) we 
154 know that th- I know contact 
155 w(i)- j- wi- wi with ah a j(a)- 
156 Joyce Bowles case 
157 (. 2) 
158 1 oh Joyce Bowles yeah 
((continues)) 
The utterance 'and we were contemplating our state of mind at 
about (. 2) two o'clock in the morning' (lines 147 to 149) does not 
lead directly to a description of the anomalous event. The speaker 
does appear to start a report of his first awareness of the 
phenomenon in that he identifies the area of land above which the 
UFOs were sighted. This area is significant for another series of 
sightings, and the speaker makes a reference to this; consequently 
he fails to complete the second part of the device. Despite the lack 
of a fully-developed example of the format, however, the description 
in lines 147 to 149 can still be treated as a legitimate state 
formulation. 
The speaker introduces a number of issues which are sources of 
personal anxiety: his relationship to his art school (lines 13 to 
33); his relationship to Winchester by virtue of his identity as an 
art student (lines 36 to 58); his girlfriend's abortion and his 
medical problems (lines 64 to 69) and his attitudes towards the 
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class system (lines 93 to 111). The speaker thus goes to 
considerable lengths to provide material which indicates that, at the 
time, he was at least unsettled. Yet his state formulation 
summarises this prior talk by focusing on the act of contemplation, 
and thereby discards the more graphic aspects of his account. 
In extracts (13) and (16), there is a similar phenomenon. In 
both cases the speakers draw attention to the non-ordinary character 
of their activites or state at the time. In (13) the speaker 
reveals that he had been thinking about the effect on personal faith 
resulting from an encounter with a numinous force; in (16) the 
speaker provides a detailed account of the reasons for his unhappy 
frame of mind. Having provided this information, both speakers 
extract the gist of it in the course of producing a state 
formulation. In both cases they discard explicit reference to the 
emotive or disturbing character of the issues they raised in their 
talk; furthermore, they provide a routine or 'mild' description of 
the act of thinking itself. Therefore, in the course of extracting 
the gist of prior talk so as to construct state formulations, both 
speakers display a method of utterance design which provides for, 
rather than reflects, the routine and bland character of their 
circumstances. 
In the following data the speakers draw the 'upshot', or 
consequences which resulted from events described in their prior 
talk. 
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(17) LE 1: 6 (the speaker is describing the circumstances in which she 
first encountered the spirit of her deceased husband. This occurred 
shortly after she had been informed by two representatives of the R. 
A. F. of his death in an aircraft accident. ) 
1S a:: n: deh (. ) they drove me (. ) 
2 to (. ) Angelsey 
3 (1.5) 
4 a: nd 
5 (. 5) 
6X we were all sat round 
7 (. ) 
8 ehm 
9 in a room 
10 (. 6) 
11 Y and I knew >thut< (. 3) 
12 1 know it sounds silly but 
13 I knew that David was there 
14 he was behi: nd me 'hhh 
((continues)) 
(18 [81) LE 5: 39 (The speaker had had her husband's funeral service 
video recorded for relatives unable to attend the ceremony. ) 
SI also wanted it videod for my 
children: who were 
(1.7) 
two and four at the time 
and they didn't come to the funeral 
(2.4) 
and so perhaps a wee: k later 
(1.3) 
>must've bin about< a week afterwards 
'h I:: (. 5) put the recording on 
and was: (. 5) watching it 
I was obviously extremely upset 
(. 8) 




Y when I looked down David was (. ) 
kneeling at the side of me 
((continues)) 
(19 [5) ) BY 3: 13 (At the time of the experience the speaker was 
suffering from a severe bout of double pneumonia, from which, it 
later transpired, his doctor had not expected him to recover. ) 
1S so:: anyway (. 5) when you're 
2 in bed that length o' time 
3 you don't sleep re ular hours 
202 
4 like (. 3) when you normally 
5 go to bed at night yuknow 
6 if you've been up all day 
7 you go to bed you go to 
8 sleep 
9 (. ) 
10 'hhhh an' you wake 
11 up in the morning 
12 (. ) 
13 X an' I musta bin do: zin' there 
14 or something 
15 (. ) 
16 unuhr: 
17 Y suddenly this: light 
18 a very small light 
19 (. ) 
20 must've started playing 
21 (. ) 
22 s: i: lly devils 
((continues)) 
In extracts (17)-to (19) speakers produce innocuous upshots from 
material provided prior to their use of the 'I was just doing X... ' 
format. In (17) the speaker says 'we were all sat round (. ) ehm in a 
room' (lines 6 to 9); this is an upshot from her having been met by 
representatives of the R. A. F. and driven to her husband's camp. In 
the light of emotive events which she had just experienced, and 
which she had just described in the account, this utterance is 
conspicuously routine. Similarly, in (18) the upshot of the 
speaker's prior talk about the video recording of her husband's 
funeral service is 'I was sat on a chair' (line 14). It is 
noticeable that earlier in the account the speaker had already 
provided one upshot of the talk about the video: '. I:: (. ) put the 
recording on and was: (. 5) watching it', after which she makes an 
explicit reference to her distress on that occasion (lines 10 to 12). 
Instead of moving directly to a description of her first perception 
of the apparition, however, she produces a mundane state formulation. 
Finally, in extract (19) the speaker's state formulation is 'an I 
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musta bin do: zin' there or something' (lines 13 and 15) is adduced as 
an upshot of his disrupted sleep patterns. Thus, on those occasions 
in which speakers use their state formulations to provide summary 
assessments of aspects of their own prior talk, the method they 
employ transforms the previous material so as to provide a mundane 
version. That is, speakers have designed their utterances 
specifically to furnish precisely these glossess of their own talk. 
This section has considered gists and upshots to show that bland 
state formulations are not merely descriptions of fixed mental 
representations. This material can also be used to support a more 
general point - that the 'I was just doing X.... when Y' format is 
oriented to by speakers as an environment in which interactional 
business is mediated. 
Heritage and Watson's (1979) paper dealt with gists and upshots 
which appeared in interview interaction. They state that, in the 
data they studied, formulations derive some of their properties from 
the speech exchange system in which they are embedded. For example, 
a gist or an upshot may be employed by a participant to phrase a 
question in such a way that it prompts some further comment. In so 
far as any formulation is inextricably tied to a turn-by-turn 
exchange system, however, the recipient has the option of challenging 
or rejecting the assertion or position which is achieved through it. 
That is, although an acceptance may be a preferred response, the 
provision of a formulation in an interactional setting is constrained 
by the possibility that it may receive a dispreferred response, such 
as disagreement. Any formulation, then, is produced for inspection 
by the recipient, and the recipient has the option of rejecting it in 
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a next turn utterance. Until a formulation has been sanctioned in by 
the recipient in the next turn, it stands as a candidate reading of 
that part of the conversation to which it refers. 
Heritage and Watson state that any formulation glosses, and thereby 
accomplishes a sense for, the indexical properties of the talk for 
which it stands as a formulation. However, formulations themselves 
are constructed through indexical items, and thus cannot be treated 
as definitive readings of any part of the trajectory of a 
conversation. This is apparent inasmuch as it is possible for one 
participant to disagree with the gist or upshot of her talk provided 
by another. In extended, multi-unit, single speaker turns, however, 
the properties of formulations are subtly amended. 
First, formulations in extended turns are not designed to be 
assessed by the recipient in the same way as those which occur in 
conversational interaction. ' In two-party talk a gist or an upshot 
may be the vehicle for a range of interactional events such as asking 
a question, being rude, displaying an interpretation of the other's 
talk, or simply exhibiting the speaker's current understanding of the 
trajectory of the conversation. By virtue of the fact that they 
display a version of the sense of the other's talk, they invite the 
other to reconsider their prior talk in the light of the version of 
that talk accomplished in the formulation. In extended multi-unit 
turns, however, the speaker is recasting the character of their own 
talk. That a state formulation has been produced does not demand the 
explicit attention of the recipient. This is not to claim that they 
have no interactional basis: the interactional importance lies in the 
way in which a speaker can publically exhibit the manner in which 
they made an assessment of their own prior talk. 
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In the data considered here the speakers have transformed sections 
of their previous utterances to draw out the mundane character of the 
features discussed, thus exhibiting an understanding that state 
formulations are conventionally designed to reveal their routine 
character. In so far as this method is available for analytic 
inspection by a professional analyst, it is also available for the 
recipient at the time. By displaying that they have interpreted the 
salient features of the account in this way, the speakers explicitly 
demonstrate that this is their preferred method to employ when 
producing a state formulation. That is, the speaker shows the 
recipient how it has been accomplished. Moreover, insofar as the 
formulation is a commentary on their own prior talk, and not one put 
to them by someone else, the speakers are able to demonstrate their 
subscription to this method. Thus, it is not merely that they are 
doing formulations in this way, but that they are displaying their 
reasoning that it is appropriate to do them in this way for that 
occasion. And it is precisely this feature of formulations embedded 
in multi-unit turns that ensures their importance as environments 
through which a variety of interactional tasks can be accomplished. 
We saw in the last chapter how, in the course of producing a verbal 
account, a single speaker oriented to the inauspiciousness of 
reporting paranormal experiences, and how her descriptions were 
designed with respect to tasks generated in the course of making such 
a report in this type of environment. One feature of the 
inauspiciousness of reporting anomalous events is that, due to the 
prevailing skepticism, recipients may try to formulate explanations 
of the reported experiences so as to recast them as ordinary. That 
is, simply reporting such an experience may be sufficient to warrant 
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the ascription of unfavourable characteristics to the individual 
concerned. The speaker's circumstances - background, mental health, 
personality, beliefs and values, and so on - can then be investigated 
to reveal what it is that leads them either to believe that they have 
experienced what they claim, or to report such an experience. 
In data extracts (13) and (16) to (19) the speakers provide not 
only an account of their experience, but also a vast array of 
information about themselves. From an inspection of precisely this 
material a recipient may draw an alternative account of the 
experiences, such that it is possible to reject the speakers' claims. 
For example, in (13) the speaker reports that he had been thinking 
that religious conversion with a numinous force provides the 
experient with a degree of certainty regarding the basis for faith. 
His subsequent experience was exactly that type of revelatory 
mystical encounter. On the basis of this it would be entirely 
feasible to suggest that the speaker's experience was, in some way, a 
form of self-fulfilling prophecy: the experience was the product of 
his implied wish to have some objective and external verification of 
his faith. In extract (16) the speaker deals at length with the 
reasons behind his dissatisfaction at the time of the experience. 
This material could provide the warrant for the assertion that the 
experience was one way in which the speaker could obtain some measure 
of self-esteem. In extracts (17) and (18) the speaker's perception 
of the apparition of her dead husband could be explained by reference 
to the trauma resulting from his sudden death. The first experience 
occurred very shortly after first being told of his accident. The 
second experience occurred while she was watching a video reording of 
her husband's funeral service; indeed, in this account she goes as 
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far as to state explicitly that she was upset. From these sets of 
information a recipient can infer that the actual apparitions were no 
more than hallucinations resulting from the speaker's obvious 
distress. Finally, in extract (19) the speaker has stated that his 
experience happened while he was seriously ill. From this it is 
possible to infer that it was due to an illness-induced delerium, and 
not an external phenomenon. 
In each case the speakers have provided material in which could be 
found evidence which might cast doubt on the veracity of their 
accounts. The provision of a state formulation, constructed through 
a gist or an upshot, permits them to do work which is designed to 
counter this possibility. First, the description of the routine 
circumstances at the time ensures that the first reference to the 
actual phenomenon is not introduced directly after the speakers' 
prior talk. -That is, the material which could support an alternative 
explanation for the experience is not provided as an immediate 
context for the introduction of the phenonemon itself. Second, in 
these extracts the speakers have reformulated their prior talk so as 
to bring its routine character to the recipient's attention. By 
emphasising the mundane character of the prior talk they have also 
amended it, thereby defusing the possibility that damaging inferences 
could be drawn from it. Third, in ordinary conversation 
formulations can be challenged. That is, there are dispreferred 
responses to the actions accomplished through them, and these may be 
displayed in the recipient's next turn. In multi-unit extended turns 
formulations are not produced in a turn-taking system: there is no 
next slot in which the adequacy of the formulation can be assessed. 
Consequently, these gists and upshots are, for all practical 
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purposes, definitive (routine) readings of the speakers' prior talk. 
Finally, we have seen that state formulations are organised to 
reveal the the mundane nature of the speaker's circumstances; 
therefore, organising descriptions in this way permits speakers to 
display further their competence to report upon such events. , 
That 
is, they engage in a form of 'normalizing' (Jefferson 1984) in which 
they explicitly display their recognition of the way that such 
experiences are conventionally made available for public inspection. 
This section has considered state formulations which are 
constructed through gists and upshots of the speakers' prior talk. 
Insofar as these are occasions in which speakers provide an implicit 
assessment of their own prior talk, the manner in which these are 
produced reveals the concerns informing the production of the first 
part of the 'I was just doing X.... when Y' format. Analysis of the 
method by which these are accomplished indicates that speakers 
manufacture their descriptions so as to provide for the routine 
character of their circumstances at the time. It is not possible to 
claim conclusively that all state formulations are informed by a 
similar set of concerns. This analysis, however, provides strong 
evidence that the nature of the descriptions are practical 
accomplishments in the course of the interaction, and not determined 
by a series of fixed mental representations. 
There are some further points. These data suggest the speakers may 
be engaging in a form of normalizing activity through the use of the 
'I was just doing X.... ' format. Furthermore, the speakers have 
used this device to attend to, and defuse, potentially damaging 
inferences which are available in their prior talk which could be 
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used as the basis for the rejection of the alleged 'paranormality' of 
the story. This work is accomplished in the speakers' construction 
of the device, which suggests that it may be oriented to as an 
environment which can usefully be exploited for precisely these 
purposes. This points to the social dimensions of this sequence, and 
in the next section these dimensions will be explored further through 
analysis of some organisational aspects of the device. 
6 The sequential implicativeness of state formulations 
In the previous two sections it has been argued that speakers work 
to produce the routine character of their circumstances immediately 
prior to their first awareness of the onset of a paranormal 
phenomenon. In this section we will consider one of the broader 
interactional consequences of state formulations. This will be done 
through an investigation of features in the organisation of the first 
part of the 'I was just doing X.... ' device. 
Data extracts used previously have provided the following state 
formulations: 
(1) DN 22: 159 ' as I was going through the doorway' 
(2) MD 2: 9 '1 were just thinkin'' 
(4) ME B 10 'I was sitting in bed one night' 
(5) BY 3: 13 'an' I musta bin do: zin there or something' 
(6) LE 4: 29 'and I was just looking at the coffin' 
(7) WER 52 'an ( .) I were lookin' out that way' 
(8) LE 5: 39 'and I was sat on a chair' 
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(9) VA 1 100 
(10) HY 14 
((11) ME B 88 
(16) WIR 1: 7 
(17) LE 1: 6 
'as I went up (. ) one of the staircases' 
'a: nd I was >thinkin' to myself<' 
'an' I was standing right there on the 
platform' 
'and we were contemplating our state of mind' 
'a: nd (. 5) we were all sat round (. ) ehm in a 
room' 
So far it has been argued that these formulations focus 
specifically on the mundane character of the speakers' circumstances, 
and that this is actively constructed through the selection of 
descriptive items. A further feature of these utterances is that 
the events described in them are distinctly uneventful. That is, the 
activities reported would not, in ordinary conversation, merit the 
status of storyable or reportable experiences. Indeed, it is 
possible to speculate that in certain occasions formulations such as 
these might be deployed by speakers to reveal the 'doing nothing' 
character of their situation. 
In one of his early lectures Sacks (1984b) proposes that there are 
powerful constraints upon making an 'epic' of one's life. That is, 
'normal' people do not regard the routine detail of everyday life as 
the proper subject of intense interest. Only those sanctioned by 
their artistic or creative occupations, such as painters and writers, 
can legitimately display that they observe the everyday world to seek 
its strangeness and complexity: 
'I think it is not that you might make such 
observations but not include them in the story, but it 
is the cast of mind of doing "being ordinary" is 
essentially that your business in life is only to see 
and report the usual aspects of any possible scene. 
That is to say, what you look for is to see how any 
211 
scene you are in can be made an ordinary scene, a usual 
scene, and that is what that scene is. ' (Sacks 1984b: 
416) [original emphasis] 
Furthermore, that this constraint is sufficiently powerful to 
influence the ways in which reports of genuinely extraordinary events 
are made: 
'That is to say, the rights to have an experience by 
virtue of, say, encountering something like an 
accident, are only the rights to have seen "another 
accident, " and to perhaps have felt for it, but not, 
for example, to have seen God in it. You cannot have a 
nervous breakdown because you happened to see an 
automobile accident. You cannot make much more of it 
than anybody would make of it. ' (Sacks 1984b: 427) 
[emphasis added] 
As Sacks says, 'it is really remarkable to see people's efforts to 
achieve the "nothing happened" sense of really catastrophic events' 
(1984b: 419). 
Sacks and Jefferson show that speakers can describe events to 
provide for their character as 'normal' events of this type. In the 
data on state formulations, however, there appears to be a different 
phenomenon. In the extracts analysed here speakers are making a 
point of explicitly providing for, and thereby drawing attention to, 
the routine character of their activites. Thus, instead of making 
'nothing out of something', they are actively engaged in the business 
of making 'something' - that is, a reportable event - 'out of 
nothing'. As there are general constraints upon doing precisely this 
type of activity there must be some special warrant for the speakers 
to construct conspicuously bland state formulations. To explore this 
we need to summarise the essential features of the 'I was just doing 
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X.... when Y' device. 
This device is a sequential, two-part structure. The 'X' 
components - the state formulations - present the mundane and 
routine activities at the time of the occurrence of a paranormal 
experience. Whereas psychological approaches might look to the 
cognitive basis for these recollections, we have seen that they are 
constructed by speakers in the course of their accounts. We may 
infer, then, that speakers are orienting to, in Neisser's (1982b) 
terms, cultural conventions regarding this type of news. That is, 
state formulations are designed to recognisable as having the 
character of events which, it is conventionally held, are recallable 
by virtue of their association with extraordinary events. However, 
by using this device speakers not only display their knowledge of 
these conventions: they are able also to use them as a resource in 
the production of their accounts. The basis for this is that, in the 
same way that the speaker draws upon culturally-available knowledge 
to produce a state formulation, so the recipient's interpretation of 
the subsequent utterance will rely on the same sets of culturally- 
available procedures. 
When a routine state formulation is produced the recipient can 
examine it to infer that it implicates a storyable event: the type of 
dramatic event by virtue of which it is conventionally recognised 
that routine activities accrue a storyable status. Therefore, the 
first part of the 'I was just doing X... ' device is predictive. 
There are two sources of evidence for this. 
In the following data extracts there are indications that 
recipients recognise that state formulations are sequentially 
implicative. Note that after the provision of the state formulation, 
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and just before the first reference to the speaker's paranormal or 
extraordinary experience, the recipients interject a minimal token of 
continuation or encouragement. 4 
(20) FR 21/22 (The speaker is reporting an experience which occurred 
while she was working late one night. ) 
1S and ur: I've got a pi: le 
2 (. 4) 
3 of er envelopes to file 
4 (. 5) 
5 and I was down 
6 (1) 
7 right down 
8 (. 5) 
9 bending down. 
10 I °mm hm° 
11 S and I thought this other 
12 lass there were only 
13 two of us working over 
14 °Francis° 
15 (. 5) 
16 'hhh an I thought 
17 (1) 
18 this this 
19 (. 7) 
20 uh a peculiar sensation 
21 that she wanted to come by 
((continues)) 
(21) WIR 6: 42 
X 
Y 
147 and we were contemplating our x 
148 state of mind at about (. 2) two 
149 o'clock in the morning 
150 (. ) 
151 I mm hm 
152 S three of us looked across the y 
153 north (charkum) 
((continues)) 
4 Parenthetically, it is 
continuers are produced by three 
an idiosyncracy peculiar to on, 
one in extract (20); an amateur 
interview from which extract 
information about data sources), 
third. 
worth noting that these minimal 
different participants, and is not 
speaker. I am responsible for the 
UFO investigator sent me the taped 
(21) is taken (see the Appendix for 
and Emma is responsible for the 
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(22) NB: IV: 10: R:: 20-21: Standard Orthography 
15 L 't'h An: d the iwind was so ba: d that 
16 the the th- (. ) the branches were 
17 hitting the hou: se and (. ) God (. 3) 
18 *uh:: I got up abou: t (. ) 
19 Twell it was about ei: ght o'clock, x 
20 EMm : hm: 
21 L 'h and HERE hE'S UP THERE s: awin tho: se y 
22 o"ff you know? 
The interactional significance of utterances such as 'mm hm' has 
previously been investigated in conversation analysis. Schegloff 
(1981) revealed the manner in which speakers can employ minimal 
continuers to facilitate the on-going and orderly character of talk- 
in-interaction. More relevant to these data is Jefferson's (1984b) 
paper. In this she explicates the use of 'mm hm' to display 
'passsive recipiency', by which the a recipient of some piece of talk 
can propose that the current speaker shall go on talking. While 
this feature of 'mm hm' is clearly available in extracts (20) to 
(22), it may not be the case that this is all it is doing. The 
placement of 'mm hm' directly after the speakers' routine state 
formulations suggests that recipients recognise that the speaker has 
more to tell - namely, the extraordinary event by which the non- 
storyable item gains a storyable status. The recipient's placement 
of these minimal continuers displays a sensitivity to a feature of 
the 'context' - the bland state formulations which constitute the 
immediately prior trajectory of the account. 
The second line of evidence concerns the resources speakers use and 
display to facilitate the recipients' recognition that one event is 
contingent upon another. When constructing routine state 
formulations speakers have a choice between verb tenses. They can 
employ an 'active' past tense, as in 'walking', 'looking' 'standing', 
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for example; or they can employ a 'passive' past tense, as in 
'walked', 'looked' 'stood'. The former tense preserves the active, 
on-going quality of the action being described; this character is 
lost when a passive past tense is used to refer to an activity. In 
the following data there is evidence that speakers display a 
preference for the use of one verb tense over the other. 
(23 [12]) DN 22: 162 
1SI had the teapot in my hand like that 
2 and I walked through the kitchen door 
3 (. 5) 
4 'hhh as I was going through the doorway hh 
5 (. 7) 
6I was just (. ) jammed 
7 against the doorpost 
((continues)) 
(24) ME A 10: 86 
1S but my experience was 
2I got to a certain point in 
3 the (. 3) s: circle and the chant 
4 we kept going round slowly 
5 in a circle without stopping 
6 'hh all of a sudden 
((continues)) 
In extract (23) the speaker formulates the activity 'walked 
through' (line 2), which is then displaced by 'was going through' 
(line 4). In (24) the speaker replaces 'I got to a certain point in 
the (. 3) s: circle' (lines 2 and 3, with 'we kept going round' (line 
4). In both extracts the speakers provide two consecutive utterances 
which deal ostensibly with the same material - their activity at the 
time. In both instances the information in the first utterance is 
re-packaged in the second. The reformulated utterances, however, 
employ an active past tense, whereas the first versions employ a 
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passive tense formulation. 
In the next extract the speaker does not re-formulate her prior 
talk; rather, she produces two distinct utterances. The second of 
these stands as her state formulation; the first, however, is a 
candidate insofar as it provides a mundane description of her 
activities. 
(25) WER 55 
1S there was a door there and a 
2 door there (. 5) a door there 
3 an (. 5) it was a kitchen 
4 (1) 
5 [1) and I was right by this unit part 
6 (1.5) 
7 an 
8 (, ) 
9 [21 I were lookin' out that way 
10 an' it seemed to like a figure T (. ) 
11 coming through the hal'11 
((continues)) 
The speaker's utterance 'and I was right by this unit part' (line 
5) provides a bland formulation of her activity. In the way that it 
is constructed it shares features of the state formulations listed 
above. It is not used, however, as the first part of the 'I was just 
doing X.... ' format. To do this the speaker makes the utterance 'I 
were lookin' out that way' (line 9). In this case the second bland 
formulation displays an active past tense, whereas the former does 
not. 
The following passage is taken from Hufford's (1982) investigation 
of 'Old Hag' phenomena; in it the speaker produces two versions of 
his initial perceptions of the onset of the experience. 
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'I'd come back from a lab of some sort, I had so many 
I'm not sure which one it was, and now I crashed.... 
That was approximately four o'clock in the afternoon. I 
was really dead tired. I was really dead tired. I fell 
into a very deep sleep that day.... I remember, you know 
it was a really deep sleep. 
But what woke me up was the door slamming. "0K, " I 
thought, "It's my roommate, " you know, my roommate came 
into the room.... I was laying on my back, just kind of 
looking up. And the door slammed and I kinda opened my 
eyes. I was awake. Everything was light in my room. ' 
(Hufford 1982: 58) [original emphasis] 
Here the speaker begins to describe his experience: 'But what woke 
me up.... ' to 'my roommate came into the room'. He then pauses 
(indicated by the consecutive full stops), after which he repeats 
this information, but now constructed in the 'I was just doing X.... ' 
format: 'I was laying on my back, just kind of looking up. And the 
door slammed.... '. That is, this speaker had started to describe 
his experience without using the format conventionally employed to 
report dramatic news. He stops to re-package the information he has 
already provided and his subsequent state formulation employs active 
past tenses: 'laying' and 'looking'. In the amended version, then, 
his first choice of format favours active, rather than passive, past 
tenses. 
Speakers are orienting to the provision of a non-storyable item as 
warranted by virtue of its association with another, reportable 
event. A past active tense preserves the on-going character of the 
actions so described, and thereby highlights its relationship to 
another event. That is, routinely, active past tenses are not 
employed unless the speaker wishes to draw attention to some other 
event which occurred while that activity was taking place. An active 
past tense clearly displays to the recipient that the activity 
described in this way is contingent upon some as yet-unstated 
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occurrence, thereby reinforcing the expectation for the provision of 
the relevant notable event. 
In this section we have observed how the first part of the 'I was 
just doing X... ' format interactionally generates an expectation that 
the speaker will then use the second part to refer to a momentous 
event. In the following sections data will be analysed to reveal 
some of the ways in which speakers can exploit precisely this 
property of the device in the course of describing their paranormal 
experiences. 
7 Normalizing the paranormal 
Through the use of the 'At first I thought... but then I 
realised... ' device (Jefferson 1984b) speakers clearly claim 
membership of the category of 'normal' people. In this section we 
examine one method by which speakers may engage in a more implicit 
form of normalizing. In the following extract the speaker displays 
that she is using the 'I was just doing X... ' format by providing a 
bland state formulation. Instead of then making an explicit 
reference to a paranormal phenomenon, however, she furnishes a 
description of apparently normal happenings. 
(26 [4])MEB10 
1SI mean a simple example which 
2 everybody's had something similar 
3 to 'hhh I was living in uhm (. ) 
4 inglan years ago: 
5 and all of a sudden 
6XI was sitting in bed one night (. ) 
7 getting ready to go to sleep (. ) 
8Y and I decided to write to a friend 
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9I hadn't seen for four years (. ) 
10 in Massachusetts (. ) a: nd 
11 I found myself congratulating her 
12 on (. ) the engagement of her oldest 
13 daughter (. 3) I said congratulations 
14 Miriam's getti- Miriam's gotten 
15 engaged (. 5) ar: hm and 
((continues)) 
In this account the speaker reports that she had an impulse to 
write to a distant friend to offer congratulations. Her state 
formulation is 'I was just sitting in bed one night (. ) getting ready 
to go to sleep' (lines 6 and 7), and the event she prefaces with it 
is 'and I decided to write to a friend' (line 8). 
In the data so far analysed speakers have used the second part of 
this device to talk about their first awareness of the onset of the 
phenomenon, by virtue of which the events described in the first 
part acquire a reportable status. Yet deciding to write to a friend 
is hardly the same class of event as, for example, seeing an 
apparition of a recently deceased spouse. Initially, then, the 
speaker's use of this format seems to deviate from the pattern 
hitherto established. It transpires, however, that the speaker's 
knowledge of the engagement of her friend's daughter was acquired 
before an engagement had been announced. Thus, the speaker had had a 
premonition of the engagement. 
The following data provide further examples of the way the second 
part of the device can be used to refer to apparently inconsequential 
events. As in extract (26 [4]), however, in these accounts it 
subsequently transpires that there is something anomalous about the 
event reported in the second part of the device. 
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S another experience is uhm: (. 7) 
I had read Jonathon Livingstone 
Seagull (. ) and all of a sudden 
my friend A: nna in Boston 
Massachusetts came to mind 
I >sa- I must< get this (. ) 'h 
book to her she'd lo: ve 
thi: s boo: k: and for some 
reason I couldn't get her 
out of my mind I hate writing 
letters I hate (. ) particularly 
sending anything in the mail 
packaged overseas cos' you gotta 
(s-) p(ep)- tape it so w: ell 
an 'hh I bumble the practical 
things I hate all that stuff 
'h but anyway I managed to 
get down the post office 
I got the book II wrapped 
it up properly I got all the 
sta: mps and to me that was a 
gr: e_at effort 'h (. 3) 
X and just as I was giving 
it to the man at the 
post office he knew me (. 5) 
Y he said oh by the wa: y er 
we have a package from you 
from America 
((continues)) 




















S and ur: I've got a pile 
of er envelopes to file 
(. 5) 





I °mm hm° 
S and I thought this other 
lass there were only 
two of us working over 
°Francis* 
(. 5) 
'hhh an I thought 
this this 
(. 7) 
uh a peculiar sensation 





(29) VA 1 4: 39 
1S my husband and I 
2 had a shoe repair shop 
3 and we lived above it (. 5) 
4 the kitchen was downstairs (. ) 
5 and we (. 3) had a room (. ) 
6 at the back also (. 4) 
7 'on one occasion 
8X I opened the kitchen door 
9 that led to the hall 
10 (. ) 
11 and the doorway into the shop 
12 (. 7) 
13 Y an' I saw a man in white 
14 coat go up the stairs 
((continues)) 
(30) AY 9 (In this extract the speaker is a policeman. He is 
reporting an incident which occurred while he was on duty in the 
early hours of the morning, driving through a local village. ) 
1S it was:: (. ) it was not a stop 
2 check on a night y'know 
3 yuh jus drove past it 
4 we'd 'ad a lot uv thieves (. ) 
5 yu know a couple of years ago 
6 so °yus: ° (. ) y'know (. ) 
7 look for any strange 
8 vehicles really 
9 (1.3) 
-10 X un driving fairly slowly 
11 having checked the school 
12 (. 3) 
13 on the other side of the road 
14 (1) 
15 er: m: 
16 (1) 
17 Y un something caught me eye 
((continues)) 
In each of these cases there is a normal event reported in the 
second part of the 'I was just doing X... ' device. The speaker then 
goes on to reveal that there was a mystery in each of these normal 
circumstances. In (27) the speaker's state formulation 'and I was 
just giving it to the man at the post office' (lines 23 to 25) is 
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followed by ' he said.... we have a package from you5 from America' 
(lines 26 to 28). This package subsequently transpired to have been 
sent by the friend to whom the speaker was sending the book, and 
contained a pendant related to the same book. In (28) the speaker 
reports that she was 'down (1) right down (. 5) bending down' (lines 4 
to 8) when she 'thought this other lass' (lines 10 and 11) 'wanted to 
come by' (line 19). It turned out, however, that there was no-one in 
the vicinity of the speaker when she felt a presence behind her. 
Furthermore, the other person working with her had experienced the 
same sensation at exactly the same time in another part of the 
building. In (29) the speaker provides the state formulation 'one 
one occasion I opened the kitchen door that led to the hall (. ) and 
the doorway into the shop' (lines 7 to 11). She then reports that 
she saw a 'man in a white coat go up the stairs' (lines 13 and 14). 
The speaker's husband was at that time working in the shop, through 
which was the only entrance onto the stairs. She thought that he had 
allowed a customer to use the toilet facilities in the flat, but he 
later denied having let anyone through the shop. Finally, in extract 
(30) the speaker's state formulation 'un driving fairly slowly having 
checked the school' (lines 11 and 12) is followed by the comment 'un 
something caught me eye' (line 17). It transpired that what had 
attracted his attention was a large fire attended by two dark figures 
in the middle of a local graveyeard. Subsequent investigation, 
however, revealed no evidence of any burning, nor could his police 
dog detect any scent from the two figures. 
In each case, then, the speakers have produced the type of 
5I take this as a 'slip-of-the-tongue', and assume that what 
she intended to say was 'for you'. 
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description that resembles a 'first thought' formulation of their 
reaction to the event. This enables them to display that, at the 
time, they did not immediately assume that the events they were 
observing or experiencing were extraordinary. 
The recipient can infer, however, that the routine events 
represented by the speakers' 'first thoughts' are not all they seem 
to be. From an examination of the bland state formulation the 
recipient can recognise that the 'I was just doing X.... ' format is 
being used, and is thereby alerted to the forthcoming provision of 
the extraordinary event which conventionally occupies the second part 
of the device. The events subsequently produced in the second part 
are clearly not references to paranormal experiences. Thus, 
recognisably 'correct' - that is, normatively prescribed - occupants 
of the slot are absent. By virtue of their placement where suitably 
dramatic descriptions are conventionally placed, the recipient is 
invited to inspect these descriptions to locate their warrant as 
legitimate second parts. That is, the sequential organisation of 
the device provides recipients with the basis for inferential work 
about the information in the second part. From this they can arrive 
at the conclusion that the events so described must have some 
features, not yet explicated, which account for their legitimate 
inclusion: namely, some extraordinary character which is veiled, or 
merely 'hinted at', in the design of these descriptions. 
By way of a summary to this section we may note some interactional 
benefits which accrue from exploiting the sequentially implicative 
features of this device. Firstly, speakers may present themselves as 
having reached 'ordinary' or 'normal' conclusions about events which 
were decidedly extraordinary. Thus, they are able to enagage in 
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normalizing work of the type first noticed by Sacks (1984b) and 
Jefferson (1984a). 
Jefferson's research examined a device - 'At first I thought... 
but then I realised... ' - in which speakers explicitly mark their 
first thoughts as incorrect. In the data examined here, speakers 
introduce their first thoughts so as to invite the recipient to find 
that these are in some way innaccurate. By exploiting the 
organisational features of this device the speakers are relieved of 
the sensitive task of claiming explicitly that the events being 
reported are paranormal, while at the same time allowing the 
recipient to inspect the description to come to precisely that 
conclusion. 6 
8 Insertions in the 'I was just doing X... when Y' format 
In this section we will consider materials in which speakers begin 
the first part of the 'I was just doing h... ' device, but then do not 
move directly to the second part. Instead, either they extend their 
state formulation, or introduce new information, only then completing 
the '... when Y' part of the format. That is, we will be analysing 
occasions in which speakers disrupt the device by providing inserted 
material. 
In the following data the speakers furnish information which 
6 Of course, this is not to imply that the recipient will 
necessarily believe that the event was 'really' paranormal. Using 
this device in this way allows the speaker to guide the inference 
making procedures so that recipients can come to see that the event 
described in the second part does have some element of mystery 
attached to it. 
225 
attends to one of four broad interactional goals relevant to making 
a report of a paranormal experience: 
[a] to constitute the 'paranormal' character of the event; 
[b] to highlight that the speakers' circumstances at the time 
permitted them to have a clear view of the experience; 
[c] to account for being in the right place at the right time to 
observe the event, and 
[d] to demonstrate their alertness in circumstances which might 
otherwise be taken to imply a loss of sentience. 
[a] Constituting the paranormality of the phenomenon 
In extracts (31) and (32 [20]) the speakers disrupt the 'I was just 
doing X... ' sequence to introduce information concerning another 
person present at the time of the experience. 
(31) ME A 293 (The speaker is reporting her experience of a recurrent 
noise, the manifestation of which was confined to one part of her 
house. ) 
1S 'hh well: (. 3) 
2 I never could figure it out 
3 and it didn't (. ) upset me 
4 in fact it was quite a 
5 lovely little happy sound 
6 uhn: d so I let it go 
7 (2.5) 
8 one night however a 
9 friend was with me (. ) 
10 X and we're just sitting 
11 watching the tele 
12 (. 3) 
13 ins. and she was also very psychic 
14 a: nd urm 
15 (1.3) 
16 Y its (. ) th-the s: ound started 
17 the litt(le) musical (s) tu- 
18 s:: ound started again (. 3) 
19 and uhm: (. ) 
20 >she said what's TflaWht! < 
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21 >1 said Oh (. ) 
22 have you heard it< (. ) 
23 ah (s) >oh that's wonderful 
24 you're the first person who'se 
25 ever heard it besides me< 
((continues)) 
(32 [201) FR 21/22 
1 S and ur: I've got a pi: le 
2 (. 4) 
3 of envelopes to file 
4 (. 5) 
5 X and I was down 
6 (1) 
7 right do+: ii 
8 (. 5) 
9 bending down 
10 I °mm hm° 
11 S and I thought this other 
12 lass 
13 ins. there were only 
14 two of us working over 
15 °Francis° 
16 (. 5) 
17 'hhh an I thought 
18 (1) 
19 Y this this 
20 (. 7) 
21 uh a peculiar sensation 
22 that she wanted to come by 
23 (1.3) 
24 an I said ooh (. ) 
25 shan't be a minute (. ) 
26 and I turned round and 
27 there was nobody there 
28 you know she wasn't there 
((continues)) 
Prior to the section in extract (31) the speaker had presented 
material designed to indicate that she did not immediately assume 
that the noise had a paranormal cause. She had also stressed that 
she was the only person to have heard the sound. 7 Early in the 
extract she introduces her friend (line 9) and then goes on to 
7 For a more complete analysis of earlier sections of this 
data, see Chapter Four. 
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produce a standard state formulation: 'and we're just sitting 
watching the tele' (lines 10 and 11). Before making a reference to 
the appearance of the sound she inserts material concerning her 
friend's abilities: 'and she was also very psychic' (line 13), at 
which point she moves to a description of the manifestation of the 
phenomenon. 
The identification of the friend as psychic provides an 
understanding of how it was that she was able to hear the sound: a 
recipient can search this description to find that her perception 
was due to her special abilities. Immediately after the appearance 
of the sound and the friend's subsequent reaction (line 20), the 
speaker clearly emphasises that she too could hear the sound. Thus, 
by aligning herself with her psychic friend, she makes available the 
inference that she could hear it by virtue of her clairvoyant 
powers. In doing this she resolves the puzzle she had posed earlier 
in the account, namely, why nobody else could hear the noise when it 
had occurred previously: nobody else possessed the requisite psychic 
sensitivities. 
The paranormal character of the episode hinges upon the friend's 
perception of the noise, and the implication that this was due to her 
psychic abilities, the kind of which are also possessed by the 
speaker. Up until the time of the event, however, there would have 
been no warrant to describe the friend in terms of this one special 
characteristic. Indeed, it is a somewhat peculiar description to use 
to refer to someone engaged in an activity as mundane as 'watching 
the tele'. The friend's clairvoyant abilities acquire a reportable 
status only in the light of subsequent developments, yet in order to 
provide material from an analysis of which a recipient can come to 
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the conclusion that the noise is paranormal, the speaker needs to 
ensure that her friend's psychic powers are introduced prior to the 
reference to the noise in the second part of the format. 
Similar concerns inform the speaker in extract (32 [201). 
Immediately following the state formulation 'I was down (1) right 
down (. 5) bending down' (lines 5 to 9) the speaker begins to report 
her experience, but then interrupts herself to remark that there was 
only one other person working late that night, and names her. She 
then proceeds to the seccond part of the device in which she 
describes her sensation that someone was standing behind her. That 
there was only one other person in the immediate vicinity is of 
central importance for the denouement of the story, in that the 
speaker thought that the feeling of a presence behind her was caused 
by a colleague. Later it transpires that at the same time the 
colleague had exactly the same experience and attributed it to the 
speaker standing behind her. Thus, by stating explicitly that there 
were no other people working that night the speaker facilitates the 
recipient's conclusion that the cause of the sensations she 
experienced could not be the product of a normal, human agency. 
Furthermore, as in the previous extract, the speaker would not at the 
time of the experience have identified the relevance of there being 
only one other person working late. 
[b] Constituting the grounds to have observed the phenomenon 
In the last section the speaker disrupted the 'I was just doing 
X... ' sequence to introduce material which implied the paranormality 
of the phenomenon. In the following extracts the speakers orient to, 
and try to defuse, the possibility that the veracity of their 
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accounts may be questioned by an inquiry as to whether they were 
adequately positioned to have obtained a clear sight of the phenomena 
they are describing. 
(33) HS 17 
1S ah came home from work at lunchtime 
2 (1) 
3 an I walked into 
4 the sitting room door (. ) 
5X in through the sitting room door 
6 (1.5) 
7 an:: 
8 ins. right in front of me (. ) 
9 was a sort of alcove (. ) 
10 and a chimney breast (. ) 
11 °like° this (. 7) 
12 Y and a photograph of our wedding 
13 (1) 
14 came off the top shelf (. 2) 
15 floated down to the ground 
16 'hh completely came apa: rt 
17 but didn't break 
((continues)) 
(34) DN 7: 49 
1 S1 and then the disturbances started 
2 (4.3) 
3 the first thing we 
4 (1.3) 
5 really noticed was: (. 5) 
6 one night 
7 (1.3) 
8 in (. 7) 
9I would think September 
10 S2 Yeah September [September Six 
11 Si September 
12 S2 it would be 
13 Si yeah that's right 
14 (1.5) 
15 X we were laid (. 7) in the front bedroom 
16 ins. which was below the front attics 
17 (1.5) 
18 Y and we heard a noise (. 5) 
19 like (. ) someone throwing gravel 
20 across a piece of (. ) 
21 hollow hardboard 
((continues)) 
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In extract (33) the speaker makes a 'slip of the tongue' in 
constructing a state formulation (lines 3 and 4), but then corrects 
herself to produce 'I walked in through the sitting room door ' (line 
5). Then she describes her position in relation to other features of 
the room (lines 8 to 11). This material is inserted between the 
state formulation and the description of the anomalous behaviour of 
the photograph. In extract (34) immediately after the state 
formulation 'we were laid (. 7) in the front bedroom' (line 15) the 
speaker inserts the comment that the bedroom was below the front 
attics (line 16) and then moves on to a description of the audible 
manifestation of what transpired to be poltergeist activity. 
Before making any analytic observations about these data it is 
useful to consider another example from Hufford's (1982) researches. 
'One night, everything was dark as usual and I heard 
footsteps on the stairs. This didn't surprise me at 
all---- I wasn't amazed at anything. The footsteps came 
up the stairs. I looked around the corner, my bed was 
more or less in the corner and I could look out and see 
the stairway, and I saw a figure coming up the stairs 
and turned [sic] at the top of the stairway. ' (Hufford 
1982: 33) 
In this passage the speaker displays a self-interruption: after 
beginning to report on the sound of footsteps and his reaction to 
them, he then describes his location in relation to the physical 
layout of the house. Through this he is able to state that from his 
position at the time he had a clear view of the area where the 
figure first became visible. As in all the previous cases of 
inserted. material, there would have been no warrant for him to make 
such an observation: it is only by virtue of the occurrence of a 
storyable event that his position at the time became significant. 
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In extracts (33) and (34) the speakers display a similar concern. 
Both insertions furnish material by which a recipient can infer that 
their location at the time of the experience ensured they had an 
unrestricted access to the manifestation of the particular 
phenomenon. In (33) she speaker displays her advantageous position 
through her claim that the incident occurred 'right in front' of her 
(line 8). Equally, in (34), the speaker reveals that he was directly 
underneath the attics where the poltergeist disturbances were 
happening. 
In the following extract the speaker deals with the same order of 
problem. In this case, however, the material she inserts displays 
her sensitivity to the specific circumstances of this experience. 
(35) AN APPS 17: 131 (The speaker is reporting one of a series of 
apparitional experiences. In the incident she is reporting on here, 
she first encountered the glow, reflected on the wall opposite, 
emanating from an apparitional manifestation on the wall directly 
above the spot where she lay. ) 
1S but this particuleh (er) 
2 it was when ah had me he- 
3 u-(. ) b- bedhead (. ) at that end 
4 so the m- window (. ) was 
5 behind me (we: r) so Ah 
6 an (. ) as I (. ) 
7X was laid in bed (. 7) 
8 yuh know (. ) sort uv 
9 propped up (. 4) 
10 >an ah thohhught< (. ) 
11 ins. and it was dark (. ) yuh know 
12 i(t) sws er: I hadn't me 
13 curtains drawn or anything 
14 Y 'hhh and (. ) I saw this glo: w: (. 3) 
15 on the (ws) got really (. 2) 
16 glow (. 3) was on the wall up above 
((continues)) 
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In this extract the speaker follows her state formulation - 'laid 
in bed (. ).... sort uv proppped up' (lines 7 to 9) with an utterance 
which appears to begin to describe her initial perception of the 
phenomenon. Instead of continuing with this aspect of the account 
she provides., a clear self-interruption to state that the room was 
dark (line 11). The speaker then provides further information about 
the room: 'I hadn't me curtains drawn or anything' (lines 12 and 13). 
Clearly, then, this speaker displays the importance of this 
information: not only does she interrupt the sequence projected by 
her state formulation to mention how dark her room was, but she also 
provides other materials, an inspection of which will permit a 
recipient to infer the level of illumination. 8 
The speaker's inserted utterance addresses the contingencies of her 
experience. The speaker initially perceived a glow on the wall in 
front of her. Her subsequent inspection of the source of the glow 
revealed it to be an apparitional figure above her bed. Providing 
the information that the room was dark, then, ensures that the 
recipient has information from which to infer that the speaker would 
have had no difficulty in seeing a light source reflected on a wall. 
The additional information that the curtains were shut attends to, 
and disposes of, the possibility that the light source was just a 
reflection from a streetlight, or the headlights from a passing car. 
Therefore, this insertion deals with issues which could be employed 
fi This extract is particularly interesting insofar as the 
speaker provides two separate interruptions to insert material. In 
lines 8 and 9 she remarks that she was 'propped up', and then appears 
to begin a reference to her first awareness of the phenomenon (>an ah 
thohhught<... '). Before going on to complete this reference, 
however, in lines 11 to 13 she discusses how dark it was in the room. 
We will return to this first set of inserted materials in a later 
section. 
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as evidence to suggest that the speaker was in some way mistaken 
about her experience, thus undermining the validity of the account. 
[c] Constituting the warrant to have experienced a phenomenon 
Claiming to have had a paranormal experience ensures that the 
experient is in a 'sensitive' position, not only because such 
anomalies appear to challenge common-sense assumptions about the 
nature of the world, but also because they are rare events. That is, 
being in the right place at the right time to witness something truly 
extraordinary is in itself a remarkably fortunate coincidence. The 
simple fact of such coincidences, however, can be used as the warrant 
to doubt the veracity of an account of a paranormal experience. For 
example, it may be argued that the sheer coincidence that a person 
should be in the same place as the manifestation of some paranormal 
force may be more economically accounted for by assuming that the 
experient was simply mistaken, or even lying. 9 That is, in cases 
where there are no other witnesses, the fact that an individual 'just 
happened to come upon' a paranormal phenomenon may prove to be a 
particularly strong basis for the ascription of unfavourable and 
damaging assertions, not only about the truth of the account, but 
also about the character of the person who made the report. 
The following two extracts are taken from accounts of particularly 
unusual paranormal experiences which happened while the speakers were 
alone in the early hours of the morning. In each case the speaker 
disrupts the regular pattern of the 'I was just doing X... ' format by 
9 Collins and Pinch (1979: 245) note that this line of 
reasoning and argument - referred to as 'Occam's Razor' - has often 
been used by skeptical critics to explain significant experimental 
results in parapsychology. 
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inserting material after the state formulation and before the 
reference to the phenomenon, or what transpired to be the phenomenon. 
Unlike the examples in sections [a] and [b], however, these 
insertions do not attend to issues which are unconnected to the 
sequence they disrupt. Rather, these materials embroider features 
of the prior state formulation. 
(36 [301) AY 9 (In this account the speaker is a policeman, and he 
is describing an event which occurred while he was making a routine 
night-time patrol of a local village. ) 
1S it was:: (. ) it was not a stop 
2 check on a night y'know 
3 yuh jus drove past it 
4 we'd 'ad a lot uv thieves (. ) 
5 yuknow a couple of years ago 
6 so °yus: ° (. ) y'know (. ) 
7 look for any strange 
8 vehicles really 
9 (1.3) 
10 X un driving fairly slowly 
11 having checked the school 
12 ins. (. 3) 
13 on the other side of the road 
14 (1) 
15 er: m:: 
16 (1) 
17 Y un something caught me eye 
((continues)) 
(37 [91) VA 1 100 (The speaker is reporting an experience which she 
had while she was working as a cleaner in a restaurant. ) 
1 S I got there very early 
2 in the morning simply because 
3 my mother was ill at the 
4 time with cancer "h 
5 and I used tuh have to 
6 nurse her so I (. 3) got 
7 there early to do the work (. 5) 
8 X "hh as I went up (. ) one of 
9 the staircases 
10 ins. with all my cleaning equipment 
11 (. 3) 
12 um:: 
13 (1) 
14 Y a man 
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15 
16 pushed passed me 
12 (1) 
18 he was spirit it w- 
19 or whatever you want to call it 
((continues)) 
Common to both extracts is the way speakers use an occasioned 
social identity - in these cases, their work identity - as a resource 
by which to account for their being in the place where their 
experience happened. In extract (36 [301) the speaker's state 
formulation, 'un driving fairly slowly' (line 10) is followed by the 
utterance 'having checked the school (. 3) on the other side of the 
road' (lines 11 to 13). The speaker inserts material which is 
related to the first part of the state formulation: that is, the 
fact that he was 'driving fairly slowly' is embroidered by his 
further description of having checked the school; thus, this 
information provides an account for why he was driving slowly. Also, 
checking a school is the proper business of policemen patrolling late 
in-the night, and in this way the speaker invokes his 'official' or 
occupational identity, thereby providing the recipient with material 
which can be inspected to reveal the legitimate character of the 
activity indexed by the state formulation: driving slowly late at 
night. In extract (37 (91) the speaker produces the state 
formulation 'as I went up one of the staircases' (lines 6 to 7). 
After this she provides the additional information 'with all of my 
cleaning equipment' (line 8). Only after this does she move to a 
description of the phenomenon she encountered. The information 
provided in. the additional component identifies the type of work she 
was engaged in, that is, cleaning the building, and thereby she 
provides a warrant for her presence in the building at the time of 
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the experience. 
[d] Displaying sentience 
Finally, we will look at data from previous sections. In these, 
the speakers' state formulations reveal that they were in bed at the 
time of the events they report. The inserted material defuses the 
inference that the experiences were the result of drowsiness, or 
even entirely dreamt, and therefore not the product of external and 
objective phenomena. 
(38 [35]) AN APPS 17: 131 
1S but this particuleh (er) 
2 it was when ah had me he- 
3 u- (. ) b- bedhead (. ) at that end 
4 so the m- window (. ) was 
5 behind me (we: r) so 'hh 
6 an (. ) as I (. ) 
7X was laid in bed (. 7) 
8 yuh know (. ) 
9 ins. sort uv propped up (. 4) 
10 >an I thohhught< (. ) 
11 and it was dark (. ) yuh know 
12 i(t) sws er: I hadn't me 
13 curtains drawn or anything 
14 Y 'hhh and (. ) I saw this glow: 
15 on the (ws) got rea: lly (. 2) 
16 glow (. 3) was on the wall up above 
((continues)) 
(39 (4]) ME B 10 
1 S I mean a simple example which 
2 everybody's had something similar 
3 to 'hh}1}1 I was living in uhm (. ) 
4 inglan years ago: 
5 and all of a sudden 
6 X I was sitting in bed one night (. ) 
7 ins. getting ready to go to sleep (. ) 
8 Y and I decided to write to a friend 
9 I hadn't seen for four years (. ) 
10 in Massachusetts 
((continues)) 
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In these data the speakers construct their state formulations in 
terms of their position in bed: 'an (. ) as I (. ) was laid in bed' 
(extract (38), lines 6 to 7), and 'I was sittin' in bed one night' 
(extract (39), line 6). Both speakers then provide additional 
information. In extract (38) 'yuh know (. ) sort uv propped up' 
(lines 8 to 9), and in extract (39) 'getting ready to go to sleep' 
(line 7). This material is designed to reveal that the speakers were 
awake; for example, 'getting ready to go to sleep' orients to a 
stage of activity prior to sleep; also, 'propped up' in bed is the 
type of position in which one might read, but it is unlikely to be a 
position in which one might be sleeping. 
By way of conclusion to this section it may be useful to make some 
remarks regarding why speakers may insert these materials in 
precisely this place. 
In these data, through the insertion of certain information, the 
speakers accomplish four types of tasks. We have noted that, in each 
case, the materials so inserted became relevant after the events 
which are being reported in the 'I was just doing X... ' format. At 
the time of the event this information would have not been notable. 
Yet it is clearly important if the recipient is to come to see the 
paranormality of the incident. That is, the insertions between the 
two parts of the device deal with issues relating to the veracity of 
the account or the reliability of the witness. 
Overtly attempting to make the strongest and most plausible case 
for the truth of an account, however, could be taken to imply that 
the account is, in some ways, intrinsically weak or unreliable. 
There is, then, a 'sensitive' character to the business dealt with by 
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the production of these insertions. 
In an earlier section we noted that mundane state formulations are 
predictive insofar as they generate an expectation for the 
forthcoming provision of an extraordinary event: the 'X' component of 
the device is sequentially implicative of the 'Y' component. 
Furthermore, only certain types of information legitimately can 
occupy the second part of the device. In the extracts considered in 
this section the inserted material is not the type of event which 
could stand as the warrant for the speaker to introduce a 
description of her mundane activites at the time. The recipient can 
thus infer that the momentous event has yet to be delivered. That 
is, the expectation generated by the first part still obtains. 
By inserting this material between the two parts of the format 
speakers reduce the likelihood that a recipient may examine and draw 
conclusions from its sensitive character. That is, this information 
does not constitute a proper second part, and therefore the 
expectation that one is forthcoming still obtains. By virtue of this 
expectation, an advantageous position in which to introduce 
sensitive material is directly after the first part. Disrupting the 
format in this way ensures that material which is crucial to the 
account being produced acquires the character of parenthetical or 
incidental information, thereby minimising the possibility of 
explicit assessment by the recipient. '° 
10 For a related discussion of the way utterances may be 
designed so that the recipient will not become explicitly interested 
in the information contained in them, see Chapter Four, section 3. 
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10 Conclusions 
This chapter has looked at one class of memory formulations as they 
were produced spontaneously in the course of verbal reports of 
paranormal experiences. These formulations are artfully constructed 
through a two part format, here identified as 'I was just doing 
X.... when V. Through this device speakers deliver a description of 
the routine circumstances of their environment at the time of their 
experiences, and also a reference to their first awareness of the 
actual phenomenon. 
The fine detail of these descriptions is not determined by a list 
of features which are stored in various cognitive processes, and 
thereby available to the speaker to be 'read off' at the appropriate 
moment in the conversation or account. Speakers actively constructed 
the blandness and mundaneity of their circumstances at the time of 
the event they were reporting. Descriptive items were selected to 
provide for the mundane environment of situations that were both 
evocative and traumatic. Also, the contingent relevance between the 
character of the paranormal episode and the state formulation 
demonstrated that speakers were performing analytic work so as to 
build descriptions of their activites which 'meshed' with what the 
experience transpired to be. Moreover, in those instances in which 
speakers used state formulations to furnish gists or upshots of their 
own prior talk, their utterances emphasised the most routine aspects 
of their activites or environment, thereby deleting exceptional or 
storyable materials. 
The structural features of this device furnishes a range of 
resources which can be used by speakers to attend to local, 
interactional issues relevant to making reports of paranormal 
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experiences. The device was used to do 'normalizing' work of the 
type initially observed by Sacks (1984b) and subsequently explored by 
Jefferson (1984b). Furthermore, speakers exploited the two part 
structure by disrupting it. Analysis of these inserted materials 
revealed that they were designed to defuse possible arguments u hich 
may have been adduced to undermine either the veracity of the account 
or the reliability of the speaker. 
Supernatural and paranormal phenomena are particularly unusual 
events, and it may be objected, therefore, that the results from 
analysis of materials of this kind provides little purchase on 
accounts of other classes of events. However, we have seen that this 
format was first noted by psychologists in recollections of 
political assassinations, although at the time it was cited as 
evidence of the operation of certain cognitive facilities. 
Furthermore, we have seen contemporary examples of the appearance of 
this device in accounts of events other than direct, personal 
encounters with paranormal phenomena. " 
Of central importance, though, is the fact that this device occurs 
in circumstances where the speakers may be orienting to the 
possibility that their account might receive an unsympathetic or 
skeptical hearing. Furthermore, it is employed to attend to 
specific, pragmatic tasks sensitive precisely to this possibility. 
Practical considerations of this kind are not solely found in 
11 For example, the following account comes from a recent 
newspaper article about fighting in San Salvador, and was dictated by 
the correspondent: 
'They were just relaxing when another car-load of journalists 
arrived. It was a Dutch crew: Cornel Lagrouw, a camerman... with his 
wife, Annelise. .. . We all knew each other so it was fun to see them. 
[X] We were just taking pictures of the guerillas, 
[Y] when all of a sudden gunfire rang out. ' (S. Wallace, 'The 
Guardian', 21 March, 1989, p. 24. ) 
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accounts of extraordinary experiences, however, but are generated in 
myriad occasions of everyday face-to-face interaction. For example, 
Pomerantz (1986) shows that extreme case formulations are used when 
speakers sense that the recipient of their complaints may be 
analysing their talk to find how it is that they are exaggerting the 
complainable matter. Thus, the kind of interactional and inferential 
business dealt with in the device analysed here is a common feature 
of everyday talk which occurs in a variety of circumstances. Reports 
of paranormal experiences merely provide an optimum environment in 
which to investigate one set of resources available to speakers by 
which to deal with this business. 
The 'I was just doing X... when Y' format is an organised device 
rooted in the domain of face-to-face interaction. It is a 
constitutent feature of the culturally-available communicative 
resources through which, in the course of telling accounts of 
paranormal experiences (and, we may, speculate, other types of 
extraordinary events, ), people engage in a range of fine-grained and 
orderly activites. This elaborates, and in part accounts for, 
Neisser's (1982b) observation that memory recollections of this type 
have a schematic quality, and also display the character of 
'conventional' items. 
Hitherto, psychologists have looked to cognitive processes to 
explain the reported association between mundane circumstances and 
the occurrence of extraordinary events. That is, to put it crudely, 
it has been assumed that the brain determines talk. On the basis of 
the analysis presented here, we may make the tentative suggestion 
that culturally-available practices and conventions regarding the 
organisation of accounts become sedimented in cognitive processes. 
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That is, with respect to this particular phenomenon, the way the 
brain deals with certain events may reflect the social organisations 
which deal with knowledge and accounts of these events. 
Finally, I want to make some remarks concerning the relationship 
beween inner mental states, such as cognitively-stored memory 
representations, and the social organisation of talk through which 
speakers produce conversational rememberings. The analysis 
presented here indicates that such recollections are not determined 
by the sorts of mental representations to which speakers may have 
access. Even having some form of visual representation of an event 
does not, in any automatic sense, pre-establish the "ways that the 
memory of it may be described. These recollections are 
constructions, the design of which is sensitive to moral and 
inferential business generated in the course of making an account of 
an extraordinary experience. The very character of the memory is 
circumscribed by the interactional activites in the service of which 
it is being used. Therefore, the way in which these memories are 
organised may be answerable, not so much to cognitive procedures and 
mechanisms, but to the broader organisation of naturally-occurring 
talk. These analytic observations suggest that what the behavioural 
sciences have hitherto taken to be essentially psychological 
phenomena may yet yield to forms of investigation which emerge from 





In this chapter we will examine instances in which speakers use 
reported talk in their accounts of paranormal experiences. That is, 
words that they said; words other people said, or reported dialogue 
between themselves and other people. The analysis will focus on the 
use of reported talk as a resource to accomplish identifiable tasks 
in the course of accounts. Some introductory remarks are in order. 
In the following section we will see that speakers may formulate 
information to be bearable as reported talk when in fact it is 
unlikely, or, in some cases, impossible, that the words so reported 
were actually said in this way. It is not merely the case that words 
were said which may at a later stage be incorporated usefully - that 
is, for interactional purposes - into subsequent recountings of those 
events. It is more accurate to begin with the assumption that the 
speakers are designing certain utterances to be heard as if they were 
said at the time. Consequently, we will refer to these utterances 
throughout this chapter as 'voices': the speaker's own reported 
utterances will be referred to as 'active' voices, and words reported 
to have been said by people other than the speaker are termed 
'other' voices. 
There has been little research into the interactional use of 
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reported talk. Johnstone's (1987) research looked at the variations 
in the use of 'said' and 'says' when people report dialogue they 
have had with other people. She explored hypotheses about the 
relationship between tense changes and the authority status of the 
reported speaker: for example, a speaker's tense variations in 
describing a judge's remarks and their own utterances when reporting 
their court appearance. Her analysis indicated that there is a 
significant asymmetry in the use of past and present tense 
formulations. When reporting the talk of a non authority figure, 
speakers use past tense rather than present tense constructions; when 
reporting the talk of an authority figure this is reversed, and 
speakers tend to invoke present tense formulations more frequently. 
Johnstone's paper generally concsiders issues more relevant to 
sociolinguistics, and, therefore, does not attempt to explore the 
interactional concerns which may be addressed by the use of reported 
talk. Her paper is important, however, for two reasons: first, she 
indicates that the speakers' reconstructions of dialogue do have 
systematic features; and second, she analyses these through the use 
of specifically sociological perspectives: for example, Goffman's 
(1981) discussion of 'footing' and 'authorship'. Taking a lead from 
Johnstone's research, then, this chapter attempts to provide a 
thoroughly sociological analysis of reported utterances and dialogue. 
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2 Preliminary considerations 
The objectives of this section are two-fold. First, to clarify 
some technical points regarding the source and transcription of data. 
Second, to illustrate some general points about the character of 
reported talk which occurs in the data, and thereby to sketch some 
of the issues of analytic interest. 
The data to be used in this chapter comes from two sources: 
accounts collected specifically for this research, and extracts from 
interviews reproduced in Hufford's (1982) investigation of the 'Old 
Hag' experiences. ' Extracts cited from this source will be marked by 
the prefix 'HD'. The numbers after this will refer to the page in 
Hufford's text from which the extract is taken. 
There a number of reasons for using materials from Hufford's book. 
First, within the corpus collected specifically for this project 
there is a limited number of instances of reported speech. 
Preliminary investigation of these instances indicated a number of 
analytically interesting points. For a thorough analysis, however, 
more data were needed, and Hufford's book is particularly useful in 
this respect. In the course of his research he collected a 
considerable number of interviews which are reproduced extensively in 
his text. Furthermore, he states that he performed hardly any of the 
editing or 'cleaning-up' operations which often accompany the use of 
1 This experience usually occurs to people in supine 
positions, resting or in hypnopompic or hypnogogic states. A typical 
scenario may be: the experient hears footsteps approaching them, and 
is then physically paralysed by a sensation of great weight or force. 
During the period of paralysis they may hear a voice saying things 
such as 'You know who I am', or 'You knew I would come'. The 
experience can be accompanied by visual perception of the entity. 
After a period of time the speaker regains movement in one part of 
their body; the entity disappears, if it was visible, and shortly 
after full mobility is regained. 
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transcripts in studies of personal paranormal experiences. Thus, 
although transcriptions are not done to conversation analytic 
conventions, they are faithful to the naturally-occurring 
organisations and ungrammatical 'messiness' which inhere in 
spontaneously produced, everyday talk. Finally, his interviews 
were collected during the 1970's from people in Canada and the United 
States. Therefore, we may be especially confident of analytic 
observations which are supported by materials collected from such 
diverse sources. 2 
For the purpose of analysis and ease of identification sequences of 
reported talk will be distinguished by the use of speech markers 
usually employed in fictional writing. For example: 
(1) ANN APPS 1: 4 (The speaker is describing the first of a series of 
apparitions which appeared in her bedroom. ) 
1S she stood there at 
2 the side of the bed 
3 (1.3) 
4 she had her hands like this (. ) 
-5 and she was looking down 
6 at me like that 
7 (1) 
8 and ah looked ah wo- 
9 my eyes were open 
10 'nd I looked at her 
11 (. 5) 
12 then ah jumped up 
13 ah sat up un hh 
14 (. 3) 
15 () 
16 I just said 
17 (. 7) 
-ý 18 "however did you get in" 
19 (. 5) 
20 just like that 
((continues)) 
2 In this respect, we move towards what is becoming standard 
practice in conversation analysis: using data from face-to-face and 
telephone conversations recorded in both the United Kingdom and North 
America. 
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In this extract the speaker produces the utterance 'however did 
you get in' (line 18) and is thus reporting something she said to 
the apparition. The utterance is designed so that it is hearable, 
not as a paraphrase, but as the actual words she used to address the 
figure. 
Through a brief consideration of this extract we can make some 
preliminary observations about some of the interactional activities 
mediated through the use of utterances which are designed to be heard 
as talk which occurred in the circumstances being reported. Firstly, 
the speaker can register her reactions at the time - in this case, 
her surprise at being disturbed by the figure. That she asked the 
figure how it gained entry to her home implies that she assumed it 
had certain characteristics: namely, that it was human and, 
therefore, for it to be in her home it must have overcome obstacles 
such as locked doors and bolted windows. This in turn shows that she 
made normal first assumptions about the nature of the figure. We 
have noted previously the range of normalizing activities in which 
people engage when describing extraordinary experiences; by reporting 
this question she displays that she reached 'normal conclusions' 
about the nature of the intruder. The reported utterance also tells 
the recipient something about the appearance of the figure: that is, 
for the speaker to have assumed that it was a human being, it must 
have been particularly vivid, life-like and three-dimensional. This 
works to defuse the possible accusation that the speaker's experience 
was the product of misperception; for example, mistaking the shadows 
in a dimly-lit bedroom for an apparitional visitor. 
In this extract the speaker uses her report of talk which happened 
at the time of the experience to establish some features of her 
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reaction, her assumptions and the character of the apparition 
itself. In the following extract the speaker employs reported talk 
which is attributed to other people. 
(2) HD 223 (The speaker has just finished recounting an experience 
which occurred to her husband while he was living in the Samoan 
Islands. ) 
1S And, well, what is 
2 even more fascinating 
3 about the story is, 
4 that he's telling 
5 the experience to other 
6 people and they said 
-37 "Oh, that wasn't too 
8 strange an experience, " 
9 because they had heard 
10 it before from this 
11 -particular hut. 
((continues)) 
In extract (2) the utterance 'Oh that wasn't too strange an 
experience' (lines 7 and 8) is attributed to those people to whom 
her husband related his experience. Presumably, then, the speaker 
here is reporting the comments that her husband claimed had been 
said to him when he confronted other people about his encounter. 
From this extract alone we cannot know if the husband actually used 
reported talk in his account to his wife. We can note, however, that 
if the husband had used it in his account, then the speaker here has 
retained it in her subsequent retelling; if reported talk was not 
emoployed in earlier versions related to the speaker, then she has 
embellished the account in this manner. 
The reported talk in this account serves to confirm the objectivity 
of the husband's experience: if others have heard similar reports 
from people staying in the same place, the husband's account is, in 
r 
part, substantiated. This information is particularly useful to the 
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speaker in her attempt to provide a convincing account. The 
confirmatory response of the original recipients, however, is a 
collective response, distilled from numerous reactions to the telling 
of the story. The speaker herself designates it as such by 
describing the utterance as one that 'they said' (line 6). It is 
unklikely that the 'they' to which she refers all said the same thing 
in these exact words. Yet the way they are produced in the account 
makes them hearable as words which were spoken at the time. Thus, 
not only then can we note that the speaker's choice of what words to 
report provides for the veridicality of her husband's experience, but 
that, in relating his account, she has 'worked-up' her knowledge of 
the collective or general response to the account so as to construct 
it as talk which will be heard as something that happened at the time 
of the event. 
In the following extract the speaker (Si) produces an utterance 
which describes a conclusion reached by the participants during the 
circumstances being reported. This utterance is also designed to be 
heard as a comment made at that time. 
(3) DN 24: 178 (The speakers are describing their attempt to make a 
recording of disturbances caused by a poltergeist. ) 
1 S1 we: (. ) got a 
2 tape recorder 
3 (. 3) 
4 S2 yeah 
5 S1 and tried to 1 
6 S2 ) ( 
7 S1 record the noise 
8 (1.6) 
9 on and on it would 
10 go 
11 (1.5) 
12 we tape recorded it 
13 and said 
-ý 15 "right we think 
16 we've got enough" 
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17 (. 2) 
18 switched the 
19 tape rhecohrdehr ohff 
20 (. 7) 
21 following day we 
22 rewound it to play 
23 (. ) 
24 over breakfast 
25 (. 3) 
26 nuthing 
((continues)) 
In extract (3) the utterance "'right we think we've got enough"' 
(lines 15 and 16) is prefaced by 'we.... said' (lines 12 and 13). A 
conventional interpretation of this utterance suggests that the 
speaker is reporting a joint decision regarding the length of time 
the tape recorder should have been left running. As in the previous 
extract, it is unlikely that these words were said in the way that 
they are reported as having been said: that is, jointly by the two 
parties present. In these extracts, then, speakers choose to 
introduce information into the account as though it had been spoken 
at the time of the experiences, either by others or by themselves. 
We are beginning to see that describing a version of talk which 
happened at the time, or providing information which is designed to 
be heard as a stretch of actual talk, is a powerful resource in the 
construction of these accounts. This is confirmed in the following 
two extracts. In the first, the speaker uses an active voice to 
relay remarks which could not have been said in this way. 
(4) ME B 2: 17 (The speaker has just described an impulse to write to 
a friend to offer congratulations on the engagement of her daughter. ) 
1S she wrote back 
2 to me " hhh in 
3 total chaos saying 
4 (. ) 
5 "how the Hell did 
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6 t you know" 
7 she started the letter 
8 huhh Wit she said 
9 "I received your letter 
10 at nine o'clock in the 
11 morning (. ) and you were 
12 congratulating me on (. ) 
13 Miriam's getting engaged: 
14 and I said what the Hell 
15 is she talking about "hhh 
16 at twelve o'clock that 
17 morning (. ) she walked in 
18 and announced her engagement" 
((continues)) 
In this extract the speaker's knowledge of Miriam's engagement 
transpires to be precognitive insofar as, at the time of the impulse 
to write the letter, no-one knew that there was to be an engagement. 
The revelation that the speaker's impulse was motivated by 
paranormally acquired information is introduced into the account as 
an active voice. That is, it is not merely that the letter confirms 
the speaker's knowledge as somehow mysterious, but that this 
confirmation is reproduced as if the friend was saying the words 
which the speaker is claiming she had written in the letter. 
In the following data the information revealed through the active 
voice has a conspicuous 'fit' with the nature of the experience 
reported by the speaker. 
(5) HD 177 (The speaker is one of three young women who all 
experienced a series of phenomena in the house they shared. In this 
account the speaker is reporting an evening when she and a housemate 
came home and disturbed their friend while she was having a dream 
which was related to the experiences. ) 
1S Joan and I walked into 
2 the house and Ruth's 
3 in the living room, um, 
4 asleep. And we awaken her 
5 when we go in, 
6 and she starts 
7 crying and bawling, 
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-ý 8 "Oh, my God! I'm 9 so glad you all woke 
10 me up! I've been trying 
11 to wake up and get out 
12 of this room for so long, 
13 and I haven't been able to. " 
((continues)) 
In extract (5) the speaker reports the reactions of her friend. 
What is noticeable here is that this utterence has the character of 
material which has been 'repackaged'. That is, the speaker's friend 
may indeed have said something similar to the reported talk in the 
account, but it is unklikely to have been produced in precisely the 
way that it appears in the extract. This material has been re- 
formulated to emphasise the severity of the experience through the 
depiction of the extent of the Ruth's response to the dream. 
The preliminary examination of these data furnishes two 
observations. First, an active voice can be used to address a range 
of issues regarding the credibility of the account into which the 
voice has been introduced. Following from this, the second point is 
that these data suggest that what is interesting is not merely that 
something was said at the time, which is subsequently incorporated 
into a later version of the events, but that active voices have been 
used as a resource in the design of these accounts. That is, 
utterances made in specific circumstances can be incorporated into 
the subsequent account of those circumstances. Alternatively, items 
can be packaged so that they are hearable as active voices, even in 
cases where the utterances could not have been said in the way they 
have been presented. 
In the rest of this chapter we will examine some of the ways that 
speakers can use active voices when recounting paranormal 
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experiences. The following sections will focus on the use of voices 
as a resource to deal with issues broadly concerning the 
'objectivity' of experiences, and the substantiation of the 
'paranormality' of phenomena. 
3 Sustaining the objectivity of the phenomenon 
One powerful argument which can be made about claims to have 
encountered anomalous phenomena is that the experient is mistaken, 
and that what they claim to have seen was not actually what they 
saw. One variant of this skeptical position is that the phenomenon 
was, in some way, the product of the speaker's own imagination. In 
this section we will look at three ways in which speakers can employ 
active voices in their accounts to provide material which supports 
their (implicit) claim that the event upon which they are reporting 
actually happened, and was an external phenomenon. 
[a] Demonstrating that the phenomenon was observable by others; 
[b] Revealing that the consequences or effects of the phenomenon 
were observable by others; 
[c] Using other voices to confirm that an event or experience was 
in fact an anomaly. 
[a] Displaying the observability of the phenomenon 
In the following account the speaker employs a member of her family 
as the vehicle for the active voice. It is noticeable that the 
speaker describes the words said by the active voice as being that 
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'kind of thing' which were being said at the time, thereby displaying 
her own understanding that these words may never actually have been 
spoken in the way she is reproducing them here. 
(6) HD 208 (The speaker is describing mysterious noises which 
plagued the family home. ) 
1S My brother-in-law 
2 used to get very, very 
3 upset and start 
4 cussing at this noise 
5 kind of thing. 
6 And just scream 
7 "Now get the Hell 
8 out of here and 
9 leave us alone 
10 for a while, " 
11 kind of thing 
((continues)) 
The first point to make about this data is that the active voice 
displays that someone other than the speaker could hear the 
phenomenon. This demonstrates that the noise was not the product of 
the speaker's imagination, but was objectively available to others 
present during the disturbances. 
Secondly, reporting a piece of talk as if it was said at the time 
not only allows the speaker to accomplish certain tasks with these 
words, but also provides a further resource in that it presents an 
opportunity to describe how the words were said. In this utterance 
the speaker gives two descriptions of the way in which the words 
were delivered. The first refers to a general reaction: he 'used to 
get very, very upset and start cussing' (lines 3 to 5). When she 
describes the words which she presents as an active voice, however, 
she uses the word 'scream' (line 6). 'Cussing' implies a mild form 
of bad language; 'scream' on the other hand, projects a for more 
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extreme form of behaviour. By upgrading the severity of her 
brother-in-law's response in this way she provides inferences about 
the character of the phenomenon: that it was the type of event which 
could provoke an extreme response of this kind. Moreover, there is 
the implication that such extreme reactions were warranted. This 
description of the way the other's words were said provides materials 
which confirm the drama of the experiences. 
Thirdly, the experiences occurred over several months, manifesting 
on numerous occasions. The words that she portrays as being said 
confirm the consistency of the phenomenon: the brother-in-law's 
remarks are designed to be heard as being directed to the consistency 
of the phenomenon in that he makes a plea for it to cease: 'leave us 
alone for awhile' (lines 9 and 10). 
Furthermore, the speaker portrays a further character of the noise 
by reporting her brother-in-law's remarks as being addressed to the 
phenomenon. That is, he is not talking about it, but talking to it. 
This suggests that the noise exhibited a discernible pattern, which 
in turn implies a controlling agency. That is, it wasn't random, but 
occurred only in certain times and in certain places. Imputing a 
regular pattern and a discriminating agent serves to negate the 
charge that the family were merely over-reacting to rare, but 
perfectly natural, noises which occasionally occur in houses. . 
This 
is further corroborated in that her utterance is designed to be heard 
as making a demand of the noise to cease disturbing the family. Such 
a request is only explicable if the noise had displayed some pattern 
which indicated an initial intention to cause disruption. 
This use of another's voice allows the speaker to perform a range 
of activities. Not only does she demonstrate the objectively- 
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available character of the phenomenon, but she also provides material 
which can be assessed to discover some of the features of that 
phenomenon. For example, that it displayed the presence of a 
controlling agency, the goal of which appeared to be the disruption 
of routine home life. 
Hearing a mysterious noise is not the most dramatic of possible 
anomalous experiences: there are no physical objects or traces which 
can be observed, and thus experients have little to which they can 
refer to demonstrate the severity of the experience and the effect 
that it had. This utterance simultaneously provides information 
which allows the recipient to infer that the phenomenon was 'out 
there' in the world, and also the drama of the experiences. 
In the following extract the dramatic nature of the experience is 
furnished by the speaker's preliminary description. 
(7) VA II 10: 85 (The speaker is describing one of a series of 
encounters with a malevolent spirit. ) 
1S tha: t night: 
2 (1.5) 
3 I don't know what 
4 time it was: 
5 (1.3) 
6 my: husband (. ) and I 
7 both woke up: (. 7) 
8 with the mo: st (. ) 
9 dreadful (. 5) 
10 feeling of 
11 (1.7) 
12 hhh °well° being (nyrie) 
13 smothered (. 5) but the 
14 powerful smell 'h and 
15 a blackness (. 3) that was 
16 that was (. 2) blacker than 
17 black I can't describe it 
18 like (. ) anything else (. ) 
19 'hh it was the most 
20 penetrating (. 3) type of 
21 blackness 'hh 
22 and there was this 
23 (1.7) 
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24 what I assumed to be th- 
25 the shape of a man (. ) 
26 in a cloak 
27 (2) 
28 it was the most 





34 my husband said 
-4 35 "my God what is it" 
36 (. ) 
37 an I just said 
38 "now keep quiet and 
39 say the Lord's prayer" 
((continues)) 
In this extract the speaker invokes the urgency of the encounter by 
dealing with three features of the experience: the smell (lines 13 
and 14), the 'blackness' (lines 15 to 21) and the description of the 
figure itself (lines 28 to 32). Immediately after this elaborate and 
evocative descriptive work, she introduces her husband's utterance 
'my God what is it' (line 35). This establishes that he could see 
the figure, and also corroborates the description provided by the 
speaker. That is, the severity of the husband's verbal reaction 
confirms that the thing in the room, and the associated sensations, 
were as powerful and alarming as the speaker had reported. 
Consequently, the speaker's reliability as an accurate reporter of 
the scene is confirmed, as is the drama of the experience. 
Immediately following the the husband's utterance the speaker 
reports what she said at the time. We will discuss the use of 
reported stretches of dialogue in more detail during a later section; 
we can note as a preliminary observation, however, that this 
sequence enables the speaker to make inferable information about 
herself. First of all, by contrast to the shock registered in the 
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husband's response, her subsequent utterance - 'now just keep quiet 
and say the Lord's prayer' (lines 38 and 39) - is controlled and 
calming. Furthermore, she displays that she knows what to do in 
circumstances such as these, and that this involves religious 
incantations. In reporting these utterances she establishes a 
contrast between her husband's reactions and her own, and thus 
emphasises her competence to deal with these events. 
In extract (7) the speaker makes a claim about the objectivity and 
drama of the experience by using another's voice to register a 
suitably astonished reaction. This is achieved through the words 
which are reported as having been said. In the following data the 
speaker achieves the same result by graphically reproducing the 
manner in which another person reacted to the occurrence of an 
unusual noise. 
(8) ME A 295 
1S one night however a 
2 friend was with me (. ) 
3 and we're just sitting 
4 watching the tele 
5 (. 3) 
6 and she was also very psychic 
7 a: nd urm 
8 (1.3) 
9 its (. ) th-the sound started 
10 the litt(le) musical (s) tu- 
11 s:: ound started again 
12 (. 3) 
13 and uhm: (. ) 
14 >she said 
--315 "what's THaght! "< 
16 >I said 
17 "Oh (. ) have you 
18 heard AN (. ) 
19 ah (s) 
20 >"oh l that's wonderful" 
((continues)) 
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Finally, in the following data the speaker initially reports what 
the other person did upon experiencing the phenomenon: scream (line 
9). Then she introduces dialogue which reveals that her colleague 
had had the same experience (lines 14 and 15). 
(9) FR 3: 28 (The speaker has just described her experience of a 
presence behind her which she intially assumed to be a work 
colleague. She discovered subsequently that there was no-one 
standing behind her to account for her sensation) 
1S the next thing 
2 (. ) 
3 I heard her say 
44 "ah shan't be a 
5 minute Sheila" 
6 (2.1) 
7 so ah sai- uh I went to 
8 the end and she >(cch)< (. ) 
9 and she screamed (. ) 
10 and she went (. ) to the end 
11 of her (. ) block and I went to 
12 the end of my block 'hh 
13 she (s) 
14 "I thought you were 
15 standing behind me" 
16 >ah said 
17 "wel11 I've just had 
18 that sensation"< 
((continues)) 
In these data speakers incorporate other voices to confirm that 
there was something present in the world to be observed. Also, 
employing another's reaction corroborates the accuracy of the 
speaker's description of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the use of 
other voices provides an environment which speakers can exploit to 
present materials from which favourable assessments of their 
behaviour at the time may be drawn: for example, that they acted 
calmly or rationally. 
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[b] Displaying the observability of effects of the phenomenon 
In the following extracts the speakers use active voices to 
establish that the effects of the phenomenon were noticeable by other 
people. 
(10) HD 93 (The speaker has just had an 'Old Hag' experience. ) 
1S I was still sleeping in 
2 bed with my brother 
3 because then we only had 
4 one bed for the two of us. 
5 And he told me one time 
6 that I was breathing 
7 very heavily. And in fact 
8 one time he said, 
--->9 "What's the matter with you ?" 
10 And when I looked over to him 
11 and moved my head, everything 
12 went, you know. And then 
13 my eyes were wide open. 
14 And I said, 
15 "Well I just had a bad dream 
16 or something. " 
17 And he says, 
-p18 "What's the matter, " 
19 you now. And like I 
20 really didn't know 
21 what to say to him. 
-22 He said, 
23 "You were breathing really 
24 heavy and just staring 
25 straight out into space, " 
((continues)) 
In this data the brother's comments refer to the speaker's strange 
behaviour (lines 9,18 and 23 to 25). Prior to this extract the 
speaker had been describing an 'Old Hag' encounter, which involves 
the physical sensation of being paralysed by an oppressive force. 
Here the brother's comments are reported as being provoked by the 
observation of. some of the consequences of the phenomenon which were 
displayed by the speaker during the experience. This reveals that 
the experience, regardless of its phenomenological characteristics, 
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was accompanied by correlating physical and physiological events 
which were sufficiently severe to arouse the concern of the speaker's 
brother, and to warrant his subsequent inquiry. 
We may note also that the speaker initially produces a paraphrase 
of his brother's utterance: 'And he told me one time that I was 
breathing very heavily' (lines 5 to 7). Immediately after this, 
however, he reproduces the same material, but presented as an active 
voice. That is, the speaker does not produce a description of his 
response after the initial paraphrase, and then designs his utterance 
as reported talk. This suggests that the speaker prefers to 
introduce this material by the use of an active voice. 
A further feature of this extract is that the brother is presented 
as being unaware of the causes of the effects which are being noted. 
This 'innocence' is repeated in the following two cases. 
(11) DN 31: 216 (The speakers are reporting a series of poltergeist 
disturbances which they alone experienced, despite living in a shared 
house. ) 
1S when we left the house 
2 we (re) talking to 
3 the lad who lived 
4 on the ground floor 
5 (. 6) 
6 and he also had bought 
7 a house and he was gonna 
8 leave wasn't he 
9 (. 2) 
10 S2 °yeah° 
11 S1 and he said 
12 (1.2) 
-13 "somehow the atmosphere 




(12) 11D 199 (The speaker has been experiencing a number of 
disturbances in her home. In this account she is reporting upon her 
meeting with two strangers in a bar. ) 
1S So I went over and 
2 sat down and introduced 
3 myself, and she said - 
4 the girl, there was a 
5 girl and a guy - 
6 She said, 
7 "I dont know why, " 
8 she says, 
-49 "I feel something 
10 really weird from you. 
11 Like I know you're 
12 really upset about 
13 something. And you know 
14 I'm just wondering if 
15 it has anything to do 
16 with witchcraft or 
17 anything like this ?" 
((continues)) 
In extract (11) the speaker reports the utterance made by a co- 
tenant: 'somehow the atmosphere in this house has changed' (lines 13 
to 15). The co-tenant's innocence is displayed in that he is 
portrayed as not knowing specifically the way in which the atmosphere 
in the house had changed: that is, because of the presence of the 
poltergeist. By reporting this utterance the speaker allows the co- 
tenant to reveal himself to be sensitive to subtle changes in the 
ambiance of the building; this not only confirms the events being 
reported, but also delicately evokes images of a haunted house. 
At this stage in the account the speakers have described a number 
of specific incidents caused by the poltergeist. Thus the recipient 
has sufficient information to infer that the root of the worsening 
atmosphere was the presence of the spirit in the attic. Thus, the 
recipient arrives at the conclusion that the other voice is reporting 
contact, albeit unknowingly, with the effects of the anomaly. This 
relieves the speaker of the task of making it explicit that the 
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phenomenon was present in the world to be experienced by others. 
In extract (12) the speaker reports a lengthy series of utterances 
from a stranger. In the main part of this series the stranger 
reports that her 'feelings' lead her to wonder if the speaker is 
associated with any witchcraft (lines 9 to 17). The speaker's 
experiences, although particularly unusual, are not correctly 
described as witchraft. In failing to identify the real cause of the 
'feelings' associated with the speaker, the active voice is portrayed 
as being innocent of them. 
Insofar as this knowledge about the speaker is described as coming 
from someone to whom she has never spoken, it is itself indicative of 
a paranormal event: communication of information by extrasensory 
channels. Whereas in previous extracts the speakers report other 
voices commenting upon events which would not immediately sustain a 
paranormal interpretation - heavy breathing and changes in the 
atmosphere - in this case the other voice corroborates the nature of 
the speaker's experience while at the same time constituting a 
further example of the occurrence of anomalies. 
[c] Using other voices to confirm the paranormality of the event 
In extracts (9) to (12) the speaker uses an active voice to confirm 
that the effects of the phenomenon were observable to others, without 
a direct reference to paranormal agencies or causes. What is 
significant about extract (12) is that the other voice indicates that 
occult activities might be the cause of the effects which had been 
observed; that is, it furnishes an explicit reference to supernatural 
events. In the following two extracts the speakers use another's 
voice to refer directly to the phenomenon which they had encountered, 
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and in so doing, confirming it as a paranormal experience. 
(13) ME A 306/7 (The speaker has been describing a series of strange 
noises appearing in her living room. ) 
1S so: about two or three 
2 days later (. 3) ahr (. ) 
3 1 went to: a seance 
4 (1.3) 
5 the medium came to 
6 me almost immediately 
7 and >she sed< 
-48 "o: h (. ) by the way" 
9 (. 2) 
10 she >didn't know me< 
11 she jus: t (. ) came 
12 straight to me however 
13 'nd she said ehm (. ) 
14 "you know that ehm musical (. ) 
15 sound you've been hearing 
16 in your liyving room" 
17 nI dy(e) h huhh hah 
18 I just said 
19 "ye: ah" hh 
20 'hhh and she said ehm 
22 (. 7) 
22 "that was Bo: b (. ) 
23 a ma: n (. ) who passed 
24 over quite a lo: ng time ago" 
((continues)) 
(14) ME A 5: 385 (The speaker has just described an encounter with a 
spirit which occurred while she was in a state of meditation. ) 
1S a week or two later 
2 I was at a seance 
3 (2) 
4 and the medium *h 
5 s ws a different medium 
6 came to me 
7 (. ) 
8 and she said: ehm 
9 (1.3) 
10 she came to me late 
11 in the seance 
12 actually not immediately 
13 uhm sh- she came to me 
14 and she said 
-4 15 "there's 
16 (. 2) 
17 I just want to tell you" 
18 she said 
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19 "there's ehm (. ) 
20 you have an Irish 
21 gypsy guide" 
((continues)) 
In extracts (13) and (14) both experiences are confirmed by 
mediums. In the (13) the medium's remark confirms that the cause of 
the phenomenon was paranormal by identifying the spirit who was the 
agent. It is further noticeable that the words produced through the 
other voice have a clear relation to the phenomenon as described by 
the speaker earlier in the account; 3 indeed, they are almost 
identical. This further substantiates the accuracy of the medium's 
assessment, while at the same time providing evidence that the 
speaker is using the other voice as a vehicle through which to 
produce her own words. Furthermore, insofar as the medium presumably 
has had contact with spirit agents, it is also another anomalous 
experience. In (14) the medium's voice is used to reveal that 
someone else knows about the speaker's encounter with a spirit. In 
this case, however, the other voice does not have the same degree of 
familiarity with or detailed knowledge about the speaker's 
experiences. That is, she can identify that the speaker has a spirit 
guide, but does not know that the speaker has had recent contact with 
it. 
Finally, in the following account the speaker's experience is 
confirmed as paranormal by a friend. 
3 See the analysis in Chapter Four. 
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(15) HD 186 (The speaker is reporting an experience she had while 
staying with a friend. The morning after the night of the 
experience she questioned her friend about the history of the house. ) 
1S she says, 
2 "Did you feel something ?" 
3 "Damn right I felt something! " 
4 I said, 
5 "There's a ghost up there. " 
6 She says, 
-ý17 "Yeah, we know. 
8 We didn't want to tell you 
9 because we didn't want to 
10 unnecessarily frighten you. " 
((continues)) [original emphasis] 
In this extract the other voice is used to confirm that the 
speaker's assumptions about the nature of her experience were 
correct. Through the construction of the account in this way she is 
presented as arriving at a conclusion about the experience 
independent of any prior knowledge. It is only later that her 
assumptions about the experience are proved to be correct. 
4 Using voices to premonitor a 'mystery' 
In this section we will look at the way speakers use voices in 
their accounts to provide information from an assessment of which a 
recipient can arrive at the conclusion that the phenomenon being 
reported is anomalous. This is most clearly illustrated in extracts 
(16) and (17); these come from an interview with a couple who were 
plagued by poltergeist disturbances. In the first extract the 
speaker is describing an occasion on which they first noticed that 
something appeared to be moving around in the attic above their 
bedroom. In the second he describes their attempt to make a tape 
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recording of the noises caused by the movement. 
(16) DN 13: 91 
1S the noi: se (. ) 
2 was disturbing -hh (. ) 
3 Ernie got out of bed 
4 un I said 
-: )5 "it must be running 
6 between the rafters" 
7 (2.4) 
8 and it wasn't it was 
9 going diagonally across 
10 the room 
((continues)) 
(17) DN 24: 179 
1S o^n and o: n it would go 
2 (1.5) 
3 we tape recorded it 
4 and said 
-45 "right we think 
6 we've got enough" 
7 (. 3) 
8 un switched the tahape 
9 recohrdeh off un 
10 (. 3) 
11 following day we 
'12 rewound it (. ) to play (. ) 
13 over breakfast 
14 (. 3) 
15 nuthing 
((continues)) 
In both these extracts the active voice is used to report routine, 
normal assumptions about the origin and character of the 
disturbances. In (16) the speaker reports that 'it must be running 
between the rafters' (lines 5 and 6). This invokes the image of the 
activities of a small animal, such as a rat, as the cause of the 
noise. This assumption is disappointed in the following utterance, 
however, when it is revealed that the noise of the movement did not 
follow the pattern of the rafters, but actually crossed over them. 
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The speakers had previously described the construction of the 
ceiling, emphasising the sturdiness of the materials used, in 
particular the size of the rafters. An animal small enough to enter 
the space between the ceiling and the attic floor would have also 
been too small to negotiate the rafters. Thus, the recipient is 
presented with a normal hypothesis as to the cause of the sounds, 
which is then shown tobe false by the behaviour of the phenomenon. 
In extract (17) the speaker reports the joint decision 'we think 
we've got enough' (lines 5 and 6) as an active voice. This reveals 
the speakers to have made certain assumptions about the character of 
the sounds: namely, that if they could hear it, then a tape recorder 
would also be able to detect it. However, it transpires that the 
noise did not register on the tape, and thus another element of 
mystery is woven into the account. 
In these cases an active voice is used to present information 
which implies the normal cause or character of the phenomenon. The 
recipient's appreciation of the mystery of the event is cultivated in 
the manner in which this information is then revealed to be false. 
In the following data the speaker provides a more elaborate 
construction: an active voice is used to describe the expected 
outcome of the speaker's illness, during the period of which he 
experienced his encounter with an image of his deceased father. 
(18) BY 2: 10 (The speaker is reporting what the doctor had told his 
mother on the evening prior to his experience. ) 
1S one day the doctor come 
2 'e said 
3 "well there's no more I can 
4 do (. ) 'e: s: (. ) yuknow (. ) 
5 you must prepare yourself 
6 for the worst 'e: s not 
7 gonna make it through the 
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8 night in my opinion" 
9 'e said 
10 "cos people become at 
11 their lowest ebb (. 3) 
12 during the early hours 
13 of the morning I don't 
14 think he'll make it" 
15 an 'ee says (. ) 
16 yuknow (. ) 
17 "all you can do is hope" 
((continues)) 
. 
In this account the speaker uses an expert's voice to permit the 
recipient to come to realise the significance of the subsequent 
experience. In this, the image of the speaker's father appeared and 
requested that his son 'let go' of life, succumb to the disease and 
pass over into the next world. The speaker screamed his refusal to 
die, the apparition disappeared and, eventually, he recovered. 
The speaker's recovery is implicitly portrayed as remarkable in 
two respects. First, expert medical opinion - the active voice- 
proclaims his imminent demise; second, it is intimately related to 
his rejection of the request, from his father, to die. Thus, the 
recipient can form the conclusion that the encounter with the image 
was in some way responsible for the speaker's recovery 'against all 
odds'. Not only is the recovery unusual, but because it was due in 
part to the speaker's interaction with a supernatural agency, it 
acquires its extraordinary status. 
Further 'scene-setting' work is accomplised through an active voice 
in the following extact; this comes from the same poltergeist case as 
extracts (16) and (17) 
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(19) DN 4: 28 (The speakers rented, in addition to their own rooms, 
the attic rooms. ) 
1 S1 we asked the landlady's 
2 permission (. ) to restore 
3 the windows 
4 (. 2) 
5 S2 yeah 
6 (. ) 
7 S1 and she said 
8 (. 7) 
9 "don't put glass in 
10 (. 7) 
11 I want you to put 
12 plastic in" 
13 (1.3) 
14 this went against the 
15 grain for us but 
16 (1) 
17 fuh fifty pee a week 
((continues)) 
Here the speaker sets a mystery by emphasising the landlady's 
request regarding the windows: he produces her voice actively making 
this request. He draws further attention to it by remarking that 'it 
went against the grain', and by providing a reason for why they 
complied - the small amount of extra rent they were paying for use of 
the attic rooms. At this stage there is no account for the 
landlady's unusual demand and the recipient is provided with a puzzle 
without a solution. By virtue of the nature of the account -a story 
of a haunting - the recipient can make, at least, tentative 
speculations that the mystery is in some way tied to the phenomenon. 
It later transpires that the landlady was fully aware of the nature 
of the disturbances which occurred in the attic, and, furthermore, it 
is implied that she knew that the windows may be severely damaged if 
the attic rooms were to be renovated. One of the speakers' first 
experiences of the phenomenon was indeed a violent attack on the 
windows, the repair of which had only recently been completed. Thus 
271 
the recipient is presented with a puzzle - why should the landlady 
make such an odd request ?- which is subsequently resolved by the 
information that the poltergeist had a peculiar penchant for violent 
attacks on modernised windows. 
In this section, then, we have looked at some ways that speakers 
can use active voices to hint at the paranormality of events without 
making this an overt focus of their talk. In the following section 
we will look more generally at a set of resources through which 
speakers explicitly point to the anomalous character of their 
experiences. 
5 Reported dialogue 
Earlier in this chapter we considered an extract in which the 
speaker reported a brief stretch of dialogue between herself and her 
husband which occurred at the time of their encounter with a 
particularly unpleasant hostile apparition. 
(7) VA II 10: 85 
34 S my husband said 
-3 35 "my God what is it" 
36 (. ) 
37 an I just said 
--'*38 "now keep quiet and 
39 say the Lord's prayer" 
((continues)) 
The primary feature of this sequence is that there are two active 
voices in the account, that of the speaker's husband and her own, the 
reported interaction of which permits her to display both the 
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reliability of her initial description of the experience, and that 
the figure so described was indeed external to them both and present 
in the bedroom. 
In this section we will examine the way that reported dialogue 
provides a set of resources which can be exploited by speakers in the 
service of specific interactional goals. Some of the structural and 
organisational features of these resources are illustrated in the 
following extract, which is taken from the conclusion of an account 
of a series of mysterious noises which had been disturbing the 
speaker in her home. Until this point in the interview the speaker 
has not explicitly claimed that she knew the noises were caused by a 
paranormal agency. Indeed, previously in the account she had 
described her earlier reactions to the noise to facilitate the 
impression that she initially assumed that it had a perfectly 
natural explanation. In this excerpt she goes on to provide 
information which clearly substantiates the paranormality of the 
experiences. 
(20) ME A 307 (The speaker is describing events which occurred 
shortly after a manifestation of the noise. ) 
1S so: about two or three 
2 days later (. 3) ehr (. ) 
3 I went to: a seance 
4 (1.3) 
5 the medium came to 
6 me Talmost immediately 
7 and >she sed< 
8 "oh: y (. ) by the way" 
9 (. 2) 
10 she >didn't know me< 
11 she jus: t (. ) came 
12 straight to me however 
13 nd she said ehm (. ) 
14 "you know that ehm musical (. ) 
15 sound you've been hearing 
16 in your living room" 
17 nI dy (e) h huhh hah 
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18 I just said 
19 "ye: ah hh" 
20 'hhh and she said ehm 
21 (. 7) 
22 "that was Bo: b (. ) 
23 a ma: n (. ) who passed 
24 over quite a lo: ng time ago" 
((continues)) 
Of interest here are the following three sections: (a] the medium's 
initial utterance, and the remarks leading up to it (lines 5 to 16), 
[b] the speaker's subsequent turn (lines 17 to 19), and [c] the 
medium's final utterance (lines 20 to 24). 
[a] The medium's initial utterance 
5S the medium came to 
6 me Talmost immediately 
7 and >she sed< 
8 "oh: 4, (. ) by the way" 
9 (. 2) 
10 she >didn't know me< 
11 she jus: t (. ) came 
12 straight to me however 
13 nd she said ehm (. ) 
14 "you know that ehm musical (. ) 
15 sound you've been hearing 
16 in your li, /ving room" 
The medium's utterance in this extract is designed to be heard as 
mysterious, and this is achieved partly through the description of 
the circumstances in which it was delivered. Firstly, the medium is 
reported as moving towards the speaker 'almost immediately' (line 
6), thus implying that the motivation for such an approach was at 
least urgent. The speaker then begins to report the medium's first 
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remarks: "'oh: (. ) by the way"' (line 8). 4 Instead of completing 
this utterance, however, the speaker interrupts her report of the 
medium's talk to introduce information regarding the relationship 
between them, and she makes it plain that they did not know each 
other. The speaker's next utterance reiterates the directness of the 
medium's approach (lines 11 and 12). Thus sets up a puzzle: why did 
the medium approach the speaker with such urgency if they were not 
acquainted ? 
The speaker has so far described the circumstances in which the 
medium approached her, and she has made it clear that she is going to 
report what the medium said to her. The way that these circumstances 
have been described, however, already provides information from which 
the recipient can arrive at an understanding of the forthcoming 
utterance. That is, it is not customary to dwell upon, and 
elaborate, the circumstances surrounding the provision of an 
utterance which deals with routine, everyday matters. The warrant 
for reporting the urgency of the medium's approach, and the lack of a 
relationship between the speaker and the medium, is a direct 
consequence of the nature of the information she imparted to the 
speaker. That is, these features of the circumstances only merit a 
reportable status by virtue of what happened next. By introducing 
this information prior to the medium's remarks, the speaker provides 
the basis for the recipient's inferential work about the character of 
the forthcoming utterance. The provision of this information 
generates an expectation about the unusual character of the 
4I hear the utterance 'oh: (. ) by the way' as designed to be 
heard as something the medium said to the speaker, rather than a 
digression instituted by the speaker in the course of telling the 
account. It isn't clear on the transcript, but the actual tape 
strongly supports this interpretation. 
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information the medium wants to reveal. 
The medium's actual utterance substantiates the mystery which has 
been introduced by the scene-setting work of the speaker's prior 
descriptions. The reference to the phenomenon which the speaker had 
been experiencing has an unequivocal character which itself borders 
on the extraordinary. This is provided for by two features of the 
medium's remarks. First, the medium is depicted as referring 
directly to the phenomenon: she does not ask if the speaker has had 
any experiences with strange noises, nor does she qualify her own 
knowledge of the phenomenon. The phrase 'you know' establishes that 
there is some knowledge common between them; it is not designed to 
depict the medium establishing the speaker's recognition, but rather 
to allow her to display her affiliation with the speaker in their 
knowledge of these experiences. Second, the speaker has designed 
the medium's description of the phenomenon to be remarkably accurate. 
Indeed, the reference to the 'musical sound' in the living room is 
almost exactly the same description provided earlier in the account 
by the speaker. Thus, the upshot of this utterance is that the 
medium is seen to be intimately familiar with specific details of the 
speaker's experiences. 
The way that this sequence has been constructed provides the 
grounds for the recipient to draw the inference that the medium's 
remarks are, to a degree, a revelation to the speaker. Despite not 
knowing her, she has approached the speaker directly and displayed 
her detailed knowledge about her experiences. In this sense, a 
puzzle has been posed: how did she know ? 
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[b] The speaker'ssubseguent turn 
17 SnI dy (e) h huhh hah 
18 I just said 
19 "ye: ah hh" 
In this section the speaker reports her rather surprised reactions 
to the medium's remarks, through which she accomplishes three tasks. 
The first feature of note is the way that this reaction proposes the 
correctness of the medium's information. The speaker utters 'n I dy 
(e)' which is hearable as the beginning of 'I just said'. Instead 
of going on to report her response, however, she self-interrupts and 
laughs briefly. 
Although we cannot be certain, it would seem that this laugh is 
designed to be heard as something that happened at that time, rather 
than the consequence of something humorous which occurred during the 
telling of the account. It intrudes upon a series of verbal 
exchanges which is clearly meant to recount things that were said at 
the time. Also, we can note that the provision of laughter in this 
place is an organised feature of accounts of paranormal events. For 
example, in the following extract, the speaker reports her mother's 
question 'why were you crying in the car', which reveals that she 
knew of an event which the speaker had not mentioned. 
(21) SW 5: 58 
1S and sh: he: saihd 
2 "well (. ) why were 
3 you crying in the car" 
4 (. 7) 
5 an 1 said 
6 "whQt" hehh h 
((continues)) 
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In this extract the speaker produces a slight breathy laugh (line 
6) as part of her response to her mother's knowledge that she had 
been upset. We may interpret this laugh as encapsulating the 
speaker's surprise that her mother knew about her crying. That is, 
it displays the speaker's response to receiving accurate information 
about events from someone who, logically, should have no knowledge of 
them. It displays the speaker's recognition that the mother's 
remarks correctly referred to an actual event. (Presumably, had the 
speaker received wildly inaccurate information, her report of her 
response at the time would include some remark to indicate that she 
did not know what her mother was talking about. ) With reference to 
the utterance in lines 17 to 19, the speaker's display of laughter 
orients to, and displays, the accuracy of the information she 
received. 
We have previously noted that that speakers' orchestrate their 
descriptions so as to allow the recipient to come to the conclusion 
that they acted like any normal person might in the circumstances. 
This occurs in extract (20): the speaker has received dramatic news, 
and is responding as anyone might in that position. The warrant for 
the legitimacy of her startled reaction is that the medium knew of 
events about which she should have had no prior information. 
Furthermore, it is noticeable that the speaker's response does not 
explicitly confirm the accuracy of the other voice's utterance; 
alternatively, her 'ye: ah' (line 19) acknowledges that she is aware 
of the events to which the medium has referred, while at the same 
time returning the floor to the other voice. This provides the 
warrant for the speaker to report the medium's subsequent utterances. 
278 
(cl The medium's final turn 
20 S 'hhh and she said ehm 
21 (. 7) 
22 "that was Bo: b (. ) 
23 a ma: n (. ) who passed 
24 over quite a lo: ng time ago" 
In this section the speaker uses the other voice to confirm that 
the cause of her experiences was a spirit agency. The most notable 
advantage to accrue from using another voice to do this is that the 
speaker is relieved of the task of providing the information which 
substantiates her (hitherto implicit) claim that the events she 
experienced were caused by something genuinely mysterious. 
In this sequence the speaker depicts an occasion in which important 
information is revealed to her by another: that is, she portrays 
herself as a passive recipient of news, the incredible nature of 
which she is entirely innocent, and hence reacts accordingly. This 
sequence occurs, however, in an account of paranormal experiences, 
and is, therefore, a vehicle for exactly this type of incredible 
news. Displaying an innocent and passive recipiency towards 
information which confirms the anomalous character of her experiences 
substantiates her attempts to depict herself as behaving normally 
when confronted with extraordinary situations. 
The three part sequence can be summarised as follows: in the first 
part, the other voice presents information which is designed to be 
heard as a revelation to the speaker at the time. The second part 
details the speaker's response to this information. The final part 
of the sequence finds the speaker portrayed as a recipient to further 
information which provides the denouement to the mystery established 
by the first utterance (and, indeed, to the mystery around which the 
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whole account has been based), and is thus a resolution. 
The same pattern is present in the following data. In these 
extracts, however, the speaker does not construct the third part of 
the sequence with an active voice. 
(22) ME A 5: 385 (Shortly before the events reported in this extract 
the speaker had had an encounter with a what she presumed to be a 
spirit guide. ) 
1S a week or two later 
2 I was at a seance 
3 (2) 
4 and the medium h 
5 s ws a different medium 
6 came to me 
7 (. ) 
8 and she said: ehm 
9 (1.3) 
10 she came to me late 
11 in the seance 
12 actually not immediately 
13 uhm sh- she came to me 
14 and she said 
15 "there's 
16 (. 2) 
17 I just want to tell you" 
18 she said 
19 "there's ehm (. ) 
-20 you have an Irish 
21 gypsy guide" 
22 and I jUMPed up which 
23 is inappropriate behahviour 
24 at a sehahnce un shouted 
25 ">OH I'VE SEEN< Her" 
26 (. 7) 
27 un then I sat down and shut up 
28 and realised that she had 
29 come to me first and 
30 this medium was confirming 
31 my experience 
((continues)) 
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(23) SW 5: 58-62 (The speaker in this extract is partially deaf. She 
has just been to a specialist who had assessed the possibility of an 
operation to clear blockages in her inner ear. Unfortunately, the 
outcome of this meeting was disappointing. Directly after the 
meeting the speaker went to see her mother, and during the drive the 
she became very upset. Not wishing to distress her mother, however, 
she decided not to mention the doctor's pessimistic verdict, and 
instead described only the routine features of the examination. ) 
1S and sh: he: h saihd 
2 "well" 
3 (. ) 
4 "why were you 
5 crying in the car 
6 (. 7) 
7 an I said 
8 "wha''t" hehh ' hh 
9 un ehr 
10 (. ) 
11 she said she'd 
12 (. 5) 
13 at the time that 
14 I'd been in the car 
15 park 
16 (. 3) 
17 she'd had ah 
18 (. ) 
19 an image um she said 
20 a picture but (*ah a°) 
21 (. ) 
22 meaning yuh know like 
23 an image 
24 'hh 
25 of me sitting 
26 in the car 
27 (. 3) 
28 crying 
((continues)) 
In both these extracts the speakers construct this part of their 
account around the same three part sequence: an other's voice is used 
to present information which, at the time, is a revelation to the 
speakers. Their response is designed to be heard as a surprised 
reaction to the receipt of this information: in extract (22) the 
speaker claims that she 'jumped up', an activity which she then 
describes as inappropriate (lines 22 to 24); in (23) the speaker 
exclaims 'what' and also provides a breathy laugh, similar to the one 
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produced by the speaker in extract (20). 
Unlike the speaker in extract (20), however, these speakers do not 
employ an active voice to provide the resolution to the puzzle 
established in the first part. In (21) the speaker reports that she 
came to appreciate more fully the nature of her experience through 
the other's comments; in (22) the speaker paraphrases the remarks 
made by-her mother. This indicates that the third part of the 
sequence need not necessarily employ an active voice construction. 
It would appear that the primary function of this part is to be a 
vehicle for the resolution of the puzzle established in the 
revelation of the other voice's initial utterance. 
In the following account the same sequence is in evidence, although 
it is broken up by the speaker's digressions about the background of 
the people whose talk she is reporting. 
(24 [12]) IID 199 (On entering a nightclub, the speaker noticed two 
people who appeared to be observing her closely. ) 
1S So I went over and sat down 
2 and introduced myself, and she 
3 said - the girl, there was a girl 
4 and a guy - she said 
5 "I don't know why", 
6 she says, 
7 "I feel something really weird 
8 from you. Like I know you're really upset 
9 about something. And you know, I'm just 
10 wondering if it has anything to do with 
11 witchcraft or anything like this ?" 
12 And I said, 
13 "Wow, I can't believe you said that" 
14 I'd never seen her before. She's not 
15 from Bowling Green. She's from 
16 Louisville. She was just visiting here 
17 for the weekend. Her and her 
18 boyfriend are down here. 
19 And I went, 
20 "I can't believe you said that, " 
21 you know. And I proceeded to tell her 
22 about our house and everything. 
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23 And she said, 
24 "I knew something was troubling you, 
25 you know, and I could just feel it. 
26 And you sitting over there I could 
27 feel something was wrong. " 
28 And at the time it really was 
29 bothering me because we were going 
30 to have to go home that night. 
31 And I was scared to go home. 
32 I was real scared to go home 
((continues)) 
The revelatory material is that the girl is able to sense the 
speaker was involved in some form of occult activity (lines 5 to 11), 
and the speaker's startled reaction is reported twice (lines 13 and 
20). The revelation and response sequence allows the speaker then 
to go on to say that she was frightened to go home because of her 
paranormal experiences (lines 28 to 32). 
In extracts (20) to (24) the speakers use the third part of the 
sequence to introduce information which is particularly significant 
to the account. For example, in (20). the third part is used to 
reveal that the noise was caused by a paranormal agency; in (22) the 
speaker describes the way that her understanding of her experience 
was aided by the other voice's revelatory announcement; in (23) the 
speaker clarifies the telepathic mechanism whereby her mother knew 
about her distress, and in (24) the speaker reveals that anomalous 
phenomena increased her reluctance to return home. 
In each of these cases the speakers are thus dealing with 
'sensitive' material. In extract (20) the speaker confirms that the 
experience was paranormal: had she not legitimised the provision of 
this information through the first two parts of the sequence it may 
have appeared that this was a clumsy and conspicuous effort to 
substantiate her story. Likewise, it is to the advantage of the 
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speaker in extract (23) that she clarifies that her mother's 
knowledge of her distress was telepathically-acquired, but to do so 
without the warrant provided by her mother's startling knowledge of 
the incident would decrease the validity of her claim. Finally, in 
extract (24) the speaker's fear about returning home substantiates 
her claim that she was experiencing anomalous phenomenoa. Without 
warranting this information it could be inferred that she was merely 
over-reacting and unjustifiably frightened. In each case then, the 
speakers construct these sequences so as to allow them to deal with 
information which is of crucial significance to the resolution of the 
account, or the description of a particular episode, but which could, 
in different circumstances, provide the basis for unfavourable 
inferences about either the speaker, or the validity of the 
experience they claim to have had. 
Finally, we can examine further examples of the way speakers 
exploit the three part sequence identified here. In the following 
extracts the speakers are reporting not one specific event, but a 
series of connected incidents: in the first case, recurrent 
poltergeist disturbances; in the second, apparitions of the speaker's 
r?:: ently deceased husband. 
(25) DN 31: 216 
1 S1 when we left the house 
2 we (re) talking to 
3 the lad who live 
4 on the ground floor 
5 (. 6) 
6 and he also had bought 
7 a house and he was gonna 
8 leave w asn't he 
9 (. 2) 
10 S2 °yeah° 
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11 S1 and he said 
12 (. 7) 
13 "somehow the atmosphere 
14 in this house has 
15 cha: nged" 
16 "uo: h really Basil" 
17 ah said 
18 "when would you reckon 
19 that happened" 
20 (. 4) 
21 "oh about September" 
22 'e said 
((continues)) 
(26) LE 9: 75 (Shortly after the death of her husband, the speaker and 
a friend attended her children's school Christmas play .) 
1S when I came out 
2 and I was driving 
3 my neighbour home 
4 she said to me 
5 "I hope you won't 
G be upset 
7 (. 5) 
8 but I think David 
9 was there" 
10 and I said 
11 "what made you (. 3) 
12 think that he was there" 
13 (. 7) 
14 and she said 
-15 "because I felt him 
16 on my shouTlder" 
((continues)) 
In both cases the first utterance is produced by someone who had no 
knowledge of the speaker's experiences, but is designed to be heard 
as a hesitant reference to the phenomena. In (25) 'somehow the 
atmosphere in this house has cha: nged' (lines 13 to 15) reveals that 
someone other than speakers could sense the presence of the 
poltergeist, even if they did not have actual experience of the 
accompanying disturbances In (26) 'I think David was there' (lines 8 
and 9) points to someone other than the speaker having direct 
contact with the spirit of her husband. 
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These utterances do not refer explicitly to the phenomena. The 
other voice is not used to provide immediate confirmation of the 
experience, for example, by displaying a detailed knowledge of the 
circumstances of the experiences. Instead, these utterances hint at 
the underlying phenomenon. Even veiled reference such as these could 
stand as evidence of the objectivity of the experience. In both 
cases, however, these remarks are not employed for this task; 
instead, speakers respond by asking a question which seeks 
confirmation that the other voice's remarks do indeed concern their 
own experiences: in (25) 'uo: h really Basil.... when would you reckon 
th at happened' (lines 16 to 19); in (26) 'what made you think that 
he was there' (lines 11 and 12). In both these cases the speakers 
had, prior to the report of this exchange, previously described their 
experience of the relevant phenomena. Thus, the recipient has been 
informed that, at the time of the exchange being reported, the 
speakers themselves knew what the other voice is referring to. 
Despite this knowledge, however, their responses to the revelatory 
material are distinctly cautious, if not guarded. This has two 
interactional consequences. First, reporting this type of response 
permits the speakers to display themselves as actively withholding 
confirmation of the phenomenon to which the other voice's innocent 
remarks refer. 5 That is, they reveal their decision not to exploit a 
legitimate opportunity to proclaim their own experience of the same 
phenomenon, and thereby confirming its strangeness. They display 
'caution' about claiming explicitly that they have encountered 
5 In the case of the speaker in extract (26) this seems 
particularly apparent. It later transpires that she had had the same 
experience as her friend at exactly the same time. Intuitively, 
then, a more likely reaction would have been something like 'Really? 
So did W. 
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something anomalous. Such a cautious approach would, routinely, be 
taken as indicating a hesitance to accept or endorse a paranormal 
interpretation of the events raised by the other voice. By drawing 
the recipient's attention to this reluctance they exhibit that they 
acted as any 'normal' person might, and withheld making a commitment 
to a supernatural explanantion, or, in the case of extract (26) a 
denouement, of the mystery referred to by the other voice. Second, 
they can supply the warrant to reproduce the other voice's further 
utterances, which in both cases deliver stronger evidence of the 
objectively-available character of the phenomenon. 
In the next extract this organisation is employed in an account of 
someone else's experience of a paranormal event. 
(25) ME B2 16/17 (The speaker has written to a friend 
congratulating her on the engagement of her eldest daughter. ) 
1S an and she wrote back 
2 to me 'hh (. ) in in 
3 total chaos saying (. ) 
4 "how the Hell did you know" 
5 she started the letter 
6 huhh hah'f` " hh she said 
7 "1 received your letter 
8 at nine o'clock in the 
9 morning (. ) and you 
10 were congratulating me 
11 on (. ) Miriam's getting 
12 engage: d: 
13 and I said 
14 'what the Hell is she 
15 talking about' 'hhh 
16 at twelve o'clock that 
17 morning (. ) she walked in and 
18 announced her engagement" 
((continues)) 
The three part sequence begins with the report of the friend's 
utterance 'I received your letter... ' to '... Miriam's getting 
engage: d: ' (lines 7 to 12). The friend's next utterance treats this 
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information as revelatory, and is designed as a response to this: 
'and I said what the Hell is she talking about' (lines 14 and 15). 
The subsequent stretch of reported talk reveals that the engagement 
eventually did occur, thus indicating that the speaker's knowledge of 
the engagement was paranormally acquired. This structure is used to 
organise the denouement of a mysterious event which was originally 
experienced by someone else, and subsequently related to the speaker. 
This implies one of two things: either the other person used it in 
her original report of the experience, in which case the present 
speaker has merely preserved it as a feature of this account; or, 
that the present speaker designed her report of the friend's 
experience in this way. Either interpretation indicates that this 
structure may be a pervasive device by which to organise the 
denouement of accounts of anomalous experiences. 
By way of a conclusion to this section I want to discuss some 
issues concerning the range of resources identified in this section: 
specifically, the ways that speakers uses stretches of dialogue 
between themselves and other people. This resource is interesting on 
two counts: conversation analytic research has focused precisely on 
materials generated through interaction between two or more parties, 
and thus should be able to help illuminate some of the events 
occurring in these data. Moreover, such considerations touch upon an 
issue which is of primary importance in in sociology - the notion of 
intersubjectivity. 
Alfred Schutz's writings on this subject are particularly 
illuminating. Schutz (1967) begins his analyses by raising a 
dilemma: how can intersubjective understanding occur ? For example, 
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with regard to common knowledge of a physical object in the world, 
one person's perception of the object will be different to any 
other's simply because each act of perceiving will necessarily happen 
in different physical locations, thereby assuring varying 
perspectives on the object. Furthermore, the personal inclinations 
and motivations for looking at the object will vary between the two 
percipients. Thus, in what sense can we talk of 'common knowledge ' 
of the 'same' states of affairs ? However, Schutz argues that this 
dilemma always remains abstract or theoretical because of the 
operation of two 'idealizations', or sets of commonly-available 
assumptions and procedures, by which these problems are practically 
negotiated. 
'First, the idealization of the interchangeability 
of standpoints. If I were there, where he is now, then 
I would experience things in the same perspective, 
distance, and reach as he does. And, if he were here 
where I am now, he would experience things from the 
same perspective as I. 
Second, the idealization of the congruence of 
relevance systems. He and I learn to accept as given 
that the variances in apprehension and explication 
which result from differences between my and his 
autobiographical situations are irrelevant for my and 
his, our, present practical goals. Thus, I and he, we, 
can act and understand each other as if we had 
experienced in an identical way, and explicated the 
Objects and their properties lying actually or 
potentially in our reach. ' (Schutz and Luckmann 1974 
[1967): 60) [original emphasis) 
Together, these two idealizations combine to form the general 
thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives. 
In Schutz's terms these presuppositions are implicit - incarnate- 
in actual occasions of actors' dealings with each other, and, 
thereby, are not available for inspection or scrutiny by participants 
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themselves. That is, in Pollner's (1974) terms, these are 
incorrigible propositions. This insight has hitherto been used as an 
analytic tool to demarcate and investigate analytic issues; for 
example, Pollner's (1979) study of resources available to repair 
problems arising from 'reality disjunctures' which occur in traffic 
violation court cases. (See also Pollner's more extended [1987] 
discussion of mundane reasoning. ) 
In some of the data cited previously, however, we can see a 
different use for the thesis of reciprocity: as a resource for the 
participants to concretise the objective status of a phenomenon. 
Take, for example, extract (7). 
(7) VA II 10: 85 
34 S my husband said 
35 "my God what is it" 
36 (. ) 
37 an I just said 
38 "now keep quiet and 
39 say the Lord's prayer" 
((continues)) 
We have already noted that this reported exchange reveals that 
someone other than the speaker saw the phenomenon. What gives these 
utterances their power as an inference-building sequence is the 
manner in which the idealization of the interchangeability of 
standpoints is affirmed, while the idealization of the congruence of 
relevance systems is disconfirmed. 
The voices are designed to reveal that, despite differing spatial 
locations, both parties saw the same thing. That is, the husband's 
comment makes a direct and alarmed reference to the phenomenon. The 
speaker's reported utterance obliquely confirms her husband's 
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perception by orienting, not to his question, but to the consequences 
of the apparition's presence for what they, as experients, should do. 
That is, although she does not refer explicitly to the phenomenon, 
her utterance becomes meaningful by virtue of its appeal to the 
assumption that both parties are witnessing the same phenomenon. 
In Chapter Three we observed that a fundamental resource for the 
social scientist in the study of naturally-occurring talk is the way 
that participants construct utterances in the light of their analyses 
of prior turns. That is, next turns display the result of this 
analysis, and thereby the producer of an utterance can make an 
assessment of the way that it was interpreted. As a consequence of 
the public exhibition of the interpretative practices on which 
participants rely in their talk, intersubjective understanding - 
that is, a combined orientation to 'what's being done here and now'- 
is procedurally accomplished in the course of the conversation. For 
example, in the following extract M asks a question which 
legitimately supports two immediate interpretations. 
(28) (Family Dinner) 
1M Do you know who's going to that meeting? 
2R Who. 
3MI don't know. 
4R Oh::. Prob'ly Missiz McOwen ('n detsa) en 
prob'ly Missiz Cadry and some of the teachers. 
R's response reveals which of these interpretations he has made. 
M's second turn displays that R had made an assessment which was, for 
practical purposes, incorrect. R's subsequent turn resolves the 
dilemma by adopting the second possible interpretation, and in doing 
so he displays his orientation to the pragmatic concerns which he now 
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realised informed M's original question. 
The point is this: in talk, people display their analyses of other 
people's talk; there is a 'public display' of interpretative 
practices. When reporting stretches of dialogue, speakers allow the 
recipient to see the 'publically displayed' reasoning practices 
which informed that dialogue at the time it was said. So, in extract 
(7), the speaker reports two very different reactions to the 
apparition: her husband's startled exclamation, and her measured and 
cautious response. That is, she relies on two distinct 'relevance 
systems': for her husband, the apparition provokes fear; she, 
however, displays her knowledge of and competence to deal with 
phenomena of this kind by reporting her essentially practical 
response. The upshot of displaying these diverse relevancies is that 
the speaker provides a contrast for the recipient - her measured 
reaction against her husband's more vehement outburst - from which a 
recipient can deduce at least, the calm and authoritative manner in 
which the speaker dealt with the apparition. 
A combination of a Schutzian and conversation analytic approaches 
to the issue of intersubjectivity can therefore illuminate the 
processes by which sequences of reported exchanges are constucted. 
Schutz's idealizations may be exploited as resources in the design 
of talk which occurred at the time, and not merely a series of 
incorrigible propositions upon which participants rely to sustain 
intersubjective understanding. Moreover, the way that a sequence of 
exchanges will reveal the practical analytic tasks performed in situ 
by participants at the time may be further exploited in the pursuit 
of fine-grained inferential business. 
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6 Conclusions 
In these data we have explicated some of the organised procedures 
by which utterances containing active voices, both the speakers' and 
those of other people, have been designed to display the objective 
and paranormal character of the experiences being reported. This has 
been accomplished in various ways: 
[a] by revealing that other people were able to observe the 
phenomenon; 
[b] by displaying that the effects of the experience were 
sufficiently enduring to be observed and commented upon by others; 
[c] by providing information which hints at, and thereby allows 
the recipient to infer, some underlying mystery surrounding the 
events reported, 
[d] by presenting other voices as confirming the paranormality of 
the phenomenon. 
In this then, we are contributing to the broader study of the way 
that the 'facticity' and 'objectively-available' features of 
members' worlds are constitued through and sedimented in their 
linguistic practices. It connects with with Garfinkel, Lynch and 
Livingston's (1981) study of scientists' 'discovery' of a pulsar; 
Pollner's (1987) research on the incorrigibility of mundane 
reasoning about a world 'out there'; Pollner and McDonald-Wikler's 
(1985) study of the practices whereby a family constituted the 
'normality' of a severely retarded child; Pomerantz's (1986) analysis 
of some devices to reveal the basis for complaints as being 
independent of the speaker; Potter and Wetherell's (1988) remarks on 
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the construction of the 'external' warrant for racist comments, and 
Smith's (1978) explication of the procedures used to construct a 
factual account of mental illness. I want to make two brief 
concluding remarks: the implications of these types of research 
findings for traditional parapsychological research, and the 
relationship of this methodological approach to other fields of 
sociological research which display a commitment to investigating the 
socially-constructed character of scientific knowledge. 
We noted in Chapter One that, within certain areas of 
parapsychology, there is a growing feeling that more attention should 
be given to people's actual experiences, and that this necessarily 
implies a greater dependence upon their accounts. The analyses 
presented in this chapter indicate at least one set of related issues 
which could be pursued through the detailed analysis of such 
materials: that is, the explication of how experients themselves 
describe their encounters so as to provide for the 'objectivity', 
'paranormality', and so on, of the phenomena they experienced. 
Whereas the preceding chapters have demonstrated that a project of 
this kind is a legitimate sociological enterprise, it would represent 
a major break from traditional parapsychological methods and research 
questions. Therefore, in the final chapter we will discuss the 
extent to which these research recommendations are compatible with 
parapsychological objectives. 
Hitherto in sociology, the term 'socially-constructed' has been 
associated with studies of scientific knowledge undertaken from a 
'relativist' perspective. For example, studies of the social 
construction of parapsychology as a scientific discipline (Collins 
1976; Collins and Pinch 1979; 1982). The goal of researches such as 
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these has been to reveal the social basis of the factual status of 
knowlegde claims at an institutional level: as the consequence of the 
concerted-yet-tacit activities of groups of scientists as a 
community. The analytic points raised in this and earlier chapters, 
however, indicate that the linguistic resources available to speakers 
are essentially social - that is, cultural - sets of procedures for 
'doing' reporting. Therefore, the 'social' construction of phenomena 
as objective features of an external world may be explored also 






It is important to set out the primary issues addressed in this 
thesis. In Chapter One we established the basis of an interest in 
people's accounts of their personal experiences of paranormal 
phenomena. First, by showing that in parapsychological quarters 
there is a small but vocal contingent arguing for new forms of 
analyses which take as their point of departure the experiences which 
people claim to have in the course of their everyday lives. Insofar 
as these experiences do not happen conveniently in the presence of 
parapsychologists, there is a growing realisation that accounts are 
of central methodological importance to parapsychology. Second, we 
looked at previous sociological studies on aspects of the paranormal 
and its relationship to society. The vast majority of these studies 
not only overlooked accounts as a topic for research, but were 
informed by assumptions that such accounts would be analytically 
useful only insofar as they could be used in the sociological study 
of the architecture of people's false beliefs. The limiting 
character of these assumptions were delineated by comparing them to 
those which inform ethnomethodological analyses. 
The goals of Chapter Two were two-fold: first, to illustrate the 
nature of an ethnomethodological interest in accounts through the 
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examination of some empirical materials. Second, to look in more 
detail at four areas of parapsychological research which have used 
accounts as investigative resources. This exercise allowed us to 
point out some methodological difficulties in these studies, and 
thereby clarify the advantages gained by adopting an 
ethnomethodological perspective. 
There are two contemporary empirical approaches which display a 
commitment to Garfinkel's (1967) remarks on the nature of langauge 
and its significance in social life, and these were discussed in 
Chapter Three. This discussion was informed by an appreciation of 
the underlying common goals of conversation analysis and discourse 
analysis. It was decided, however, that the empirical analyses of 
the present research would investigate features of people's accounts 
more conventionally explored in the analysis of naturally-occurring 
conversational materials. Also, we discussed some potential 
difficulties in the application of a broadly conversation analytic 
interest this kind of data. Some comments were made about the 
significance of these problems and how they could be overcome. 
Chapter Four was the first of the analytic chapters. In this a 
single data extract was subjected to a detailed analysis, the object 
of which was to illustrate the range of analytic considerations which 
might be brought to bear on materials of these kind, and to 
explicate some of the resources by which the speaker methodically 
assembled her utterances. This in turn provided a 'test case' for 
the application of a distinctly conversation analytic approach, and 
further generated an array of issues for subsequent investigation. 
One such theme was explored in Chapter Five. Stimulated by the 
observation that all accounts are necessarily versions of people's 
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memories of those events, we started by looking at cognitive 
psychological work on one class of memory formulations, forms of 
which appeared to be recurrent not only in reports of paranormal 
experiences, but also in accounts of other types of dramatic 
incidents. The analysis explicated some of the procedures by which 
these memories were assembled by speakers in the talk about their 
experiences, and examined some of the interactional tasks negotiated 
through the use of this class of memory formulation. 
Finally, in Chapter Six we looked at the use of active voices, or 
reported talk, as resources to enable speakers to achieve certain 
ends; for example, to point to the 'objectivity' of the phenomenon. 
Some of the organisational features of these resources were examined. 
In the rest of this chapter we will discuss four issues which have 
either informed, or emerged from, the work presented in this thesis. 
In section 2 we will discuss some consequences of the methodological 
position developed in this thesis for the sociological study of the 
paranormal. Section 3 has a discussion of the results of the 
empirical analyses. Some broader methodological issues are raised 
in section 4: for example, the suitability of micro-analytic 
techniques, developed in the study of interactions between two or 
more active parties, for the analysis of materials of a substantively 
different kind. In addition I discuss the relationship between the 
two pre-eminent approaches to the study of natually-occurring talk, 
and language use more generally. Finally, in section 5, I will trace 
some implications of a distinctly ethnomethodological interest in 
accounts of paranormal experiences for parapsychological research; 
also, I will discuss the wider issue of the relationship between 
parapsychology and sociology. 
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These themes are, inevitably, far more inter-connected than 
suggested by such a simple representation. In the following 
discussion I will outline the important points of convergence. 
2 Sociology and the paranormal 
Three major points became clear from the review of previous 
sociological work on the paranormal, or the occult. Much of this 
was informed by the assumption that belief in the existence of, or 
claimed experience of, paranormal agencies and forces are epi- 
phenomenal manifestations of underlying and determinant social or 
cultural events. Therefore, it is the sociolgist's task to 
investigate these determinant processes to provide a 'rational' 
account of what are considered to be essentially 'irrational' 
beliefs and claims. In Chapter One it was argued that such attempts 
are unsatisfactory. First, because there is evidence that shows 
paranormal phenomena are not significantly associated with those 
social aggregates which were collectively termed the 'socially 
marginal'. Second, there is a wide array of research which indicates 
that the occult is an integral feature of contemporary culture, and 
not a form of transient deviancy. 
The second important point to emerge from Chapter One was that the 
incidence of anomalous phenomena may be very high. The surveys 
reviewed by Blackmore (1982a), and Haraldsson's (1985) compilation 
of survey results from studies of Western European countries and 
North America, suggest that, as a conservative estimate, one person 
in ten believes that they have experienced some form of anomalous 
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phenomena. 
From these observations it follows that empirical interest in the 
paranormal need not be restricted by the presupposition that these 
beliefs and events are essentially irrational or peripheral to the 
cultural and societal concerns traditionally studied by sociologists. 
These events are recurrent and integral features of contemporary 
society, and, therefore, legitimate phenomena for serious 
sociological attention. 
The third important observation was that the majority of previous 
sociological studies dealt with both the experience of and belief in 
the paranormal. There have been few studies which draw a distinction 
between these two aspects for research purposes. As a consequence 
there has been little sociological interest in the experiental 
character of encounters with paranormal phenomena. 
The empirical research in this thesis took these observations as 
its point of departure. First, it dealt only with experiental 
issues: in this case, accounts of direct contact with paranormal 
phenomena. Issues concerning belief in the existence of supernatural 
forces, or participation in groups which adhere to occult 
philosophies, were ignored. Second, it developed distinctly 
ethnomethodological lines of inquiry in that people's own accounts of 
their experiences were given analytic priority. Furthermore, the 
analytic task was not to ironicise these reports by pointing to the 
supposedly 'rational' causes of claimed experiences; the objective 
was instead to investigate the linguistic practices embedded in 
people's descriptions. That is, sociological research issues were 
pursued which are agnostic about the ultimate truth or falsity of the 
events being claimed, or the beliefs espoused. 
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These analyses deal only with accounts of personal encounters; 
there is a range of alternative empirical issues generated by similar 
considerations, however, and it is useful to sketch these here. For 
example, we may take issues which have been studied before, such as 
belief in astrology. Instead of looking to find why people believe 
in the efficacy of astrological charts and predictions - and in doing 
so incorporate the assumption that, in reality, they furnish spurious 
information - we may try to find out how such pronouncements come to 
be seen as true or false by the reader or recipient. That is, how is 
it that a set of (usually) vaguely-worded phrases - unavoidably 
constructed from indexical materials - come to be interpreted as 
providing correct and useful information about personal history, 
idiosyncratic characteristics or contemporary ambitions and goals ? 
What order of sense-making procedures are being employed by people 
when they 'see' that horoscopes are 'accurate' ? 
One main conclusion from Chapter One was that knowledge about the 
paranormal is a central feature of contemporary cultural life. A 
further empirical project, then, would be to investigate the ways in 
which this knowledge permeates everyday social life: for example, a 
study of references to supernatural powers and forces which occur in 
everyday discourse. Do people invoke 'fate', 'luck', 'chance' 
'providence' (in its theological sense) in systematic ways ? Are 
they used in certain types of accounting practices, for example, to 
provide a sense of inexplicable accidents or unforseen consequences ? 
In what precise linguistic contexts do people refer to these forces ? 
What interactional goals are pursued through the use of utterances 
which refer explicitly or implicitly to supernormal agencies ? Such 
a project could develop our understanding of the cultural knowledge 
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about the paranormal, and at the same time reveal how aspects of this 
culture are actually instantiated and used in occasions of everyday 
life. 
Insofar as the paranormal can be conceived as a normal and 
recurrent feature of contemporary society, studies such as these are 
legitimate additions to the sociological investigation of 
contemporary cultural life. The previous remarks have illustrated 
the general point that there is scope for a variety of 
ethnomethodologically-informed projects. The research presented in 
this thesis takes an initial step towards a sociological approach to 
the paranormal which does not seek to explain its subject matter, 
but merely to further our understanding of it. 
3 Analytic conclusions 
Jefferson's (1984a) research on a 'normalizing' device revealed 
two issues which informed much of the analyses presented here. 
First, that speakers can design utterances to attend to the 
possibility that their reports of extraordinary (but not paranormal) 
experiences may receive an unsympathetic hearing. Second, that 
speakers orient to this possibility even when the report is made to 
people who are merely interested in the story - journalists, friends 
and so on. Thus, speakers orient to a potential skeptical response 
even when there is little likelihood of an overt challenge to the 
accuracy or reliablity of their story. Her main contribution in this 
paper, then, is to point to the culturally-based skepticism about 
claims of extraordinary events. 
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The primary analytic conclusion from the studies presented in this 
research is that, when making their accounts, speakers display their 
orientation to the inauspiciousness of claiming to have had 
paranormal experiences. In Chapter Four we observed that this was 
the case even when the speaker was a self-described medium who 
claimed that, for her, communication with the dead and other types of 
elemental spirits was a practical business and a routine, everyday 
event. 
In the empirical chapters we examined some resources and 
procedures by which the speakers were able to attend to a range of 
possible skeptical responses to their stories. For example, a 
paranormal experience can be 'explained' by arguing that the speaker 
merely misperceived a perfectly normal event. Using the resources 
identified in these analyses the speakers have, in a variety of ways, 
produced descriptions which are designed to reveal, not only the 
'out-there-ness' of the phenomenon, but also its 'facticity' as a 
recognisably non-normal occurrence. Another option open to the 
skeptic by which to undermine the veridicality and reliability of the 
speaker's claims is to imply, or make an outright claim, that the 
speaker is not 'normal': that is, they are suffering from 
hallucinations, experiencing forms of 'wish fulfilment', show 
inclinations to regard every strange event in their environment as a 
sign of paranormal phenomena, and so on. In the data we have 
explicated a number of methods through which speakers display their 
own 'normality' in the way that they reason about and behave in the 
world. 
In the extracts we have examined the speakers display their (tacit) 
awareness of the possibility that these arguments, and other related 
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explanations, can be invoked to account for the experiences they 
claim to have had. In the analysis of the fine-grained and orderly 
details of their talk we have explicated some aspects of speakers' 
specifically interactional activities, through which they produce 
their accounts to be recognisably reliable, and, moreover, 
recognisable as accounts of real - that is paranormal - experiences. 
In Chapter Four we observed that the speaker's utterances were 
designed to address local, interactional tasks. By designing her 
utterances to attend to these, however, she also was enaged in the 
business of building the phenemenon which she was reporting; for 
example, invoking certain features to accomplish tasks, fashioning 
her descriptive remarks to bring certain characteristics to the 
recipient's attention, while actively disattending to others, and so 
on. That is, the speaker was engaged in the moment-by-moment 
interactional construction of the phenemenon itself. This 
observation has some relevance for parapsychology, and these points 
are discussed in section 5. For present purposes, however we, can 
note that such an analytic interest is parallel to that of the 
'social constructivists " approach in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. For example, Collins and Pinch's (1979) research on the 
social construction of the scientific status of parapsychology; also, 
their (1982) comments on the way that the experimenters in a series 
of laboratory-based observational studies negotiated whether or not 
video-recordings revealed 'paranormal' or 'normal' events. 
The 'negotiation' of the character of paranormal phenomena has 
hitherto been studied at a broader institutional level, and has 
focused on the activities of groups of scientists. However, the 
single case analysis in Chapter Four suggests that the micro- 
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analytic, language-oriented investigation of the interactional 
construction of paranormal phenomena is a feasible and potentially 
useful project. 
I think that an important empirical contribution of this thesis is 
the analysis of the 'I was just doing X.... when Y' format. First, it 
tackles a class of memory formulations which are conversational 
instances of what are known as 'flashbulb memories'. Within 
cognitive psychology these are considered to be largely exempt from 
the distorting processes which are a normal feature of memory 
storage, retention and retrieval. However, the analysis revealed 
these formulations to be socially-organised devices through which 
speakers attend to local, interactional tasks. That is, features of 
these memories, which have hitherto been seen as evidence of the 
operation of determinant cognitive processes, were shown to be 
constructed and constructive. This analysis, then, calls into 
question the assumption that discourse is a neutral medium through 
which inner cognitive states can, on occasion, become 'visible'. By 
focusing on the organised and interactional character of naturally- 
occurring discourse we were able to delineate some of the inherently 
social and cultural practices by which flashbulb memories were 
accomplished. This approach makes connections with previous 
Wittgensteinian and ethnomethodologically-informed considerations of 
the relationship between inner cognitive states and a world of 
socially-organised practices (Coulter 1982; Ryle 1949); furthermore, 
it adds to the growing empirical investigation of this and related 
areas (Drew 1989; Edwards and Potter 1989). 
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4 Methodological considerations 
Perhaps the first issue to discuss is the effectiveness of the mode 
of analysis adopted in this research. In Chapter Three we noted that 
conversation analytic studies have hitherto been conducted almost 
entirely on materials drawn from face-to-face or telephone 
interaction. Therefore, we considered the possibility that the 
analysis of multi-unit single speaker turns may present difficulties, 
the foremost of which being the absence of a 'proof procedure' by 
which analysts can 'measure' their analytic interpretations by 
reference to those displayed by the participants themselves. After 
three analytic chapters we may re-assess these difficulties. 
I think it is useful to consider conversation analytic research in 
terms of two analytic 'emphases'. This is not to claim that there 
are discrete research objectives, or alternative ways of 'doing' CA, 
but merely to draw attention to different dimensions of the same 
analytic enterprise: explicating the structures of everyday verbal 
interaction. In the pursuit of this goal some anaylses have become 
increasingly 'technical', focusing on the apparent mechanics of talk; 
an illustration of this is Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's (1978 
{1974]) study of the organisation of turn-taking procedures. The 
materials analysed in the present research, however, are not 
'interactional' in the sense that they are the results of 
participants' co-ordinated activites; therefore, they simply do not 
offer the option of such technical analyses. In this respect, then, 
one important objective of conversation analytic research has not 
been explored in this thesis. 
The other feature of conversation analytic work, often obscured in 
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the pursuit of detailed technical features, i is the analysis of 
social action. As Schegloff puts it: 
'In spite of its name [conversation analysis] is 
concerned with the understanding of talk-in-interaction 
more generally, and with interaction per se more 
generally still. However, it takes ordinary 
conversation to be the fundamental form of talk-in- 
interaction.... and the primordial site of human 
sociality and social life. ' (Schegloff 1987b: 101) 
[original emphaisis] 
Conversation analysis examines the character of the social 
activites negotiated in, and mediated through, language use. That 
is, it attends specifically to moral and inferential business. It is 
an interest in the examination of these issues which has informed the 
analyses of the present research: the methodic procedures by which 
words are selected, and utterances composed, in order to achieve 
certain ends. In the pursuit of these goals a conversation analytic 
approach has been entirely applicable to lengthy stretches of one- 
speaker talk. For example, we have been able to look at some of the 
ways that the 'facticity' of phenomena have been created and 
sustained through descriptive practices; the methods used by speakers 
to display their orientation-at-the-time to normal assumptions and 
reasoning about their experiences, and the interactional concerns 
pursued through the way that descriptions of memories are designed in 
discursive recollections. 
In Chapter Three I compared conversation analysis with discourse 
analysis, and from this I concluded that, in terms of immediate 
1 Ido not mean that these broader goals are in any way 
overlooked: I realise that the 'mechanics' of talk are analysed 
because they are the vehicles for specifically social activities. 
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empirical interests, a conversation analytic approach was more 
appropriate. 2 However, as these two modes of analysis share a great 
deal - in terms of the common intellectual roots, and the emphasis 
upon the constructive and functional character of language use -I 
think it useful to address some remarks to the relationship between 
them. 
Some of the primary differences were outlined in Chapte Three: 
whereas CA deals only with talk-in-interaction, DA attends to a wide 
range of materials, both verbal and written. Following this, the 
analytic focus for CA is the detailed explication of occasionally 
short-lived interactional events; in DA larger segments of talk or 
texts are suitable environments in which to specify the functions for 
which language is being used. Finally, the 
. 
terminological 
vocabulary is different: we have already noted that CA attends to the 
structural or 'technical' aspects of talk, and has developed a 
suitable terminology to match this analytic enterprise; the language 
of DA is sensitive to the broader analytic goals it pursues, however, 
and is couched in terms of interpretative repetoires and linguistic 
registers. 
Within discourse analysis there have been attempts to use results 
from conversation analytic studies as research resources. For 
example, Mulkay's (1984) analysis of ceremonial discourse draws on 
2I talk in terms of 'CA and DA' only to allow me to draw out 
some concluding methodological observations. I am reluctant to refer 
to CA and DA approaches as if these are rather mechanical empirical techniques or tools which are merely t; aiting to be applied to data. I don't want to reify what are, essentially, practical analytic 
mentalities employed in the investigation of, and always answerable to, the particulars of natural actions and events. (An example of describing CA as if it is an operationalised technique, see Lee's (1987] introduction. ) 
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Pomerantz's (1978) paper on responses to compliments; also, his 
(1985: 79ff. ) analysis of scientists' letters takes as its point of 
departure findings from the study of turn-taking and conversational 
closings. So far, however, conversation analysts have not looked to 
the fruits of discourse analytic endeavours to assist their 
researches. 
I mentioned earlier the benefits which accrue to analysts who work 
on conversational materials in which the participants themselves 
provide analyses of prior turns in their subsequent talk. The 
analyses presented here indicate that the lack of such a resource is 
not an intractable problem. It is a weakness of this research, 
however, that the development of analytic themes was not assisted by 
the kind of insights afforded by the public display of participants' 
own interpretations which are generated in turn-taking procedures. 
This weakness is most notable in the business of actually doing 
analytic work: the practical activity of working through long 
stretches of transcribed talk. It is here that the absence of co- 
participants' active contributions are most keenly felt, simply 
because there is, initially at least, little by way of an analytic 
'foothold' into the explication of specific themes. In dealing with 
this practical problem, however, the concept of the linguistic 
repetoire can be an aid. 
As we have seen, in discourse analysis linguistic repetoires are 
treated as a set of resources through which members fashion the 
character of their discourse. Empirically, the features and 
functions of repetoires are usually examined over lengthy stretches 
of talk. While I have argued that such an approach provides little 
access to the methodic construction of the particulars of such 
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stretches of talk - for example, specific word selection - it does 
provide an initial analytic point of entry to the details of the 
talk. In this it provides a resource in the pursuit of distinctly 
conversation analytic goals. For example, and in retrospect, I 
think this was a (tacit) methodological procedure employed in data 
analysis in Chapter Four. Here a single extract was taken apart to 
reveal the organised procedures by which it had been initially 
assembled. A theme throughout this analysis was that the speaker was 
constructing events so as to provide the inference that she acted 
like any normal person would have done in those circumstances. That 
is, in discourse analytic terms, we investigated the linguistic 
repetoire through which this 'function' was achieved: the repetoire 
of 'normal behaviour in the face of abnormal events'. 
Had this repetoire been ascribed to this data in place of detailed 
examination of the particular interactional concerns mediated through 
these utterances, it would not have been possible to delineate the 
precise resources employed by the speaker: listing, extreme case 
formulations and the provision of inferable materials achieved 
through the speaker's (implicit) self-ascription as a member of a 
specific category. Thus, the analytic gains would have been 
delimited. A preliminary investigation of these utterances, however, 
indicated that the speaker was, in broad terms, engaged in 
normalizing work, and from this basis a more comprehensive analysis 
was conducted. An initial assessment that this was the function of 
the speaker's utterances, therefore, furnished the analytic resource 
by which the more specific features of this accomplishment could be 
explicated. That is, in the absence of the kind usually furnished by 
the activities of co-participants, the linguistic repetoire provided 
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an analytic foothold: it established an interpretative base from 
which more detailed analysis could begin. 
It may be objected that such a procedure abnegates the central 
methodological recommendation in conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodology: to approach data analysis with no a priori 
theories, assumptions and presuppositions about the character of the 
materials in the data. That is, to be 'unmotivated' about the data 
with respect to the analytic conclusions that are to be drawn from 
them. To follow such a recommendation, however, forces us into a 
paradox: if we accept the central ethnomethodological point that 
language is a reflexive medium, including the language used by the 
analyst, then the vocabulary, objectives and methods of conversation 
analysis are also constructive and reflexive. That is, this analytic 
method can not, in principle, provide a privileged point of access to 
events 'in the world' (however they may be made available for 
analytic inspection) which are independent of the language employed 
in their discovery. It is not possible for sociology to be the 
'observational science' Sacks envisaged in his early lectures (Sacks 
Lectures 1-8, Fall 1964; see also Schegloff's [19881 illuminating 
'memoir' on the early development of Sacks' thinking). 
While this may be a powerful argument in principle, it need not 
intrude in the actual business of analysis: with reference to 
discourse analysis we argued in Chapter Three that such work is a 
practical activity in the course of which the more 'paralysing' 
reflexive arguments simply may be abandoned. It does force us to 
question the idea of 'unmotivated' enquiry, however, and this in turn 
allows a degree of leverage in the use and character of the resources 
which may be brought to bear in data analysis. 
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There are two final points in connection with this. First, within 
conversation analysis there is a firm commitment to the principle of 
unmotivated inquiry; to question it, then, may be to invite analytic 
bedlam. A 'worst case scenario' would be the use of data extracts to 
support or justify 'pet' theories, thereby obscuring the fine-grained 
and orderly interactional details of those materials. However, this 
is an unwarranted anxiety: analysis is a craft skill, an important 
part of which is the development of the appropriate 'analytic 
mentality' to the treatment of data. Learning the skills of analysis 
ensures that data are not used as a 'tabula rasa' for the ascription 
of personal intellectual interests. Furthermore, the policy of 
reproducing the data from which analytic observations are drawn acts 
as a powerful public constraint on the analyst's claims. 
Second, and on a more positive note, a practical consequence of 
these arguments is that there is the possibility of producing micro- 
analytic studies which combine the attention to detail and rigour of 
conversation analytic study, but which at the same time tackle some 
of the broader sociological or social-psychological issues hitherto 
addressed through the investigation of linguistic repetoires. For 
example, Widdicombe and Wooffitt's (forthcoming) analysis of the 
conversational devices used by members of youth subcultures to 
construct their 'social identities' as punks, gothics, rockers, and 
so on. Also, Wooffitt and Widdicombe's (MS) study of specific 
linguistic resources used in a description of a violent incident to 
occasion asymmetrical interpretative accounts by which blame 
allocation and responsibility is negotiated. 
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5 Parapsychology and sociology 
After over one hundred years of thorough and sometimes painstaking 
experimental research, parapsychology cannot be considered to be a 
'proper' - that is, accepted - member of the community of academic 
subjects. Furthermore, it enjoys a limited representation in 
university psychology departments: the Chair in Parapsychology at 
Edinburgh University is the sole academic appointment in the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, there is only one research award available to 
fund post-graduate studies, 3 and there are no sources of official or 
governmental support for parapsychological research. In a very real 
sense, then, parapsychology is a 'rejected' science (Allison 1979). 
This may be regarded as a somewhat paraodxical state of affairs. 
The events parapsychologists claim to study are, potentially, of 
fundamental significance, with important implications for a wide 
variety of other disciplines. This point is accepted even by its 
critics (Alcock 1987). Furthermore, the range of experiences and 
phenomena it takes as its subject matter are, firstly, of intrinsic 
interest, and, secondly, according to the available evidence, not 
uncommon events. That is, it deals with recurrent and fascinating 
human experiences. Yet despite all this, parapsychologists are still 
having to argue for the legitimacy of their researches, and seek 
recognition from their peers for the validity of their subject. 
A recent exchange of opinions (Alcock 1987; Rao and Palmer 1987) 
carries with it a series of commentaries from a variety of 
parapsychologists, and both skeptical and sympathetic philosophers, 
social scientists and orthodox scientists. In one of these Pinch 
3 The Perrot-Warrwick Studentship, which is awarded 
approximately once every two years. 
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(1987) develops ideas derived from the sociological research into the 
relationship between parapsychology and the established sciences. In 
his commentary he suggests how parapsychology might substantiate its 
position in the wider academic community. 
Pinch does not argue that parapsychologists should increase their 
efforts to 'become' scientific by adopting the practices, methodology 
and terminolology of science. Sociological studies have shown that 
these avenues have been explored already (Collins and Pinch 1979), 
but to no significant long-standing effect (Alcock 1987; Blackmore 
1985a, 1988a, 1988b; Kurtz 1985; Mauskopf and McVaugh; McVaugh and 
Mauskopf 1976). The way forward for parapsychology, then, is not, 
for example, through an increased attention to experimental rigour, 
or replications of significant studies, but through the establishment 
of research networks and contacts with members of the orthodox 
scientific community. To illustrate: by trying to persuade 
psychologists to control for the effects of psi in their laboratory 
research, as they might control for the effects of, for example, the 
presence of the experimenter, parapsychologists can engage in a 
discourse with their colleagues which is oriented to practical 
applications. Another option is to gain the attention and interest 
of scientists by pointing to the experimental evidence on the 
relationship between psi and mechanical objects, and thereby 
indicating a range of implications for the technology of experimental 
equipment; issues which require parapsychological knowledge and 
expertise. 
Thus, Pinch argues for a pragmatic approach rather than one that 
rests on the strengths of theoretical explanantions, experimental 
results and the stringency of laboratory protocol. It is through the 
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establishment of research links like these that parapsychology may 
secure its place in the wider scientific community. 
There are two points relevant to Pinch's recommendations. First, 
his arguments are informed by an implicit acceptance of psi - not 
necessarily as a phenomenon which has been 'scientifically' proven - 
but as a primary characteristic of parapsychology. As we noted 
briefly in Chapters One and Two, the search for the elusive psi may 
have been one of the primary stumbling blocks in parapsychology's 
empirical and theoretical development, and we will explore this point 
in more detail later. Secondly, these suggestions focus only upon 
parapsychology's relationship with other 'hard' scientific 
disciplines in which knowledge is pursued primarily through 
experimental procedures. That is, his recommendations are directed 
toward furnishing parapsychology with an acceptable niche as another 
orthodox science. As such, there is no consideration given to the 
relationship between parapsychology and the social sciences. By way 
of a conclusion to this chapter, and to this thesis, I want to 
address some remarks to this issue. 
In this research I have pursued broadly ethnomethodological lines 
of inquiry, both in terms of the review of previous work in 
sociology and parapsychology, and in the empirical analyses of 
actual accounts. The core assumption of this approach is that: 
'members' accounts, of every sort, in all logical 
modes, with all their uses, and for every method for 
their assembly are constituent features of the settings 
they make observable. Members know, require, count on, 
and make use of this relexivity to produce, accomplish, 
recognise, or demonstrate rational-adequacy-for-all- 
practical-purposes of their procedures.... ' (Garfinkel 
1967: 8) [emphasis added] 
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In section 2 we saw that this position suggests a range of 
questions suitable for specifically sociological attention. However, 
throughout the present research this position has been explored 
primarily through the study of linguistic practices, and the issues 
generated as a consequence of this exploration have most immediate 
relevance to parapsychology. 
In their broadest sense, Garfinkel's insights attend to the 
relationship between language and the world, whether the world in 
question is one of social relationships, beliefs, patterns of 
normatively appropriate behaviour, attitudes, social institutions, 
social structures, and so on. What the world is - how it is 
conceived and the phenomena that populate it - are the organised 
products of members' concerted practical activities to realise that 
world and those features. This realisation occurs in and through 
discourse. What have hitherto been taken to be the proper phenomena 
for the social sciences, then, are inextricably tied to the 
reflexive and constitutive processes of language use, and the 'lay' 
procedures of practical reasoning, which, in every circumstance, 
inform that use, and are embedded in its products: 'descriptions', 
'references', 'accounts', 'judgements', 'declarations', 'claims', 
'explanations', and so forth. Any phenomenon can be investigated as 
a realised product of locally-occasioned practical activities, and 
the analyst may therefore attend to the orderly practices whereby 
that realisation is accomplished. Thus, the social scientist is 
permitted to analyse the 'molecular and sub-molecular levels of 
social structure' (Heritage 1984: 311) to explicate how the world-as- 
it-is-known comes to be known and recognised as the world. 
The reflexive features of language use, however, are not 
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'sociological issues' - that is, products of the academic discipline 
of sociology, and, thereby, limited to the researches conducted 
within this domain. While their investigation may be unique to areas 
of sociological discourse, 4 they are constituent aspects of all 
social activities: quite simply, occasions in which people employ 
natural language resources to produce descriptions. 
This has profound implications for parapsychological interest in 
people's accounts of their paranormal experiences. For example, in 
the investigation of spontanous cases, what the parapsychologist 
knows about the experience - what the actual phenomenon was, what the 
experience consisted of, and so on - can be investigated only as a 
consequence of the use of the natural language abilities available 
to the speaker. In each and every case, then, the phenomenon -a 
ghost, an apparition, a mystical encounter, a precognition, a UFO 
sighting, an out-of-body experience, a near-death experience - is 
unavoidably the product of the organised linguistic practices which 
are sedimented in its description. That is, the accounts themselves 
are constitutive of the phenomena to which they refer. 
In the empirical chapters of this thesis I have begun to explicate 
some of the procedures of practical reasoning which are embedded in 
specific features of speakers' accounts of their experiences. In 
particular, I focused on the interactional tasks mediated through the 
construction of specific referential utterances. These analyses were 
in part directed to sociological issues: the ways that speakers 
organised their accounts to provide certain sets of inferable 
} Although this may be changing. See, for example, Suchman's 
(1987) discussion of the importance of ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis in the field of human-computer interaction. 
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materials. However, they point to ways in which accounts of 
paranormal events may be investigated to address distinctly 
parapsychological issues. For example, in the analysis of the use of 
reported talk we identified procedures by which the 'objectivity' and 
'facticity' of phenomena were being constructed in the course of the 
accounts. Similarly, in the single case analysis of one short data 
extract we explicated how the trajectory of the speaker's 
description, and, therefore, the composition of the character of the 
phenomenon she was reporting, were methodically produced to attend 
to interpersonal issues, and were also constrained by normative 
prescriptions regarding descriptive practices. The ontological 
status of paranormal phenomena and the characteristics of these 
experiences are issues of central importance in parapsychology. The 
perspective on language use which informs these considerations, 
however, casts these issues in a new light, and, furthermore, renders 
them available for, and amenable to, empirical investigation. That 
is: how are the phenomena described so as to be recognisably 
'objective' ? By what methods is the 'out-there-ness' of an 
experience accomplished ? How are the dimensions of a phenomenon, 
and the speaker's experience of it, negotiated in the fine-grained 
interactional business through which the descriptions of the 
experience are mediated ?5 
It may be objected that, whereas such issues may be legitimately 
pursued as sociological projects, such an approach in parapsychology 
would amount to 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater'. That is, 
5 Although these projects are discused here in relation to 
verbal accounts, I can see no reason in principle why similar 
concerns could not inform the investigation of written reports, 
historical documents - in short, a variety of textual materials. 
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such projects would have no application to parapsychology's 
fundamental quest - the search for psi. There are two immediate 
points in response to this. First, since Rhine's initial endeavours 
the pursuit of psi has been the primary goal of parapsychology. Yet, 
despite numerous significant experimental results, the majority of 
orthodox scientists are not convinced that psi exists, and 
parapsychology is largely ostracised from the scientific community. 
That is, the search for psi has hardly precipitated the revolution in 
our understanding of human nature envisaged by the founding fathers 
of the discipline. Indeed, in the light of the lack of empirical and 
theoretical development, one can sympathise with those 
parapsychologists who call for new ideas to develop alternative 
empirical questions. Furthermore, regardless of whether psi 'exists' 
or not, one cannot help but be pessimistic about the potential of a 
discipline which, after one hundred years of research, is hidebound 
to one concept - the domain of which reduces in proportion to success 
of the orthodox sciences to provide acceptable explanations for 
events hitherto considered to be paranormal. 6 
The analysis of the constructive and functional aspects of the 
language used by people to describe their personal experiences 
provides one line of empirical research issues which could be 
legitimately assimilated to traditional parapsychological concerns. 
We have already argued that, given the contemporary understanding of 
the nature of natural language competences, the study of the patterns 
and properties of descriptive practices is a methodological 
imperative if parapsychologists are to use accounts and reports as 
6 For example, hypnotism. See also Blackmore's work on the OBE 
(1984b; 1985b), and Near-Death Experiences (1988c) 
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investigative resources. More important, however, are the positive 
benefits to be derived from the kind of research projects I envisage. 
First, there is the opportunity for a rapprochement between two 
hitherto unconnected studies: parapsychology and sociology. That is, 
the ethnomethodological analyses of language have equivalent 
implications for traditional methodologies and empirical procedures 
in each discipline. In this sense, the 'subject matter' for 
parapsychological studies of these accounts are the same reflexive 
and constitutive materials as are the subject matter for similar 
sociolgical projects. ' Blurring the boundaries of academic subjects 
can only facilitate useful interchanges, and, taking a lead from 
Pinch's (1987) recommendations, provides the opportunity for 
parapsychologists to develop practical research links with 
researchers from established disciplines. 
In Chapter One I discussed Blackmore's appeals for a 'new' 
parapsychology based on the study of experiences which occur 
spontaneously in everyday life, and noted that she explicitly 
pointed to the importance of accounts of experiences in such a 
7 Of course, I realise that the majority of parapsychologists 
would be interested primarily in what was reported, rather than how 
the report was constructed. However, it has not been my intention to 
provide a detailed critique of such an approach as these points have 
been made comprehensively elsewhere (Atkinson and Drew 1979; Gilbert 
and Mulkay 1984; Potter and Wetherell 1987). The range of criticisms 
cited in these studies, however, were referred to in the review of 
parapsychology's use of accounts of personal experiences in Chapter 
Two. 
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project. 8 While the sociological study of accounts exemplified in 
this thesis has obvious connections to the type of projects she 
envisaged, there are some important differences, and these need to 
be clarified. 
Her 'new' parapsychology involves locating the recurrent features 
of experiences and explaining these phenomenological forms by 
reference to underlying and determinant cognitive processes. (I have 
indicated previously that there may be problems involved in the 
procedure whereby consistent patterns in accounts are taken to stand 
for, and be isomorphic with, actual characteristics of the 
experience, either as it is experienced, or its 'true' causes, and 
there is no need to rehearse them here. ) tier investigations, 
therefore, are inevitably exercises in reductionism. The experience 
of (what are believed by the experients to be) paranormal phenomena 
are accounted for by the analyst in terms of rational explanatory 
frameworks. As such, it is difficult to see what is 'new' about her 
work: she is merely providing rational explanations for claimed 
anomalous experiences. It is curious, then, that the one 
parapsychologist who has so articulately championed the need for 
novel lines of inquiry fails to establish one. This is not to slight 
her work, however, but to point out that even she may be trapped by 
the 'scientistic' ethos which has pervaded parapsychology since J. B. 
Rhine established it as a laboratory-based enterprise. 
8 The project outlined here is not the only one which urges a 
greater emphasis upon accounts of spontaneous experiences. The study 
of folklore provides two notable examples: Rufford describes the 
method of his (1982) studies of the 'Old Hag' phenomenon as 
'experience-centred'; see also Bennett's (1987) study of women's 
accounts of their experience of and beliefs in the supernatural. 
Although these are very different projects to the ethnomethodological 
approach adopted here, they are to be welcomed as they demonstrate a 
serious interest in people's actual reports. 
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The project and mode of analysis for which I have argued in this 
thesis makes no claims about the 'ultimate' ontological status of the 
phenomena for which people's accounts stand as reports; nor is it an 
objective of this project to ironicise those accounts, either 
implicitly or explicitly, by attempting to discover the determinant 
'causes' of the experient's perceptions. Rather, it seeks to 
explicate the linguistic practices by which the character of those 
phenomena are produced in discourse - and produced to be recognisable 
as the phenomena they are. In this, it exposes an array of issues 
which warrant empirical investigation; it proposes the basis for a 
rapprochement between research in parapsychology and sociology, and 
it permits the development and use of-investigative techniques which 
hitherto have been employed solely to pursue analytic goals 
traditionally associated with the social sciences. Moreover, it 
seeks to establish as a legitimate subject matter for research those 
events which motivated the founding fathers of parapsychology, and 
also the research presented in this thesis - people's accounts of 
their encounters with anomalous phenomena. 
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APPENDIX: 
DATA COLLECTION AND TRANSCRIPTION 
1 Data Sources 
The data used in this thesis were collected from three sources. 
[a] An advert placed on University of York college and 
Departmental notice boards. 
The wording of the advert was as follows: 
'As part of my doctoral research, I am interested in 
paranormal or anomalous experiences, such as telepathy, 
precognition, out-of-body experiences, encounters with 
spirits or ghosts, encounters with apparitions, UFO 
sightings, etc. If you feel that you have had such an 
experience, and you wouldn't mind talking about, it 
please contact Rob Wooffitt, Department of Sociology, 
room no W. 120, internal phone no. 3062. ' 
This notice was circulated during June, July and August of 1986. 
Owing to the fact that term had ended by the time many of the adverts 
had been placed, there were only 3 initial responses. 2 of the 
people who replied were happy to be interviewed, and have the 
interview recorded. One person required a number of meetings with 
me before giving consent for a recorded interview. The interviews 
were conducted in the Sociology Department. Transcripts of parts of 
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these interviews were used to develop the 'craft skills'1 of 
conversation analysis. 
[b] Adverts placed in local daily evening newspapers in York and 
Bristol. These cities were chosen primarily because of my 
familiarity with their geography. They were further suited for two 
other reasons: they presented populations drawn from different parts 
of the country, and from very different cities: York is small 
provincial city whereas Bristol is a large and developing commercial 
and business centre. 
The adverts that appeared had the following wording: 
'I am a University researcher interested in people's 
experiences of paranormal or supernatural phenomena, 
such as: telepathy, precognition, clairvoyance, spirits 
of the dead, out-of-body experiences, apparitions, UFO 
sightings, and mystical or revelatory experiences. If 
you feel you have had an experience of this kind, and 
you would not mind talking to me about it, please 
contact me through P. O Box no. XXXXX. All replies will 
be treated in strictest confidence. ' 
This advert ran for three days in mid-January in York, and for 
three days in mid-March in Bristol. 
The York advert produced sixteen replies, the Bristol advert 
produced twenty-four. Ten of the York respondents were contacted by 
telephone and an interview was arranged. (During the initial 
telephone contact with both sets of respondents I asked permission to 
tape record the subsequent interview, and none refused. ) One of the 
replies was a 'hate-mail' letter from, presumably, a staunch 
1 Wetherell and Potter (1989: 182) use this phrase to refer to 
discourse analysis, but I think it is equally applicable to 
conversation analytic qualitative research. 
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rationalist, who berated me for being interested in such 'spurious' 
experiences. 
Of the Bristol respondents, eleven were contacted by telephone, of 
which ten were happy to be interviewed. 2 One person refused to 
allow me to record the interview when I arrived at her home, and thus 
a total of nine interviews was collected. 
Owing to teaching commitments it was not possible to try to 
collect interviews from all the respondents. There were two primary 
criteria by which I selected which of the replies were to be 
'targeted'. 
First, the availability of telephone contact was essential. I did 
not have sufficient time to write back to those people who had only 
forwarded their address, or who had no telephone. (The opportunity 
for preliminary telephone contact was especially important in 
Bristol: organising interviews by mail with people who were scattered 
over such a large area would have been far too time-consuming. ) 
Interest and involvement in the paranormal attracts some strange 
people. I was interested in meeting ordinary people who felt that 
they had experienced something extraordinary. The second criterion, 
then, was the character of the letter I received. On the basis of my 
asssessment of this I decided whether an interview would be worth 
pursuing. For example, the author of the following letter was not 
contacted for an interview. 
2 The. 12th transpired to be Christian fundamentalist who 
mistook my advert for the start of a Christian mission to 'save' 
people who had been dabbling in the occult. When I told her that I 
was simply interested in talking to people about their experiences 
she refused to have anything further to do with me on the grounds 
that my research was, in a literal sense, diabolical. 
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'Dear Sir or Madam, 
In reply to your appeal in Saturday's E. Post I may 
be able to help you, I have been clairaudient since 
1970 and am 'told' of the world, about life and my own 
future, I have never published the fact of my gift.... 
Your appeal for those experienced with the 
supernatural/paranormal made me smile, it is not the 
mystery you expect once you understand the truth, may 
I quote you one of my verses I was 'told' in the 
winter of 85-86: - 
You live in two worlds and two bodies 
The earthly ones are temporaries 
and that explanes it all 
I will end by repeating what I was 'told' about Terry 
Waite on Feb. 22nd. 87, 'they' said he was gun runner 
and was in the Bekar Valley, I am often surprised at 
what I am 'told' because 'they' seem to have a 
different outlook on life. 
Yours.... ' 
This t; pe of letter was by no means unusual. 3 Letters of the 
following kind were more likely to be targeted. 
'Dear Box No H4237 
I read with interest your 
Press. 
I have had an "experience" 
interested in hearing about. 
(Name and telephone number)' 
Advert in the Evening 
which you may be 
This rule of thumb may be formulated as follows: 'if the letter 
indicates, or hints at, some bizarre behaviour, characteristics or 
attitudes of the writer, do not target it'. This rule was adopted 
for the purely pragmatic reason of deciding which of the letters to 
3 There were about four replies from people who were willing to 
'explain' the paranormal to me. The most interesting was from one a 
man in Bristol who claimed to be a Lecturer in Subatomic Phenomena. 
He sent me photocopies of letters he had sent to various university 
professors in which he tried to explain the relationship between 
spiritualism and quantum mechanics. He also forwarded a booklet 
which, among other things, claimed that the suppression of public 
knowledge about the paranormal was a Vatican-inspired Catholic 
conspiracy. 
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follow-up, and in no way reflected any commitment to specific 
interpretations or explanations for paranormal experiences. Besides 
which, I wanted to investigate the normal communicative skills relied 
on by people when accounting for direct paranormal experiences. I 
felt that the letters provided a useful indicator of the writer's 
possession of mundane natural language abilities. The decision to 
reject 'odd' letters was thus useful insofar as it increased the 
chances that the people I eventually interviewed were culturally 
competent in this sense. Thus, ironically, the rejection of 'odd' 
people had nothing to do with my assumptions about the 'underlying' 
causes of the extraordinary experiences they claimed to have had, but 
was related more to their possession of routine natural language 
abilities. 
The York interviews were conducted either in the Sociology 
Department or in the interviewees' homes. In Bristol, all the 
interviews were conducted in the interviewees' homes. 
[c] Other Sources. 
Owing to my teaching duties I had access to a number of first- 
year sociology students. Two first-year students came forward to be 
interviewed. 
Prior to beginning this research I had been involved with local and 
national UFO research groups. Through my contact with the 
administrator for the British UFO Research Association (Jenny 
Randles), and with the help of one of my supervisors at the time 
(Shirley McIver), I was given the name of one of the leading amateur 
UFO investigators, who kindly sent me copies of taped interviews with 
witnesses to three UFO cases he was currently investigating. 
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During the period of data collection I developed the habit of 
carrying a small pocket-sized tape recorder and several blank tapes. 
By virtue of these accessories I was able to obtain three 
'spontaneous' interviews with friends and chance meetings. 
In total I conducted twenty-seven recorded interviews, and was sent 
three more, thus making a total of thirty separate interviews. 
The interviews were informal, and I had no set questions or 
routines. My objective was to make the interview as 'conversational' 
as possible. Therefore, once the tape recorder was running my opening 
remark would merely provide the speaker with the floor to say 
whatever he or she wanted about their experience. For example, the 
following remarks are indicative of the kind of 'first' words on the 
%. ape (these are not transcribed according to conversation analytic 
conventions): 
LE: 'Okay if you'd just like to tell me about the 
experiences you've had' 
VA 1: 'Well could you tell me about some of the 
experiences that you've had' 
PE: 'Well then if you'd care to tell me about the 
experience you mentioned in the letter' 
BT: I 'you mentioned in your letter that you had 
experiences as a child 
S yeah 
I what sort of experiences were they' 
During the interviews I did not make any remarks until the speaker 
had clearly finished talking about the experience, or had stated that 
they had finished. This was in order to allow the speaker to tell 
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the story spontaneously without interruptions. Upon subsequent 
inspection of the tapes it transpired that I had been making 'minimal 
continuers' - 'mm hm', 'uh huh', 'yeah' - during the interviews, and 
these were transcribed. 
Some of the interviewees produced a large number of personal 
experiences, and these interviews regularly extended over two sides 
of a C. 90 tapes. The majority of interviewees, however, had only 
one account, or a small number of direct experiences. 
The transcription procedures were borrowed from conversation 
analysis. 4 I decided that it would take too long to transcribe all 
the accounts produced from the interviews. Therefore I transcribed a 
sufficient amount to begin analysis. When certain themes started to 
emerge, I re-examined the tapes to locate further examples of the 
phenomenon, and then transcribed these episodes. Forty-six separate 
accounts were initially transcribed (approximately 1/10 of the 
combined duration of the interviews). 
Certain transcription symbols, more useful in the close inspection 
of conversational materials, were not used in these transcriptions. 
As I was interested in broader features of the talk, I felt that 
attention to such detail was unnecessary. Subsequently, I have used 
a limited number of the available transcription symbols. 5 
4 As these conventions have been described extensively in 
other works in the relevant literature (for example, Atkinson and 
Heritage 1984; Button and Lee 1987) I will not rehearse them again 
here. 
5 Hopper has made the point that no transcript can ever 
completely exhaust the details of the talk. That is, they are not so 
much 'finished' as 'abandoned' (Hopper 1989: 55). In this respect, 
then, my transcripts were abandoned comparatively early. 
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